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Chapter 1
Introduction
How firms raise enough capital to sustain profitable production is a central question in
corporate finance. Broadly speaking, equity and debt are the most common sources for
companies’ external finance. Firms’ interaction with capital markets should be viewed
as a repeated process rather than a one-shot game. In my dissertation, I explicitly take
such a dynamic feature into consideration and investigate the firms’ behaviors in the
equity and debt markets separately.
In the first essay “Buying high and selling low: Stock repurchases and persistent
asymmetric information”, coauthored with my adviser Philip Bond, we study the con-
sequences of allowing for repeated equity market transactions in a model with asymmet-
ric information between firms and investors. All firms in the model possess a profitable
project that they need to raise cash to undertake. However, equilibria exist in which
firms return cash to investors via share repurchases. Consistent with managerial ac-
counts, some repurchasing firms profit from repurchasing their stock. The ultimate
source of these profits is that other firms buy high in order to improve the terms of their
subsequent stock issues. Only equilibria with repurchases satisfy a relatively mild re-
finement. Repurchases lower social welfare by reducing the fraction of firms that invest,
even though repurchasing itself is a costless signal. Our model generates a number of
empirically consistent predictions.
In the second essay “A dynamic model of optimal creditor dispersion”, I build a
dynamic rollover model to analyze how firms choose the number of creditors and how
this decision changes over time. Raising debt from more creditors may lead to inefficient
1
2liquidation caused by coordination failure. Potential coordination failure can, however,
improve a firm’s incentive to repay its debt, thus increasing its debt capacity. Given
this trade-off between higher liquidation risk and enhanced pledgeability, I show that
firms optimally increase the number of creditors when they perform badly. Even though
having more creditors increases the liquidation probability, allowing for potential coor-
dination failure from multiple creditors is valuable. Policies that commit the creditors
to ex post efficient coordination exacerbate rollover difficulty and the reduction in firm
value ex ante. Finally, if the firm can renegotiate its debt very frequently, the extra
pledgeability from multiple creditors diminishes. The model also generates empirical
implications for the firm value, the interest rates, and the probabilities of liquidation,
renegotiation, and default.
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 contains the
first essay “Buying high and selling low: Stock repurchases and persistent asymmet-
ric information”. Chapter 3 contains the second essay “A dynamic model of optimal
creditor dispersion”. Proofs of the results can be found in the appendix.
Chapter 2
Buying high and selling low:
Stock repurchases and persistent
asymmetric information
2.1 Introduction
An important idea in corporate finance is that firms have more information about their
future cash flows than investors. A large body of research has studied the consequences
of this asymmetric information for a firm’s capital market transactions. However, the
vast majority of such papers have restricted firms to a single round of capital market
transactions.1 In this paper, we study the implications of relaxing this assumption
for what is arguably the best-known corporate finance model based on asymmetric
information, namely Myers and Majluf (1984) model of equity financing to fund an
investment.2
Our main finding is that allowing for multiple capital market transactions in Myers
and Majluf generates the following equilibrium dynamics. Some firms repurchase their
1 In exceptions such as Lucas and McDonald (1990, 1998), Chowdhry and Nanda (1994), and
Hennessy et al. (2010), a firm’s informational advantage only lasts one period. In contrast, in our paper
the information asymmetry is persistent. In Constantinides and Grundy (1989), which we discuss in
detail below, firms engage in two rounds of transactions, but the second transaction is a deterministic
function of the first.
2 As we detail below, we focus on the version of this model where firms know more about the value
of their existing assets, but have no informational advantage with respect to growth options.
3
4stock for strictly less than its fair value, consistent with managerial claims that repur-
chases are driven by undervaluation.3 Other firms repurchase stock in order to lower
the cost of subsequent equity issuance, consistent with empirical evidence (see Billett
and Xue, 2007).4
Moreover, these dynamics are present in all equilibria satisfying a standard and
arguably mild refinement: specifically “Never Dissuaded Once Convinced,” Osborne
and Rubinstein (1990), and discussed in detail below.
At first sight, the ability of firms to strictly profit from trading on their superior in-
formation would appear to violate the no-trade theorem (see, e.g., Milgrom and Stokey,
1982). Many existing models of share repurchases avoid this problem by introducing
an assumption that firms (exogenously) care directly about an interim share price.5
Our model avoids this assumption. Instead, in our model some firms strictly profit from
repurchases because other inferior firms also repurchase, and make losses. This second
group of firms “buy high” when they repurchase, i.e., buy their stock for more than it
is worth.
Why does this second group of inferior firms repurchase at a loss? They do so
in order to improve the terms at which they can subsequently issue stock to finance
a profitable investment. This is consistent with the empirical findings of Billett and
Xue (2007). Nonetheless, and as is standard in models of this type, even the improved
issuance terms are still associated with a negative price response at issue (this is the
“selling low” of the title). These firms can be viewed as “manipulating” their stock price:
after they repurchase, their stock price increases, and although the price then declines
with the issue announcement, the issue price is still higher than it would otherwise be.
Repurchases do not carry any deadweight loss in our model; in this, our model is
very different from much of the prior literature, which assumes that payouts generate
a deadweight loss either via increased taxes or via an increased need for (exogenously)
costly external financing.6 Nonetheless, the repurchases strictly lower social welfare
3 Brav et al. (2005) survey managers. A very large fraction of managers agree (Table 6) that the
“Market price of our stock (if our stock is a good investment, relative to its true value)” is an important
factor.
4 Related, in Brav et al. (2005), a very large fraction of managers agree (Table 3) that “Repurchase
decisions convey information about our company to investors.”
5 See discussion of related literature below.
6 See discussion of related literature below. Note that Brav et al. (2005) survey of managers finds
5(meaning the total amount of profitable investment), in the sense that social welfare
is lower in an equilibrium with repurchases than in an equilibrium of a benchmark
one-period model without repurchases. The reason is that firms that issue to finance
the profitable investment are forced to first repurchase to signal their quality, and this
repurchase generates a loss (which, as discussed above, makes it possible for other firms
to strictly profit from repurchases). Consequently, equilibrium repurchases raise the net
cost of financing for firms that eventually invest; this in turn reduces the amount of
equilibrium investment. Note that because repurchases have no deadweight loss, this
welfare result is fundamentally different from the commonly-made observation (see, e.g.,
Arrow, 1973) that social welfare would be higher if a costly signal were prohibited.
Related literature:
Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) offer a good survey of the literature on repurchasing.
The idea that firms repurchase their stock to signal they are good is related to the
old idea that retaining equity is a useful signal (Leland and Pyle, 1977). Also related,
Example 1 of Brennan and Kraus (1987) has a good firm simultaneously repurchasing
debt and issuing equity. The debt repurchase allows the firm to signal that it is good.
Our paper is related to the literature on signaling in static payout models. In one
branch of this literature (e.g., Bhattacharya, 1980; Vermaelen, 1984; Miller and Rock,
1985), good firms repurchase to show that they have (or expect to have) high cash
flow. Bad firms do not mimic because they have low cash flow, and so paying out
cash necessitates either costly external financing or distorts investment. An important
assumption in this branch of the literature is that a firm’s objective (exogenously)
includes the interim share price. Regarding this assumption, Allen and Michaely (2003)
write “why would a management care so much about the stock price next period? Why
is its horizon so short that it is willing to ‘burn money’ (in the form of a payout) just
to increase the value of the firm now, especially when the true value will be revealed
next period?” In contrast to this literature, we do not exogenously assume that the
firm cares about the interim share price.
In a second branch of the literature (e.g., John and Williams, 1985; Ambarish et al.,
little support for the idea that repurchases are made to signal that a firm can bear such costs. For
example, only a small fraction of managers (Table 3) say that “We use repurchases to show we can bear
costs such as borrowing costly external funds or passing up investment...”
61987; Williams, 1988), firms pay out cash in a costly way, typically by issuing dividends,
which are tax-inefficient. Firms then issue equity to finance an investment. Good firms
pay out, while bad firms do not. Because of this separation, good firms are able raise the
funds they need for investment in a less dilutive way. Bad firms do not mimic good firms
because they would pay the same cost (inefficient cash pay outs), but benefit less because
dilution is less costly to them then it is to good firms. The economic function of pay outs
in these models is that they destroy value. This raises the question of whether other
value-destroying actions would make better signals, and led the literature to consider
multi-dimensional signaling models (see, e.g., Ofer and Thakor (1987), Viswanathan
(1995); we briefly consider the robustness of our analysis to multi-dimensional signaling
in Section 2.9). Because repurchases are generally regarded as a tax efficient way of
making pay outs, and hence do not destroy value, the main focus of this branch of the
literature is on dividends rather than repurchases.
Constantinides and Grundy (1989) study a model in which firms issue securities
to fund an investment, and can commit to return any excess cash in the form of a
repurchase. They give conditions under which full separation of firms is possible, and
show that the commitment to repurchase plays an important role in supporting this
separating equilibrium. Because the equilibria they study are fully separating, no firm
profits from the repurchase transaction. Moreover, it is important that the original
security issued differs from equity. In contrast, we study a case in which firms cannot
commit to future transactions, and transact in the same security (equity) at all dates.
We show that all equilibria entail some firms making strictly positive profits from stock
repurchases.
An important assumption in any model of repurchasing based on signaling, including
ours, is that a firm’s repurchase decision is actually observable. Although regulatory
mandates force this to be true in many markets, there has been some debate in the
literature about the observability of repurchases in the United States. For example,
in an early study of repurchases, Barclay and Smith (1988) find evidence that the
announcement of a repurchase program is followed by an increased bid-ask spread,
which they interpret as an increase in adverse selection, which they in turn interpret as
investors being unsure about whether or not they are trading against the firm. However,
in general subsequent research has not supported this original finding (see the discussion
7in Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000).
A relatively small literature studies dynamic models of trade under asymmetric in-
formation. Noldeke and Van Damme (1990) and Swinkels (1999) study a labor market
model where education acts as a signal. Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2013) study trade of a
single indivisible asset that is more highly valued by buyers than the seller. They focus
on whether more trading opportunities increase or reduce welfare. Kremer and Skrzy-
pacz (2007) and Daley and Green (2012) study a similar model in which information
arrives over time. In contrast to these papers, in our model both sales and repurchases
are possible; trade is in divisible shares; and the gains from trade arise from the pos-
sibility of financing a profitable investment. Perhaps closest to the current paper are
Morellec and Schu¨rhoff (2011) and Strebulaev et al. (2014). Both papers study dynamic
models in which a firm with long-lived private information chooses a date to raise out-
side financing and invest. In both papers, issue and investment are tied together (by
assumption), and the combination of repurchases with subsequent equity issue—which
is our main focus—is not examined. Instead, the main results of both papers concern
the timing of investment. Finally, a contemporaneous paper by Ordon˜ez et al. (2013)
studies a dynamic model of debt issuance.
In a model with moral hazard in place of adverse selection, DeMarzo and Urosˇevic´
(2006) study the dynamics of a large shareholder selling off his stake in a firm.
Bond and Eraslan (2010) study trade between differentially-informed parties in
common-values setting. The no-trade theorem does not apply because the eventual
owner of the asset takes a decision that affects the asset’s final cash flow. Trade affects
the information available to the party making the decision. In the current paper, trade
of the asset (i.e., shares) at date 1 instead affects a firm’s ability to raise finance at date
2. Related, Huang and Thakor (2013) give a model in which the gains from repurchase
stem from reducing disagreement among a firm’s shareholders.
2.2 Example
Firms have cash 1, and the opportunity to invest 9 at date 2 in a project that subse-
quently yields 11. Hence firms need to raise additional funds of 8 in order to invest.
Firms can either repurchase (buy) or issue (sell) shares at each if dates 1 and 2. All
8uncertainty is resolved at date 3, and firms act to maximize their date 3 share price.
The initial number of shares is normalized to 1.
Firm assets-in-place a are distributed over [0, 40], with a density that satisfies the
following properties. First, there is a probability 14 that the assets-in-place lie in each
of the intervals [0, 2], [2, 4],[4, 21], and [21, 40]. Second, the conditional expectation of a
satisfies E [a| ∈ [0, 2]] = 1, E [a| ∈ [2, 4]] = 2.2, E [a| ∈ [21, 40]] = 37.8.7
The following is a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE):
• At date 1, firms with assets-in-place either in [2, 4] or [21, 40] spend all their cash
1 to repurchase 122 shares for a price P1 = 22. The remaining firms do nothing.
• At date 2, firms with assets-in-place below 2 raise funds 8 by issuing 2 shares at
a price PD2 = 4. Firms with assets-in place in [2, 4] raise funds 9 by issuing
9
4.4
shares at a price PRI2 = 4.4. The remaining firms do nothing.
We verify this is an equilibrium. First, conditional on firms behaving this way, the
repurchase and issues prices are fair, as follows. The date 2 issue-after-repurchase price
is fair, since it solves
PRI2 =
E [a|a ∈ [2, 4]] + 11
1− 122 + 9PRI2
,
i.e.,
PRI2 =
2.2 + 11− 9
1− 122
= 4.4.
The date 2 direct issue price is fair, since it solves
PD2 =
E [a|a ∈ [0, 2]] + 11
1 + 8
PD2
,
i.e.,
PRI2 = 1 + 11− 8 = 4.
The date 1 repurchase price is fair, since with probability 1/2 the date 2 price will be
PRI2 = 4.4 and with probability 1/2 it will be
E[a|a∈[21,40]]
1− 1
22
= 39.6, and so, conditional
on date 1 repurchase, the expected date 2 price is 22.
7 Note that there are an infinite number of distributions satisfying these properties. We stress that
these properties are chosen only to produce a reasonably simple numerical example.
9Second, firms respond optimally to the stated repurchase and issue prices. The date
3 share price of a firm with assets-in-place a from repurchasing then issuing is
11 + a
1− 122 + 94.4
=
11 + a
3
,
the date 3 share price issuing directly at date 2 is
11 + a
1 + 2
=
11 + a
3
,
the date 3 share price from repurchasing at date 1 and then doing nothing is
a
1− 122
=
22
21
a
and the date 3 share price from doing nothing at both dates is simply
1 + a.
Out of these three alternatives, firm with assets-place below 4 obtain the highest payoff
from either repurchasing and then investing, or directly issuing and investing; they
are between the two options. Firms with assets-in-place between 4 and 21 obtain the
highest payoff from doing nothing. Finally, firms with assets-in-place above 21 obtain
the highest payoff from repurchasing at date 1 and then doing nothing.8
Discussion:
Firms with assets-in-place a > 21 repurchase shares for strictly less than their true
value, a+ 1, and so make strictly positive profits. The reason investors accept the lower
price is that these firms pool with worse firms (namely, firms with a between 2 and 4).
But this raises the question of why these worse firms are prepared to repurchase. They
do so in order to improve the terms at which they can subsequently issue: if instead
they attempt to issue equity directly, they obtain a worse price. Specifically, they issue
shares at a price 4 rather than 4.4.
The intermediate interval of firms with between 4 and 21 find issue too dilutive, as
in Myers and Majluf, and also find repurchase too expensive.
8 We have established that firms act optimally when their choice set is limited to the four equilibrium
strategies. This still leaves open the possibility that a firm could profitably deviate to some strategy
other than these four strategies. However, there exist off-equilibrium beliefs such that all other strategies
leave firms worse off. The proof of Proposition 3 below includes the description of one such set of off-
equilibrium beliefs.
10
Firms with a > 21 strictly profit from their repurchase transactions, even though
these transactions fail to create any value. The ultimate source of these profits is that
the investing firms with a ≤ 4 end up paying a premium to raise capital. By this, we
mean that if firms a ≤ 4 could all credibly pool and issue directly, the issue price P
would satisfy P =
11+ 1
2
(1+2.2)
1+ 8
P
, i.e., P = 3 + 1.6 = 4.6, and so the payoff of each firm
a < 4 would be 11+a
1+ 9
4.6
, which is higher than they get in the above equilibrium.
A related observation is that the equilibrium of the Myers and Majluf setting, where
repurchase is impossible, entails investment by firms with assets-in-place between 0 and
a cutoff level strictly in excess of 4. In other words, repurchases lower total surplus in
the economy (see Section 2.7). Nonetheless, and as we show below, when repurchase is
possible, any equilibrium that satisfies NDOC features some repurchase.
2.3 Model and preliminary results
Our model is essentially the same as Myers and Majluf (1984). The only substantive
difference is that whereas Myers and Majluf consider a firm’s interactions with the
equity market at just one date, we consider two possible dates. As we will show, this
additional feature generates equilibrium share repurchases.
There are four dates, t = 0, 1, 2, 3; an all-equity firm, overseen by a manager; and
at each of dates 1 and 2, a large number of risk-neutral investors who trade the firm’s
stock. We normalize the date-0 number of shares to 1.
At date 0, the manager of the firm privately learns the value of the firm’s existing
assets (“assets-in-place”). Write a for the expected value of these existing assets, where
a ∈ [a, a]. Let µ be a measure on [a, a], which determines the distribution of assets-
in-place a. We assume a has full support on [a, a], and has no atoms. In addition to
assets a, the firm has cash (or other marketable securities) with a value S.
At the end of date 2, the firm has an opportunity to undertake a new project. (In
Section 2.8, we extend the model to allow for a choice of investment timing, with the
firm able to invest at either date 1 or date 2.) The project requires an initial investment
I and generates an expected cash flow I+b. For simplicity, we assume that b is common
knowledge; in other words, we focus on a version of the Myers and Majluf environment in
which asymmetric information is about assets-in-place, not investment opportunities.
11
Throughout, we assume I > S, so that the firm needs to raise external financing to
finance the investment I.
At each of dates t = 1, 2, the firm can issue new equity and/or repurchase existing
equity. Equity issues and repurchases take place as follows. The manager makes a
public offer to buy or sell a fixed dollar amount st of shares, where st > 0 corresponds
to share repurchases and st < 0 corresponds to share issues. Investors respond by
offering a quantity of shares in exchange. In other words, if st > 0 each investor offers
a number of shares he will surrender in exchange for st; and if st < 0, each investor
offers a number of shares he will accept in return for paying the firm −st.
(Note that both a and I+b are expected values, so our model allows for very volatile
cash flows. In particular, we assume that there is enough cash flow volatility that it is
impossible for firms to issue risk free debt. In general, the choice between risky debt
and equity under asymmetric information is non-obvious; see Fulghieri et al. (2012) for
a recent characterization. In Section 2.9 we discuss the robustness of our analysis to
allowing for other securities.)
At date 3, the true value of the firm is realized, including the investment return,
and the firm is liquidated.
Write P3 for the date-3 liquidation share price, and write P1 and P2 for the trans-
action price of the shares at dates t = 1, 2. Because the number of investors trading
at each of dates 1 and 2 is large, competition among investors implies that the date t
share price is
Pt = E [P3|date t information, including firm offer st] . (2.1)
The manager’s objective is to maximize the date 3 share price, namely
P3 =
S − s1 − s2 + a+ b1investment
1− s1P1 − s2P2
, (2.2)
where 1investment is the indicator function associated with whether the firm undertakes
the new project, and the denominator reflects the number of shares outstanding at date
3. Note that in the case that only share issues are possible, the manager’s objective
function coincides with the one specified in Myers and Majluf (1984), which is to maxi-
mize the utility of existing (“passive”) shareholders. In our setting, where repurchases
are possible, the manager’s objective function can be interpreted as maximizing the
12
value of passive shareholders, who neither sell nor purchase the firm’s stock at dates
1 and 2. Alternatively, the manager’s objective can be motivated by assuming that
the manager himself has an equity stake in the firm, and is restricted from trading the
firm’s shares on his own account.9
For use throughout, observe that (2.1) and (2.2), together with the fact that the firm
invests whenever it has sufficient funds, imply that the date 2 share price conditional
on s1 and s2 is
P2 (s1, s2) =
S − s1 + E [a|s1, s2] + b1S−s1−s2≥I
1− s1P1
. (2.3)
Iterating, (2.1) and (2.3), together with the law of iterated expectations, imply that the
date 1 share price conditional on s1 is
P1 (s1) = S + E [a+ b1S−s1−s2≥I |s1] . (2.4)
From (2.3) and (2.4), the payoff of firm a from (s1, s2) is
S−s1−s2+a+b1S−s1−s2≥I(
1− s1P1
)(
1− s2S−s1+E[a|s1,s2]+b1S−s1−s2≥I
)
=
S−s1−s2+a+b1S−s1−s2≥I(
1− s1
S+E[a+b1S−s1−s2≥I |s1]
)(
1− s2S−s1+E[a|s1,s2]+b1S−s1−s2≥I
) . (2.5)
We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) of this game. We restrict at-
tention to pure strategy equilibria in which all investors hold the same beliefs off-
equilibrium. We focus on equilibria in which all firms play a best response (as opposed
to equilibria in which almost all firms play a best response).10
Finally, we state here a simple result that we use repeatedly:
9 Note that if the manager also put weight on a high date 1 share price this would further increase
the manager’s incentives to repurchase equity. On the other hand, it is important for our analysis that
the manager does not fully internalize the welfare of date 0 shareholders who sell at date 1: in particular,
our analysis requires that if a manager is able to repurchase shares at less than their true value, then he
does so. As discussed in the text, one justification is that the manager seeks to maximize the value of
his own equity stake. A second justification is that when a firm repurchases its own stock, it may not
be its existing shareholders who sell shares to the firm; instead, the firm’s repurchase offer may be filled
by short-sellers of the firm’s stock. Attaching zero welfare weight to short-sellers is analogous to the
Myers and Majluf assumption of attaching zero welfare weight to new purchasers of the firm’s shares.
10 Given a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which almost all firms play a best response, one can easily
construct an equilibrium in which all firms play a best response by switching the actions of the measure
zero set of firms who originally did not play a best response. Because only a measure zero set of firms
are switched, the original set of beliefs remain valid.
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Lemma 1 If in equilibrium firms a′ and a′′ conduct capital transactions (s′1, s′2) and
(s′′1, s′′2), with S − s′1 − s′2 > S − s′′1 − s′′2, then a′ < a′′.
An immediate corollary of Lemma 1 is:
Corollary 1 In any equilibrium, there exists a∗ ∈ [a, a] such that all firms a < a∗ invest
and all firms a > a∗ do not invest.
2.4 One-period benchmark
Before proceeding to our main analysis, we characterize the equilibrium of the bench-
mark model in which firms can only issue or repurchase shares at date 1, with the date 2
issue/repurchase decision s2 exogenously set to 0. The main conclusion of this section
is that the the Myers and Majluf conclusion holds: only the lowest asset firms issue
and invest, and repurchases play no meaningful role. In other words, the addition of
the possibility of repurchases to the Myers and Majluf environment is, by itself, incon-
sequential. Instead, our results further below are driven by the possibility of firms
engaging in capital transactions at multiple dates.
The key reason that the firms do not take advantage of repurchases in a one-period
model is the no-trade theorem (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982). Even though firms enjoy
an informational advantage relative to investors, they are unable to profit from this
advantage.
Proposition 1 In the single stage benchmark game, the set of firms who repurchase
and strictly profit relative to doing nothing is of measure 0.
Proposition 1 establishes that, in the one-period benchmark, a firm’s ability to
repurchase its own stock plays no meaningful role. Accordingly, the equilibria of the
one-period benchmark coincide with those of the standard Myers and Majluf (1984)
setting, as formally established by the next result:
Proposition 2 In any equilibrium, there exists a∗ ∈ (a, a¯] such that almost all firms
below a∗ issue the same amount s∗ and invest, while almost all firms above a∗ receive
the same payoff as doing nothing (i.e., P3 = a+ S).
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Proposition 2 characterizes properties an equilibrium must possess. However, it
does not actually establish the existence of an equilibrium. However, this is easily
done. In particular, fix any s∗ such that S − s∗ ≥ I, and define a∗ by
a∗ = max
{
a ∈ [a, a¯] : S − s
∗ + a∗ + b
1− s∗S+E[a|a∈[a,a∗]+b]
≥ S + a∗
}
.
Then there is an equilibrium in which all firms with assets below a∗ issue and raise an
amount −s∗, while firms with assets above a∗ do nothing. Off-equilibrium-path beliefs
are such that any offer to issue (i.e., s < 0 and s 6= s∗) is interpreted as coming from
the worst type a, and any offer to repurchase (i.e., s > 0) is interpreted as coming from
the best type a¯.
Observe that if I+a+b
1+ I−S
S+E[a]+b
≥ S + a, this benchmark model has an equilibrium in
which the socially efficient outcome of all firms investing is obtained. In order to focus
attention on the case in which asymmetric information causes a social loss, for the
remainder of the paper we assume instead that
I + a+ b
1 + I−SS+E[a]+b
< S + a, (2.6)
so that there is no equilibrium of the benchmark model in which all firms invest. For
use below, note that (2.6) implies
a¯ > E [a] + b > a+ b. (2.7)
2.5 Analysis of the dynamic model
We now turn to the analysis of the full model, in which the firm is able to engage in
capital transactions at multiple dates.
2.5.1 Existence of a repurchase equilibrium
We first show that there is nothing “special” about the example we presented above.
For all parameter values satisfying (2.6), there exists an equilibrium in which the best
firms strictly profit from repurchasing, while worse firms repurchase their stock for more
than it is worth—i.e., “buy high”—in order to improve the terms at which they can
subsequently issue stock to finance the investment.
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Proposition 3 An equilibrium exists in which a strictly positive mass of firms pool
and repurchase at date 1. A strict subset of these these firms make strictly positive
profits from the repurchase, and do nothing at date 2. The remaining repurchasing
firms repurchase their stock for more than it is worth, and then issue enough shares to
finance investment at date 2.
The proof of Proposition 3 is constructive. The equilibrium constructed is either
similar to the above example; or else features all firms repurchasing at date 1, with a
strict subset then issuing equity to fund investment at date 2.
2.5.2 Necessity of repurchases
As is common with games of asymmetric information, our model has multiple equilibria.
However, we next show that the properties stated in Proposition 3 are possessed by
any equilibrium satisfying a refinement known as “Never Dissuaded Once Convinced”
(NDOC) (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990). Hence the NDOC refinement selects precisely
the set of equilibria that feature repurchases.
In our context, NDOC states that date 2 investor beliefs after observing firm actions
(s1, s2) must satisfy the following: (I) if s1 is an equilibrium action, then date 2 beliefs
assign probability 1 to the firm’s type lying in the set of firms who play s1 in equilibrium,
and (II) if s1 is not an equilibrium action, and date 1 beliefs assign probability 1 to
some subset A of firm types, date 2 beliefs likewise assign probability 1 to the same
subset A. This restriction is highly intuitive and is typically regarded as mild; see,
for example, Rubinstein (1985) and Grossman and Perry (1986), or more recently, its
use as Assumption 1 in Ely and Va¨lima¨ki (2003) and as Condition R in Feinberg and
Skrzypacz (2005).
Proposition 4 Any equilibrium satisfying NDOC has the properties stated in Proposi-
tion 3.
The economics behind Proposition 4 is as follows. Under assumption (2.6), the best
firms do not invest in equilibrium.11 Consequently, if they do not repurchase, these
firms do not make any profits, and the final payoff of a high-value firm a is simply
11 Formally, this is established in Corollary A-2 in the appendix.
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S + a. Consequently, for repurchases to be unattractive in equilibrium for the top firm
a¯, investors must charge at least S + a¯ to surrender their shares; in turn, this requires
investors to believe that (off-equilibrium) repurchase offers come from very good firms.
But given these beliefs, a low-value firm could profitably deviate from its equilibrium
strategy by repurchasing at date 1, thereby triggering beliefs that it is very good, and
then (by NDOC) issue at a high price at date 2.
A second important implication of Proposition 4 is that the equilibrium outcome
of the one-period benchmark economy is not an equilibrium outcome of the full model
under NDOC. At first sight, this might seem surprising: one might imagine that one
could take the equilibrium of the one-period economy and then assign off-equilibrium
beliefs to make other actions, and in particular repurchases, unattractive. However,
the dynamic nature of the model makes this impossible. The reason is that, as just
illustrated, to deter repurchases, off-equilibrium beliefs must assign a large weight to
a repurchasing-firm being a high type; but given these beliefs, a deviating firm can
issue at attractive terms at date 2. In brief, under NDOC it is impossible to assign
off-equilibrium beliefs that deter both date 1 repurchase and date 2 issue.
2.5.3 Existence of a repurchase equilibrium satisfying NDOC
A significant drawback of the NDOC restriction is that in some cases it eliminates all
equilibria: see Madrigal et al. (1987). To see the issue, consider again the example of
Section 2.2. In the equilibrium described, if a firm does nothing at date 1, the NDOC
restriction implies that investors must believe the firm has a type a ≤ 21, regardless of
the firm’s action at date 2. This in turn means that any firm that does nothing at date
1 is able to repurchase shares for a price of 1 + 21 = 22, or less. In particular, firms
with a > 21 would make strictly positive profits from the strategy of doing nothing at
date 1, and then repurchasing at date 2.
It is important to note that—despite this concern—the actions described in the
example of Section 2.2 are consistent with an equilibrium satisfying NDOC. The reason
is that the deviation just discussed—namely doing nothing and then repurchasing—gives
a firm a payoff of a
1− 1
22
if investors associate the strategy of do-nothing-then-repurchase
with the belief that a firm is type a = 21. (Note that this belief satisfies NDOC.) But
this payoff is no better than the equilibrium payoff of firms a > 21, and hence is not a
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profitable deviation.
Nonetheless, we are unable to establish the general existence of an equilibrium satis-
fying NDOC. However, there are two straightforward perturbations of our model under
which we are able to obtain such a result:
Proposition 5 There exists an equilibrium satisfying NDOC if either:
(I) There is a probability α > 0 that a firm is exogenously unable to conduct any
capital market transaction at date 1. In addition, suppose the density function f for
firm’s asset in place takes the value 1b at most countably many times.
(II) The maximum repurchase size is S¯, and S¯ is sufficiently small.
Moreover, under each of these model perturbations, Proposition 4 continues to hold,
i.e., any equilibrium satisfying NDOC has the properties stated in Proposition 3.
Perturbation (I) of Proposition 5 is motivated by the observation that the act of
doing nothing at date 1 has too much signaling power in the above example. After all,
it is easy to imagine that a firm does nothing at date 1 for some exogenous reason; for
example, perhaps its manager failed to get approval for either an issue or repurchase. In
this case, NDOC does not impose any restriction on investor beliefs about firms that do
nothing at date 1, and the equilibrium constructed in Proposition 3 is an equilibrium of
this perturbed game. In contrast, NDOC continues to have bite for firms that repurchase
at date 1 and then issue at date 2: this is why Proposition 4 continues to hold. Finally,
note that the the exogenous probability α can be made arbitrarily small.
Perturbation (II) is motivated by the fact that there may exist limits on how much
a firm can repurchase. For example, not all of the firm’s “cash” S may be immedi-
ately available for repurchase transactions. Instead, only an amount S¯ may be truly
liquid, while the remaining portion S − S¯ can be liquidated before the investment I
must be made.12 Existence is guaranteed in this case for the same reason that
the example satisfies NDOC: when the maximal repurchase size is small, the deviation
of doing-nothing at date 1 and then repurchasing at date 2 does not generate strictly
higher profits than the strategy of the equilibrium established in Proposition 3, namely
repurchasing immediately at date 1.
12 See Duchin et al. (2014) for a detailed empirical analysis of the nature of firms’ cash holdings.
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2.6 Stock price reactions
A large empirical literature has examined stock price reactions to repurchase and is-
suance announcements; see, e.g., Allen and Michaely (2003) for a survey. As documented
by this literature, repurchase announcements are associated with price increases, and
issue announcements are associated with price declines.
Our model provides a natural explanation of both these announcement effects. Issue
announcements generate negative price responses because lower-value firms issue. This
is the “selling low” of the paper’s title, and is very much in line with the existing
literature (again, see Allen and Michaely, 2003).
Repurchase announcements generate positive price reactions. The reason is that
some of the firms repurchasing are high-value firms. This is an effect present in several
existing models in the literature. With respect to this previous literature, the innovation
of our paper is to obtain this effect without exogenously assuming that firms care about
the interim stock price. Specifically, the reason high-value firms repurchase in our model
is that they pool with low-value firms, and so are able to repurchase at an attractive
price.
The reason low-value firms repurchase—and do so at a price that is high for them—
is that by doing so they reduce the price of subsequent equity issues. This is one of
the primary empirical implications of our model. Billett and Xue (2007) find evidence
for this effect. They compare the issuance price reactions of firms that previously
repurchased stock with the issuance price reactions of firms that did not previously
repurchase. The price decline of the former group is smaller, consistent with our model.
The following result formalizes these predictions of our model:
Proposition 6 Let s1 ≥ 0 be a date 1 repurchase decision used by a positive measure
of firms. Then:
(A, price drops at issue) A positive-measure subset of these firms issue an amount
s2 such that S − s1 − s2 ≥ I at date 2, at a price P2 ≤ P1. Moreover, the date-2 price
of non-issuing firms exceeds P1. Both relations are strict whenever Pr (s2|s1) < 1.
(B, repurchase increases subsequent issue price) Suppose that a positive measure of
firms issue s′1 < 0 at date 1. Then there exists s′2 such that s′2 ≤ 0, S − s′1 − s′2 ≥ I,
Pr (s′2|s′1) = 1, and P2 (s′1, s′2) = P1 (s′1) ≤ P2 (s1, s2). Likewise, if (0, s′2) with s′2 < 0 is
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played by a positive measure of firms, then P2 (0, s
′
2) ≤ P2 (s1, s2). Both price relations
are strict if s1 > 0 and Pr (s2|s1) < 1.
(C, price increases at repurchase) If, in addition, a positive measure of firms take
no action at date 1, then P1(s1) ≥ P1 (0), with the inequality strict under the same
conditions as in Part (B).
Our model also generates cross-sectional predictions between, on the one hand, the
size of repurchases and issues, and on the other hand, the price response associated
with these transactions. These predictions emerge in equilibria of the model in which
multiple repurchase and issue levels coexist (in contrast to the example, which features
just one repurchase level and one issue level).13
As one would expect, larger repurchases are associated with higher repurchase prices,
since they are conducted by firms that are, on average, better. Similarly, larger issues
are associated with lower issue prices. Both predictions are consistent with empirical
evidence: see, for example, Ikenberry et al. (1995) for evidence on repurchases, and
Asquith and Mullins (1986) for evidence on issues.
Proposition 7 (A, repurchases) Consider an equilibrium in which s′ and s′′ > s′ are
repurchase levels, with associated prices P ′ and P ′′, and such that there exist firms a′ and
a′′ where firm a′ (respectively, a′′) repurchases s′ (respectively, s′′) and does not conduct
any other capital transaction at any other date. Then (i) P ′′ ≥ P ′, (ii) s′′/P ′′ > s′/P ′,
and (iii) a′′ > a′. In particular, repurchase size is positively correlated with repurchase
price.
(B, issues) Let (s′1, s′2) and (s′′1, s′′2) be equilibrium strategies such that S − s′′1 − s′′2 >
S − s′1 − s′2. Then P2 (s′1, s′2) > P2 (s′′1, s′′2) . In particular, if s′2 < 0 and s′′2 < 0, then
greater cumulative issue is associated with lower date 2 issue prices.14
2.7 Welfare
As we have established, our economy features equilibria in which some firm repurchase.
Here, we ask how social welfare in such equilibria compares with social welfare in the
13 One can show, via numerical simulation, that such equilibria exist.
14 It is also possible to establish that s′1 > s
′′
1 , i.e., greater cumulative issue is associated with smaller
initial repurchases. A proof is available upon request.
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equilibrium of the one-period benchmark. Because capital market transactions do not
have any deadweight cost, social welfare is simply proportional to the fraction of firms
that invest.15 We obtain the following strong result:
Proposition 8 Consider any equilibrium featuring repurchases, and a finite number of
actions. 16 Then there exists an equilibrium of the benchmark one-period model that
has strictly high welfare, and no repurchases.17
The example illustrates the basic economics of this result. In the equilibrium of
the example, some high-value firms strictly profit from repurchasing their stock for less
than its true value. Because investors break even in expectation, the ultimate source of
these profits is low-value firms who initially pool with high-value firms and repurchase,
in order to reduce the cost of subsequent issues. Low-value firms lose money on the
repurchase leg of this transaction. If repurchases are prohibited, low-value firms no
longer have to endure this loss-making leg. This allows them to issue at better terms,
which in turn means that a greater fraction of firms find issuance (and investment)
preferable to non-issuance.
At least since Arrow (1973), it has been understood that the possibility of economic
agents signaling their type by undertaking a socially costly action may result in lower
welfare relative to a situation in which signaling is prohibited or otherwise impossible.18
In our setting, however, repurchases carry no deadweight cost, yet welfare is still
reduced.
2.8 Extension: Investment timing
In our main model, the investment project can only be undertaken at date 2. Here,
we consider an extension in which the investment can be undertaken at either date 1
or date 2 (though not both). We focus on the benchmark case in which the project
available is exactly the same at each of the two dates.
15 If each investor holds a diversified portfolio of shares, this welfare measure coincides with the
Pareto welfare ranking.
16 This restriction is made for simplicity, to avoid mathematical complication. The result covers
equilibria with an arbitrarily large (but finite) number of equilibrium actions.
17 In particular, if the one-period benchmark has a unique equilibrium in the class of equilibria with
S − s1 + I, then welfare in this equilibrium exceeds welfare in any equilibrium of the full model.
18 For a recent result along these lines, see Hoppe, Moldovanu and Sela (2009).
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Investment at date 1 moves both the cash outflow associated with investment (I) and
the subsequent benefits (I + b) forward by one period. If the discount rate is positive,
this means that date 1 investment is more expensive, but generates greater benefits,
relative to investment at date 2. In our main model we normalize the discount rate to
0; or more precisely, the objects S, s1, s2, I, b, a are all expressed as date 3 future
values. To incorporate the effect of the investment timing choice on investment costs
and benefits, we write the investment cost at dates 1 and 2 as I1 and I2 respectively, and
likewise write the present value generated as b1 and b2 respectively. Hence
I1
I2
= b1b2 ≥ 1,
where both ratios equal the one-period interest rate.
The flexibility of investment timing introduces an additional dimension in which
firms can signal their type. In particular, if b1 > b2, then delaying investment is costly,
and so there may exist equilibria in which bad firms issue and invest at date 1, while
good firms signal their type by waiting until date 2 to issue and invest. (See Morellec
and Schu¨rhoff, 2011, for an analysis dedicated to this issue.) However, when b1 and
b2 are sufficiently close, i.e., when the effect of discounting is small, one can show that
no equilibrium of this type exists, and the best firms never invest in equilibrium. In
this case, the economic forces behind our result that any equilibrium satisfying NDOC
features repurchases (Proposition 4) remain unchanged. Formal proofs of the analogues
of both Proposition 4 and Proposition 3 (on equilibrium existence) are available upon
request.
Consequently, the extension of our model to endogenous investment timing leaves
our main results unchanged, at least when discount rates are not too high. At the same
time, endogenous investment timing introduces a new effect into our model: namely
that the repurchase are associated with an inefficient delay of investment. Specifically, if
repurchases are exogenously ruled-out, the one-period benchmark equilibrium remains
an equilibrium of the two-period model, with all investment conducted at date 1.19
But when repurchases are feasible, any equilibrium satisfying NDOC features at
least some investment at date 2. Hence, there are three distinct costs associated with
investment: (i) inefficient delayed investment (the new effect of this section); (ii) the
cross-subsidy from investing firms to repurchase-only firms (the effect stressed in the
main model); and (iii) the cross-subsidy from better investing firms to worse investing
19 Again, this is for the case in which b1 and b2 are sufficiently close.
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firms (the standard Myers and Majluf effect).
2.9 Robustness
We have restricted attention to the case in which firms can only signal via equity re-
purchases. However, we do not believe this restriction is critical, as follows.
Our main equilibrium characterization result is that that any equilibrium satisfying
NDOC must feature repurchases (Proposition 4). A key step ingredient in this result
is that in any candidate equilibrium without repurchases, the best firms would obtain
their reservation payoff of S + a. As discussed, this property implies that repurchases
can only be deterred in equilibrium if off-equilibrium beliefs associate a repurchase offer
with a high firm type. The dynamic setting, combined with NDOC, then implies that a
firm that deviates and repurchases could issue at very good terms the following period,
thereby undercutting the proposed equilibrium without repurchases.
This argument still works even if additional signaling possibilities are introduced,
provided that any candidate equilibrium without repurchases has the best firms receiving
their reservation payoffs. Indeed, the extension of Section 2.8 in which investment timing
can potentially serve as a signal illustrates exactly this. Moreover, it may be possible
to extend this argument to cover cases in which the best firms receive more than their
reservation payoff, since in such a case, it is still necessary to assign very favorable
beliefs to any firm that attempts to repurchase. Finally, note that in this generalization
firms may repurchase a different security from equity; however, under the conditions
described, some firms will repurchase some form of risky security.
2.10 Conclusion
We investigate the consequences of allowing for repeated capital market transactions in
a model with asymmetric information between a firm and its investors. All firms in the
model possess a profitable project that they need to raise cash to undertake. However,
we show that there always exist equilibria in which firms return cash to investors via
share repurchases. Consistent with managerial accounts, some repurchasing firms profit
from repurchasing their stock. The ultimate source of these profits is that other firms
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buy “high” in order to improve the terms of subsequent stock issues. Moreover, only
equilibria that feature repurchases satisfy the relatively mild NDOC restriction on off-
equilibrium beliefs. Repurchases lowers social welfare by reducing the fraction of firms
that invest, even though repurchasing itself is a costless signal. Our model generates a
number of empirical predictions.
Chapter 3
A dynamic model of optimal
creditor dispersion
3.1 Introduction
Many firms borrow simultaneously from multiple creditors. Having multiple creditors
brings the disadvantage of coordination problems, which in bad times make it harder
for a firm to restructure its debt to avoid liquidation. In good times, however, these
same coordination problems enhance pledgeability by making it harder for a firm to
opportunistically hold up its creditors.
In this paper, I study the trade-off between these two forces—liquidation risk and
enhanced pledgeability—for a firm that seeks to roll over its existing debt. In contrast
to the existing literature,1 I focus on the case in which a firm has insufficient internal
resources to repay its outstanding debt. Instead, the firm must issue new debt to repay
the maturing debt—that is, roll over its debt. This case is empirically relevant. In
reality, 47% of the Compustat firms during fiscal years 2012 and 2013 have insufficient
operating cash flow to repay their maturing debt and thereby have to rely on debt
rollover.2
1 For example, Berglo¨f and Von Thadden (1994), Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), and Diamond
(2004).
2 I use the Compustat variables total debt in current liability (DLC — the total amount of short-
term notes and the current portion of long-term debt that is due in one year) and EBITDA as the
proxies for maturing debt and operating cash flow. For 47% of the firms, EBITDA is smaller than total
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A firm’s ability to roll over its debt is fundamentally a dynamic concept: the ability
to roll over debt today depends on whether the firm’s new creditors anticipate that they
will be able to, in turn, roll over their debt in the future, which in turn depends on
whether creditors anticipate that rollover will be possible even further in the future. I
build a parsimonious dynamic model to analyze a firm’s choice of the number of creditors
in a rollover framework. Each period, a firm trades off the increase in liquidation risk
with the enhanced pledgeability that a greater number of creditors engenders. Despite
the model’s parsimony, it is challenging to analyze and generates a rich set of predictions.
I use my model to make three main points. First, my model delivers predictions
on how many creditors a firm has as well as when it decides to seek more creditors
or consolidate the existing ones. I show that firms with higher growth prospects can
support more creditors, which is consistent with cross-sectional empirical findings. In
the time series, I show that firms increase the number of creditors when they perform
badly and need to support a higher leverage, a point well illustrated by the following
case. School Specialty Inc. is a distributor of classroom supplies that went bankrupt
in 2013. Barrett (2013) writes, “The [subprime] recession and cuts in public spending
severely affected school budgets and hurt School Specialty” (para. 17). The company
increased the pool of creditors and borrowed $64 million from a new lender, Bayside,
in January 2012 after its current lenders refused to provide new loans to refinance its
existing debt according to Dugan (2013). The firm indeed survived one more year until
it breached a loan covenant set forth by Bayside and filed for bankruptcy protection.
Second, I challenge the received wisdom that having multiple creditors and the
resulting coordination problems are responsible for firms’ difficulties in rolling over their
debt. In the School Specialty case, Bayside’s demand for a full repayment after School
Specialty’s covenant violation triggered its bankruptcy filing. It is easy to conclude
that introducing the additional lender Bayside and its high priority prevented private
debt restructuring that could have led to a more efficient resolution. Implicit in such
views is the idea that the firm would have had an easier time if it had had fewer
creditors. But this counterfactual ignores the fact that borrowing from more creditors
is an endogenous choice made by the firm in the past. Without the decision of borrowing
from more creditors the firm could have failed even earlier. To make a more meaningful
debt in current liability.
26
comparison, I compare the expected liquidation probability and the firm value in my
model to the ones in a counterfactual model in which the firm can borrow from only
one creditor. I show that for a large range of fundamental values, firms with multiple
creditors would have an even higher chance of liquidation and lower firm value, if they
were forced to borrow from just one lender. An interesting policy implication is that ex
post efficient reorganization processes, such as the automatic stay clause and Chapter
11 reorganization, that eliminate coordination failure among creditors may reduce a
firm’s ability to raise money ex-ante and result in lower welfare due to a more difficult
debt rollover.
Finally, the model sheds light on how renegotiation frequency affects pledgeability.
I show that in the limit when the firm can instantaneously renegotiate its debt, the
enhanced pledgeability from more creditors becomes negligible. Although more creditors
can indeed force more repayment, the source of this additional payout comes from the
growth between two negotiation dates. With very frequent negotiation, per period
growth vanishes, as does the additional debt capacity from having more creditors.
3.2 Related Literature
It has been well understood that having multiple creditors can cause coordination prob-
lems. Perhaps the most famous example is bank (creditor) run. Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) show that in a static setting, socially inefficient bank run equilibria generally
exist. Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) further characterize the probability of a bank run
under a global game framework. He and Xiong (2012a) study the dynamic evolution of
a panic-based run on staggered corporate debt.
If borrowing from multiple lenders is costly, then why do firms continue doing so?
Berglo¨f and Von Thadden (1994) claim that having multiple lenders specialize in lending
at different maturities is a superior structure. The short-term creditors can impose
externalities on the long-term creditors at the renegotiation stage, thereby increasing
the ex post repayment incentives and in turn the ex ante efficiency. Following this line of
thinking, Diamond (2004) demonstrates that when enforcing a debt contract is difficult,
a single lender with a large stake in the firm has limited or no incentive to take ex post
disciplinary actions against the firm, since such actions also hurt the lender himself. The
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firm, knowing that disciplinary actions are not credible, will misbehave ex ante. In the
case of multiple creditors, the creditor who takes the action can claim against the whole
firm, thereby hurting the other creditors. The improved incentive for lenders to be active
ex post forces the borrowers to behave and thus increases the amount of money that can
be raised. These papers share the key insight that potential coordination failure with
multiple creditors disciplines the firm and can potentially improve the ex ante outcome.
However, they take the variation in the number of creditors exogenously and therefore
are silent on when firms endogenously change the number of creditors.
Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) further develop this idea and study the optimal choice
between one and two creditors. The firms in their model can strategically default and
renegotiate the debt even when they have the money to repay. The creditor(s), upon
(either strategic or fundamental-based) default by the firm, can sell the project to an
inefficient outsider. Under a multilateral bargaining setup, the benefit of having multiple
creditors is to increase the collective bargaining power against the firm following a
strategic default. In this case, the creditors can extract higher repayments from the
firm. However, the cost of introducing a second creditor is that it lowers the expected
payoff following a bad state, where this stronger collective bargaining power makes it
less likely for the creditors to get an outside investor. Although all of these papers
study the benefit brought by coordination failure from multiple creditors, they are all
static (i.e. one-shot negotiation). My model shares the classic idea that having multiple
lenders is a costly mechanism to induce correct behavior from the borrowers, but instead
I focus the optimal number of creditors with a dynamic model. This dynamic feature
is particularly important since firms usually do not have sufficient operating cash flow
to pay back the maturing debt and must rely on repeatedly rollover.
Several other papers have also explicitly investigated the cost and benefit of having
multiple creditors from various perspectives. Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013) extend
this idea by allowing the borrower to choose the maturity of the debt contract and
explain why an excessively short maturity structure prevails in equilibrium, despite the
increased rollover risks. Detragiache et al. (2000) present a completely different trade-
off. If banks can fail, then having multiple banking relationships is beneficial because
financing is more robust in this case and will not fail unless all banks do. However, when
all banks actually do fail, having more relationship banks is a stronger negative signal
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and therefore increases refinancing costs. Petersen and Rajan (1994) propose a model
that illustrates how lenders’ market power affects the quality of the financed firms and
the cost of credit. They take the lenders’ market power as an exogenous parameter. My
paper endogenizes the variation of bargaining power by explicitly modeling the game
between the firm and its creditors. Furthermore, their empirical studies in Petersen and
Rajan (1994, 1995) suggest that having more creditors is associated with a higher cost
of credit in equilibrium, which is consistent with my model’s prediction.
The effects of debt rollover and renegotiation on credit risk and debt prices have
been studied from an asset-pricing perspective. Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) and
Mella-Barral (1999) study the asset-pricing implications when the firm can renegotiate
and service the troubled debt, rather than just defaulting directly as in Leland (1998).
He and Xiong (2012b) investigate how creditors with different maturities strategically
interact with each other when they decide whether or not to roll over the maturing
debt. Similar to the work of Diamond (2004), the creditors’ decisions not to roll over
pose externalities on other incumbent creditors with claims not yet matured. Hege and
Mella-Barral (2005) look at an economy in which a firm can exchange liquidation rights
for coupon concessions on debt and study how that feature affects the credit risk premia
as the number of creditors changes. These papers focus on pricing the debt claims given
the possibility of renegotiation or rollover frictions, assuming the creditors’ structure is
exogenously fixed. My paper, on the other hand, focuses on the optimal choice creditor
dispersion.
3.3 The Model
3.3.1 The Project and Financing
Time t is discrete and the discount rate is normalized to 1. A risk-neutral penniless
entrepreneur starts a firm at t = 0 with a project.3 The project requires an upfront
investment I0 and generates no cash flow except for a final liquidating dividend at
a random project maturity. At each date, the project matures with probability pi.
The actual realization of the final dividend depends on a stochastic firm-specific state
3 Note that I do not distinguish between the entrepreneur and the firm in the model and use the
two terms interchangeably.
29
θt ∈ {G(ood), B(ad)} and the fundamental Yt = Y0Π1≤s≤tzs, where zs are i.i.d positive
random variables with continuous density g(z). Assume g(z) has a compact support
[z, z]. The random variables θt and zs are independent. Denote the mean E(zs) = µ > 1
and assume z < 1. If the project matures when the state is good (θt = G), the realized
final dividend is Yt; otherwise, if the state is bad (θt = B), the dividend is 0. The state
θt follows a Markov process with transition probability p
θ = Prob(θt+1 = θ|θt = θ) (for
θ = G,B), which can be interpreted, for example, as the demand shock for the firm’s
output or the firm-specific productivity shock. To ensure that the project has a finite
value, I impose the following parameter assumption:
(1− pi)µ < 1. (3.1)
Denote τpi to be the random project maturity date. Then given the initial state θ1
and fundamental Y0, the expected value of the project’s final dividend can be naturally
defined as
E(1θτpi=GYτpi |θ1, Y0). (3.2)
Lemma 2 If the project is carried through to its random maturity τpi, then its expected
value defined in (3.2) conditional on the current state θ and fundamental Y is given by
E(1θτpi=GYτpi |G, Y ) = pi[1−(1−pi)µp
B ]µ
[1−(1−pi)µ][1−(1−pi)µ(pG+pB−1)]Y,
E(1θτpi=GYτpi |B, Y ) = pi(1−p
B)(1−pi)µ2
[1−(1−pi)µ][1−(1−pi)µ(pG+pB−1)]Y.
(3.3)
At any time t, the project can be liquidated prematurely for λYt. The liquidation
value is assumed to be independent of θ because it is possible to sell the project to
other firms that are not subject to this firm-specific shock. The liquidation coefficient
λ ≤ 1 captures the inefficient separation of the project from its original developers.
If liquidation is inefficient enough, i.e. E(1θτpi=GYτpi |B, Y ) > λY , then the project is
always better off continuing even in the bad state. By (3.3), this is equivalent to
λ <
pi(1− pB)(1− pi)µ2
[1− (1− pi)µ][1− (1− pi)µ(pG + pB − 1)] , (3.4)
which I assume throughout the paper. Under this assumption, the values specified by
(3.2) are indeed first best. Denote them by V θ?FB(Y ).
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If the entrepreneur has enough cash to finance the up-front investment I0, then
the project is optimally carried through to its maturity and the first best firm value is
realized. However, as I have assumed, the firm does not have (sufficient) cash to begin
with. In addition, to highlight the rollover and pledgeability frictions, I assume that the
firm can only issue one-period debt to short-lived creditors. Since the project does not
generate any interim cash flow, the firm must repeatedly issue new debt to finance the
payment to the maturing creditors. The detailed game between the entrepreneur and
the creditors will be defined later following a formal introduction of the timeline.
3.3.2 Timeline
Figure 1 outlines the timeline and the evolution of the state variables. The firm enters
period t with Nt incumbent creditors and a total promised face value Ft. The current
state θt and the previous fundamental Yt−1 are also publicly known. At period t, a new
shock zt (or equivalently Yt) is realized, and then the project matures with probability
pi. If it matures, the game ends with a final dividend Yt1θt=G. Otherwise, the project
continues to the repayment stage, and a new state θt+1 is realized. The entrepreneur
then has the following three options: (a) to voluntarily liquidate the project, (b) to
make the promised repayment Ft, or (c) to initiate a repayment negotiation (described
in the next subsection). If an agreement on the actual payment cannot be reached, the
firm is forced into liquidation. Otherwise, if a repayment Xt is mutually accepted (in
case (b) Xt = Ft or in case (c) the negotiated amount), the firm enters the refinancing
stage to raise exactly Xt from Nt+1 identical creditors with an aggregate face value Ft+1.
Both Nt+1 and Ft+1 are the firm’s choice variables. Following a successful refinancing,
the firm survives period t and the next period begins.
3.3.3 The Repayment Negotiation
At the repayment stage, the firm can choose to negotiate the payment (option (c) in the
previous subsection). During a negotiation, the firm meets each creditor sequentially
in a random order and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer Si to the ith creditor. Here,
the index i reflects the realized random negotiation order. The offer history is public
information. Each creditor, when it is his turn to negotiate, can either accept (A) the
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new promised payment or reject (R) the offer and exercise the liquidation right. If any
creditor rejects the offer, the negotiation fails and the firm is liquidated. I assume that
the rejecting creditor has priority over the liquidation proceeds and gets min( FtNt , λYt).
The remaining creditors (who either previously accepted the offer or have not yet nego-
tiated) get the remaining liquidation proceeds equally, min( FtNt ,
1
Nt−1 max(0, λYt− FtNt )).
If all Nt creditors accept the new offers, the firm then enters the refinancing stage and
tries to borrow Xt =
∑Nt
i=1 Si.
3.3.4 The Firm’s Refinancing Decision
Since the project does not generate any interim cash flow, the firm has to finance the
repayment Xt and roll over this obligation to the next period. The firm chooses Nt+1
new creditors and offers them the same one-period debt contract with total face value
Ft+1 in exchange for cash Xt to honor the repayment to the Nt incumbent creditors.
The new creditors simultaneously accept or reject the new debt offerings. If anyone
rejects, the new creditors get a reservation payoff of 0 and the firm is liquidated. The
Nt incumbent creditors equally share the liquidation proceeds up to the face value and
each gets 1Nt min(Ft, λYt). On the other hand, if all Nt+1 new creditors accept the offer,
the firm survives period t and the game moves on to period t+ 1.
3.3.5 Terminal Payoffs, Markov Strategies, and Equilibrium Definition
The entrepreneur is long-lived and the creditors live for one period. The game ends at
date t if one of the following events occurs: (a) the project matures, (b) the negotiat-
ing creditor forces liquidation, (c) the entrepreneur voluntarily liquidates the project,
or (d) the refinancing offer is rejected. If (a) the project matures, each incumbent
creditor (living from period t to t + 1) gets −Xt−1Nt + 1Nt min(1θt=GYt, Ft) and the en-
trepreneur gets the remaining max(0,1θt=GYt − Ft), where Xt−1 is the amount of total
repayment made by the firm in the previous period (or total funds borrowed from the
current incumbent creditors). The first term −Xt−1Nt in the creditors’ payoff captures
the up-front cash lending in the previous period. If (b) one of the creditors forces
liquidation, then the liquidating creditor gets −Xt−1Nt + min( FtNt , λYt), every remaining
creditor receives −Xt−1Nt + min( FtNt , 1Nt−1 max(0, λYt − FtNt )), and the residual liquidation
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proceeds max(0, λYt−Ft) go to the entrepreneur. If (c) the entrepreneur liquidates the
project or (d) the refinancing offer is rejected, then each incumbent creditor receives
−Xt−1Nt + 1Nt min(λYt, Ft) and the entrepreneur gets max(0, λYt−Ft). Finally, if the firm
survives each period, then the ith (i represents the realized negotiation order) short-
lived incumbent creditor receives −Xt−1Nt + Si in the case of having a negotiation and
−Xt−1Nt + FtNt otherwise.
A pure Markov strategy profile includes the following items. The firm has a ne-
gotiation strategy for the ith creditor S
θt+1
i (
∑
j<i Sj , Ft, Yt, Nt) ∈ R+ as a function
of the total negotiated repayment in this period untill now
∑
j<i Sj , the originally
promised face value Ft, the current fundamental Yt, the realized next period state
θt+1, and the number of incumbent creditors Nt. With a slight abuse of notation,
S
θt+1
0 (Ft, Yt, Nt) ∈ {L,F} denotes a voluntary liquidation or a full repayment of Ft.
The firm also has a set of financing strategies to choose the new number of creditors
N
θt+1
+ (Xt, Ft, Yt) ∈ N and the total face value F θt+1+ (Xt, Ft, Yt) ∈ R+, as functions of the
required financing amount Xt, the originally promised face value Ft, the fundamental
Yt, and the state θt+1. In addition, in each period, the ith incumbent creditor has an
acceptance strategy after receiving an offer Si: s
θt+1
i (
∑
j<i Sj , Si, Ft, Yt, Nt) ∈ {A,R}.
Finally, given any refinancing offer (F+, N+), the new creditors have acceptance strate-
gies: r
θt+1
i (Xt, F+, Yt, N+) ∈ {A,R} for all i ≤ N+.
In this paper, I focus on the Markov perfect equilibria, meaning the strategy profiles
described above that are subgame perfect.
Remark 1: Rather than taking a contract design approach, as for example in
Berglo¨f and Von Thadden (1994), Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), and Diamond (2004),
I instead assume that only standard debt contracts are possible. I make this assumption
because, unlike the other papers, I take the cross-externality among investors as given
and investigate how firms choose exposure to this friction dynamically. In addition, I
do not allow the firm to save. However, as will be discussed in section 3.6, I do not
expect the possibility of savings to change the firm’s choice of number of creditor.
Remark 2: One interpretation of the priority structure is that the rejecting creditor
can partially liquidate the project to secure as much of the originally promised amount
as possible. The project, however, is fundamentally impaired and will be forced into
a full liquidation before the next creditor negotiates, in which case all other creditors
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share the remaining liquidation proceeds equally. Note that the results do not depend
on the specific priority structure. As long as the liquidating creditor has some priority
over the proceeds which can hurt other creditors, the story remains valid. The key
economic force here is that the creditors can pose externalities on each other as in
Berglo¨f and Von Thadden (1994), Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), and Brunnermeier
and Oehmke (2013). As the number of creditors increases, each one of them can pose a
larger externality on others by forcing a liquidation. Such an externality provides the
creditors with stronger incentives to commit to an ex post liquidation and hence creates
a stronger incentive for the firm to repay as well. The cost, on the other hand, is an
early termination of the project as a result of coordination failure when the firm is in
distress.
3.4 Equilibrium Construction
In this section, I explicitly construct an equilibrium. Before doing so, I introduce several
key variables including debt value, debt capacity, and the total firm value.
3.4.1 Debt Value, Debt Capacity, and Firm Value
Given any strategy profile, I can define the total value of debt claims DθtNt(Ft, Yt−1) at
the beginning of each period. Here I keep the time indices to make the evolution of the
state variables transparent.
DθtNt(Ft, Yt−1) = E{pimin(Ft, Yt−1zt)1θt=G + (1− pi)
[(Πi≤Nt1sθt+1i =A
)1
S
θt+1
0 6=L
(Π
i≤Nθt+1+
1
r
θt+1
i =A
)Xt+
[1− (Πi≤Nt1sθt+1i =A)1Sθt+10 6=L(Πi≤Nθt+1+ 1rθt+1i =A)]
min(Ft, λYt−1zt)]}
(3.5)
The expectation is taken over the random variables zt and θt+1. In the future, when
the time indices are omitted, I use θ′ to denote the next period state θt+1. The first
term captures the payout to the debt holders upon project maturity, which happens
with probability pi. If the project does not mature, then the total (possibly negotiated)
repayment Xt is honored if every player chooses not to liquidate. Otherwise, if anyone
liquidates the project (rejects the offer), then the liquidation payoff is distributed. Let
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τL be the stopping time when any player chooses liquidation depending, which can
potentially depend on the entire history. Define τS = min(τpi, τL) to be the time when
the game ends. The total value of the firm at the beginning of each period is
V θtNt(Ft, Yt−1) = E{1τS=τpi1θτpi=GYτpi + 1τS=τLλYτL},
which can be expressed recursively as:
V θtNt(Ft, Yt−1) = E{piYt−1zt1θt=G + (1− pi)
[(Πi≤Nt1sθt+1i =A
)1
S
θt+1
0 6=L
(Π
i≤Nθt+1+
1
r
θt+1
i =A
)V
θt+1
N
θt+1
+
(F
θt+1
+ , Yt−1zt)
+[1− (Πi≤Nt1sθt+1i =A)1Sθt+10 6=L(Πi≤Nθt+1+ 1rθt+1i =A)]λYt−1zt]}
(3.6)
It is convenient to define the debt capacity from N creditors as follows:
DCθtNt(Yt−1) ≡ maxFt D
θt
Nt
(Ft, Yt−1) (3.7)
and the total debt capacity as
DCθt(Yt−1) ≡ max
Nt
DCθtNt(Yt−1). (3.8)
Finally, define F
θt
Nt to be the face value that maximizes the value of debt, given the
number of creditors Nt, fundamental Yt−1, and state θt. If several values of F deliver
this maximum, F
θt
Nt is the smallest one:
F
θt
Nt(Yt−1) ≡ min[arg maxFt D
θ
N (Ft, Yt−1)]. (3.9)
As will be transparent in the next subsection, the entrepreneur has no incentive to pick
a new face value F+ > FN+ because doing so would weakly reduce the firm value.
3.4.2 Equilibrium Characterization
Proposition 9 is the main result that characterizes the equilibrium strategies and the
value functions.
Proposition 9 Consider the following strategies:
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1. The entrepreneur always makes an offer
Sθ?i = min(
F
N
, λY ) (3.10)
to the ith creditor.
2. The entrepreneur’s financing strategy N θ?+ (X,F, Y ) and F
θ?
+ (X,F, Y ) solves
maxN+ V
θ
N+
(F+, Y )
s.t. F+ is the smallest solution to D
θ
N+(F+, Y ) = X. (3.11)
If there is no combination of (N+, F+) such that (3.11) holds, then the firm chooses
N θ?+ = 1 and F
θ?
+ = 0.
4
3. The ith creditor accepts the offer Si (i.e., s
θ?
i (
∑
j<i Sj , Si, F, Y,N) = A) if and
only if Si ≥ min( FN , λY ) and∑
j<i
Sj + Si +
∑
j>i
Sθ?i ≤ DCθ(Y ). (3.12)
4. The potential new creditors accept the financing offers rθ?i (X,F+, Y,N+) = A if
and only if DθN+(F+, Y ) ≥ X.
Under the proposed strategies, for any state θ = G,B and any number of creditors N ,
1. the value of debt DθN (F, Y ) is continuous and homogeneous of degree one (HD1)
in (F, Y );
2. the minimum face value that achieves the N creditor debt capacity from (3.9) is
linear in Y , i.e., F
θ
N (Y ) = f
θ
NY for some constant f
θ
N ;
3. the debt capacity from N creditors from (3.7) is linear in Y , i.e., DCθN (Y ) = κ
θ
NY
for some constant κθN .
Define
κθ ≡ max
N
κθN . (3.13)
If min(κG, κB) > λ, then the proposed strategies indeed constitute a subgame perfect
equilibrium. In addition, the firm’s value function V θN (F, Y ) satisfies
4 In fact, in this case, the financing strategy can be arbitrary because it will be rejected by the potential
new creditors.
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1. V θN (F, Y ) ≥ κθNY , when F ≤ F
θ
N (Y );
2. V θN (F, Y ) is continuous, HD1 in (F, Y ), weakly decreasing in F , and increasing in
Y .
The proof takes a guess and verify approach, with the full version in the appendix.
However, outlining the procedures to establish the equilibrium is still helpful. The key
to this construction lies in finding a consistent (κG, κB) that dictates the debt capacities
in (3.8). Given a linear conjecture, the equilibrium strategies imply that rollover in state
θ is possible only when the total offered repayment is feasible:
min(F,NλY ) ≤ DCθ(Y ) = κθY. (3.14)
With the continuation region explicitly expressed, the debt value (3.5) be rewritten as
DθN (F, Y ) = E{pimin(F, Y z)1θ=G + (1− pi)
[1min(F,NλY z)≤κθ′Y z min(F,NλY z) + 1min(F,NλY z)>κθ′Y z min(F, λY z)]},
(3.15)
where the expectation is taken over z and θ′. It is easy to see that this is HD1 in (F, Y ).
Linearity of debt capacities is then just a simple corollary of HD1 with the coefficient:
κθN = maxf E{pimin(f, z)1θ=G + (1− pi)
[1min(F,Nλz)≤κθ′z min(f,Nλz) + 1min(F,Nλz)>κθ′z min(f, λz)]}
(3.16)
Clearly (3.16) depends on the initial conjecture of (κG, κB), and it has to arrive at
the same debt capacity in equilibrium by equating (3.13). Any guess of (κG, κB) that
survives this procedure is consistent and can be supported in an equilibrium.
If creditors expect a low debt capacity tomorrow, then the pledgeable amount today
decreases today as in (3.16), resulting in a lower debt capacity today. Therefore, the self-
fulfilling feature could result in multiple equilibria. It can be shown that the equilibrium
is unique conditional on a fixed choice of κθ and the results of this paper do not depend
on which κθ I choose.
Despite the potential multiplicity, the existence of any equilibrium is not obvious at
all. This is because the right-hand side in (3.16) as a function of κθ is not continuous.
For example, when κθ ≥ λN , it is always possible to roll over. However, as soon as κθ
decreases to just below λN , there is a nontrivial chance that the firm will be liquidated,
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which hurts the ex-ante borrowing capacity discontinuously. Fortunately, despite the
discontinuity of (3.16), the right-hand side is still order preserving and Tarski’s fixed
point theorem guarantees a solution.
With a consistent conjecture of κθ held fixed, the firm’s value function (3.6) reduces
to the following dynamic programming problem:
V θN (F, Y ) = E{piY z1θ=G + (1− pi)
[1min(F,NλY z)≤κθ′Y zV
θ′
N+
(F+, Y z) + 1min(F,NλY z)>κθ′Y zλY z]}
(3.17)
where F+ is the minimum solution to
Dθ
′
N+(F+, Y ) = min(F,NλY z). (3.18)
Establishing continuity in V θN is challenging, since a small change in (F, Y ) can result
in a discontinuous change in the minimum solution F+. Therefore, the constraint cor-
respondence (F, Y ) 7→ {(N+, F+)| s.t. (3.18) holds} is discontinuous and the standard
theorem of maximum does not apply. Even so, one can show that the value function in
equilibrium is indeed continuous. After proving the properties of the value functions V θN ,
it is relatively straightforward to verify that the constructed strategy profile is indeed
optimal.
Despite the complicated construction and verification, the equilibrium is quite intu-
itive. The entrepreneur has all the bargaining power, so he just needs to credibly offer
each creditor his liquidation payoff min( FN , λY ) as in (3.10). On the other hand, for an
incumbent creditor to accept an offer Sn, it must be weakly higher than the liquidation
payoff. In addition, condition (3.12) implies that the offer must be credible in the sense
that following the proposed strategies, the total repayment can be financed.
The cost and benefit of having more creditors are immediately transparent in (3.14)
and (3.15). With a higher N , the left-hand side of (3.14) weakly increases, causing a
weakly higher chance of liquidation. On the other hand, having more creditors lowers
the stake of an individual creditor relative to the whole firm and therefore effectively
grants creditors higher bargaining power. The total actual repayment conditional on
rollover in (3.15) weakly increases, as does the pledgeability.
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3.4.3 Creditor Capacity and Safe Number of Creditors
Even though I do not pose any assumption on the transition probability pθ, the debt
capacities in the two states θ = G,B can be ordered in equilibrium.
Lemma 3 The debt capacity is strictly higher in the good state, i.e., κG > κB.
To understand this relationship, one needs to remember the recursive nature of
debt rollover. The maximum amount that the firm can borrow now depends on the
maximum amount that the firm can borrow in the next period. Suppose that the firm
is in a bad state now. With probability pi, the firm dies without any payout. If the
firm has a weakly higher debt capacity in the bad state, then the actual refinanceable
repayment in the next period is bounded by the debt capacity in the bad state κBYt+1.
The expected maximum repayment, however, is insufficient to support the debt capacity
today (1− pi)Et(κBYt+1) = (1− pi)µκBYt < κBYt. Therefore, the firm has no chance of
repaying κBYt in the bad state. In other words, in order to finance the debt capacity
in a bad state, the firm must rely on the possibility a good state realization in the next
period and utilize that higher borrowing capacity.
Given this lemma,5 we can conveniently define
N ≡ [max(κ
G, κB)
λ
] + 1 = [
κG
λ
] + 1. (3.19)
When the number of creditors becomes large, namely N > N , the equilibrium no longer
depends on the number of creditorsN . This is because when (3.19) holds, the liquidation
threat becomes credible in both states θ = G,B, and creditors reject any offer less than
the full repayment of F . The firm then always repays the original face value whenever
possible. The debt and the total firm values from (3.15) and (3.17) become
DθN (F, Y ) = E{pimin(F, Y z)1θ=G + (1− pi)
[1F≤κθ′Y zF + 1F>κθ′Y z min(F, λY z)]}
and
V θN (F, Y ) = E{piY z1θ=G + (1− pi)
[1F≤κθ′Y zV
θ′
Nθ?+
(F θ
′?
+ , Y z) + 1F>κθ′Y zλY z]}
5 The bracket denotes the floor function: [a]= the largest natural number weakly smaller than a.
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with the corresponding condition (3.11) replaced by Dθ
′
N+
(F+, Y ) = F . Since both the
rollover (liquidation) region and the payoffs are independent of N , the firm’s and the
creditors’ problems are no longer sensitive to N . I refer to N defined in (3.19) as the
creditor capacity in the future. Without loss of generality, we can limit the firm’s choice
of the number of creditors to weakly below N . This finite bound turns out to be a key
piece in proving the general existence of the value functions V θN in proposition 9.
Similarly, I define the safe number of creditors:
N ≡ [κ
B
λ
]. (3.20)
When the number of creditors is lower than N , condition (3.14) always holds, meaning
that rollover is always possible. In this case, having more creditors enhances pledgeabil-
ity without an immediate risk of liquidation. Despite this seemingly costless benefit, as
we will see shortly, this does not imply that the firm always prefers to have at least N
creditors.
3.5 Key Trade-offs and Empirical Predictions
Only in this section, I study the comparative statics of the exogenous changes in number
of creditors. To do so, I change the incumbent number of creditors as if it is a parameter
and keep the equilibrium continuation strategies. In other words, I study the outcome of
a one shot deviation of the number of creditors in equilibrium. This exercise highlights
the trade off between pledgeability and the liquidation risk that the firm faces when
choosing creditor dispersion. Many empirical predictions can be carried through in
equilibrium, whereas others may be reversed by the firm’s selection effect. This topic
will be discussed in section 3.6.3.
3.5.1 Pledgeability
Value of Debt, Debt Capacity, and Interest Rate
Having multiple creditors has two offsetting effects on the value of debt. On the one
hand, the entrepreneur’s payout incentive increases with more creditors, which in turn
raises the value of debt for any given face value. On the other hand, having more
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creditors reduces the ex-post financial flexibility that leads to more liquidation, which
in turn hurts the debt value. In some cases, however, an increase in the number of
creditors has no effect on the liquidation probability, so the debt value increases.
Proposition 10 Suppose that one of the following three conditions holds: (a)N ≥ N2 >
N1, (b)N > N2 > N1 > N , or (c)N2 > N1 = 1. Then,
1. for any face value F and fundamental Y , the value of debt DθN2(F, Y ) ≥ DθN1(F, Y ),
2. as an immediate consequence of 1, the debt capacity is higher with more creditors,
i.e., κθN2 ≥ κθN1,
3. also as an immediate consequence of 1, the required interest rate is lower with more
creditors: for any θ and X ≤ DCθN1(Y ), let F θk (k = N1, N2) be the minimum
solution to X = Dθk(F
θ
k , Y ). Then the solutions exist and F
θ
N2
≤ F θN1.
The three cases in proposition 10 are quite transparent. In case (a), as discussed
following equation (3.20), rollover is always possible even in the bad state. Therefore
the incumbent creditors pose no liquidation risk. In case (b), the firm is liquidated only
in the bad state when the creditors cannot be paid in full. Case (c) is a little different.
It states that the value of debt is the worst when there is just one creditor. It is the
worst because with a single creditor, the actual repayment is just the liquidation payoff
min(F, λY ) regardless of whether or not rollover is possible.6 The debt capacity is
attained when F →∞:
κθ1 = [pi1θ=G + (1− pi)λ]µ. (3.21)
It is easy to see from (3.15) that multiple creditors can at least secure a repayment of the
liquidation value. Thus, having multiple creditors always weakly improves pledgeability.
In general, the benefit of having more creditors is the enhanced pledgeability, which
lowers the required interest rate proxied by
F θN
X in proposition 10. The cost, as will
become more clear in the next subsection, is a higher liquidation probability. Note here
that one should not expect the negative correlation between the number of creditors and
the interest rates to hold in equilibrium. I will postpone this discussion until section
3.6. As a preview, in equilibrium, the firms choose more creditors when they do badly.
6 The actual repayment is conditional on the project not maturing.
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In these cases, their debts are more likely to default so their creditors demand higher
interest rates. Therefore, having more creditors is associated with poorer performance,
which in turn causes higher interest rates.
Probability of Renegotiation and Default
I call it renegotiation whenever the firm successfully rolls over with an actual repay-
ment that is strictly less than the promised face value. This occurs when NλY z <
min(F, κθY z) and the firm continues by repaying each creditor the liquidation value
λY z. Similarly, I call it default whenever the creditors do not receive the full repayment
F . Mathematically, default means F > min(κθ, Nλ)Y z when the project does not ma-
ture. In addition, the firm also defaults if the project matures and yet the final cash
flow is insufficient to repay the creditors in full, namely, Y z1θ=G < F . By definition,
renegotiation is a special case of default. Notice that a firm can renegotiate or default
multiple times over its life cycle. To avoid any confounding effect, I denote τR and τD
to be the first time that the firm renegotiates or defaults and let
Rθ,TN (F, Y ) = Prob(τR ≤ T and τR ≤ τpi) (3.22)
DFT θ,TN (F, Y ) = Prob(τD ≤ T and τD ≤ τpi) (3.23)
be the probability that firm does so at least once during the next T ≤ ∞ periods before
or when the project matures at τpi. The probabilities of renegotiation and default must
satisfy the following recursive formulation:
Rθ,TN (F, Y ) = (1− pi)E[Rθ
′,T−1
Nθ?+
(F θ
′?
+ , Y z)1F≤min(κθ′ ,Nλ)Y z + 1NλY z<min(F,κθ′Y z)]
(3.24)
and
DFT θ,TN (F, Y ) = pi[Prob(Y z < F )1θ=G + 1θ=B] + (1− pi)
E[DFT θ
′,T−1
Nθ?+
(F θ
′?
+ , Y z)1F≤min(κθ′ ,Nλ)Y z + 1F>min(κθ′ ,Nλ)Y z]
(3.25)
The expression (3.24) is not difficult to understand. With probability 1 − pi, the firm
enters the repayment stage. Renegotiation occurs if NλY z < min(F, κθY z); otherwise,
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if rollover is possible with a full repayment F , the continuation probability of renegotia-
tion in the next T−1 periods is calculated by using the equilibrium refinancing strategies
for the next period number of creditors N θ?+ and face value F
θ?
+ . The expression (3.25)
can be similarly interpreted.
If the project continues without a renegotiation or default, the creditors are paid F
in full regardless of the number of creditors N . Therefore, the continuation probabilities
Rθ,T−1
Nθ?+
(F θ?+ , Y z) in (3.24) and DFT
θ,T−1
Nθ?+
(F θ?+ , Y z) in (3.25) are independent of N as
well. On the other hand, as N increases, the region in which the firm makes the
full repayment widens, since F ≤ min(κθ, Nλ)Y z is more likely to hold. Intuitively,
more creditors collectively have more bargaining power and provide a higher immediate
incentive for the firm to pay back its debt. This effect reduces both the probability of
renegotiation and default. The result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 11 The probabilities of renegotiation and default are lower with more
creditors, i.e., Rθ,TN2 (F, Y ) ≤ R
θ,T
N1
(F, Y ) and DFT θ,TN2 (F, Y ) ≤ DFT
θ,T
N1
(F, Y ), for all
N2 > N1, θ, F , and Y .
Proposition 11 is another way to demonstrate the pledgeability channel. Having
more creditors provides a better repayment incentive and therefore reduces the proba-
bility that the firm willingly or unwillingly cuts debt repayment.
3.5.2 Liquidation Risk
Probability of Liquidation
Recall that τL and τpi are the random times of liquidation and project maturity. Define
Lθt,TNt (Ft, Yt−1) = Prob(τL ≤ t+ T and τL < τpi), (3.26)
at the beginning of period period t, to be the expected probability of liquidation in the
next T ≤ ∞ periods before the project matures. Since liquidation occurs if and only if
(3.14) is violated, the liquidation probability L must satisfy the recursive formulation:
Lθ,TN (F, Y ) = (1− pi)E[Lθ
′,T−1
Nθ?+
(F θ
′?
+ , Y z)1min(F,NλY z)≤κθ′Y z + 1min(F,NλY z)>κθ′Y z]
(3.27)
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With probability 1−pi, the firm enters the repayment stage. A failed negotiation results
in an immediate liquidation; otherwise, the continuation probability of liquidation in
the next T − 1 periods is calculated by using the equilibrium refinancing strategies for
the next period number of creditors N θ?+ and face value F
θ?
+ .
A direct consequence of having more creditors is that the immediate liquidation
probability
Lθ,1N (F, Y ) = (1− pi)E[P (min(F,NλY z) > κθ
′
Y z)]
increases because the rollover condition (3.14) is less likely to hold with a bigger N . I
state this simple result as a lemma.
Lemma 4 The one-period-ahead liquidation probability increases with the number of
creditors, i.e., Lθ,1N2(F, Y ) ≥ L
θ,1
N1
(F, Y ) for all N2 > N1, θ, F , and Y .
Lemma 4 highlights the cost of having more creditors arising from a higher chance
of an immediate liquidation. It is also helpful to compare lemma 4 with a seemingly
contradictory result proposition 11. Fundamentally unlike liquidation, renegotiation
and default as I defined in subsection 3.5.1 pose no direct welfare loss, since they do not
lead to an inefficient termination of the project. Instead, they (oppositely) reflect the
entrepreneur’s endogenous commitment level. With more creditors, the entrepreneur
commits to make (more) repayment at the cost of a more likely ex post liquidation.
One can interpret renegotiation or default as financial distress and liquidation as a
costly outcome (for example, failed private debt restructuring). Under this interpreta-
tion, the results in this subsection state that with more creditors, the firm ex ante is
less likely to end up in distress. Once it is in distress, however, the creditors are less
likely to strike a deal. This prediction is confirmed by Gilson et al. (1990), who find
that financially distressed firms with more creditors are less likely to turn around and
emerge from a private debt restructuring.
Firm Value
Having more creditors in general reduces the total firm value. An immediate conse-
quence of having more creditors is a greater liquidation risk in the next period. The
long-run effect is the higher actual repayment which permanently increases the future
liquidation probability. Both effects lower the firm value.
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Proposition 12 The firm value is lower with more creditors: V θN1(F, Y ) ≥ V θN2(F, Y )
for any θ, F , Y , and N1 < N2.
Note that, from proposition 10, the value of debt is in general higher with more
creditors for any given face value. Therefore, the conclusion is a joint statement about
both higher market leverage (
DθNi
Y ) and more creditors. To focus on the net effect of
creditor dispersion on the firm value, one can hold the value of debt constant. Recall
that this is exactly the firm’s refinancing problem (3.11). The next section analyzes this
choice explicitly.
3.6 Creditor Dynamics
The dynamics associated with the number of creditors is determined by the firm’s re-
financing problem (3.11). As we have seen from the previous section, with more new
creditors N+, the benefit is a potentially lower refinancing cost F+, as in proposition
10. On the other hand, the cost is a higher immediate liquidation threat in the next
period, as in lemma 4. The firm optimally chooses N+ by balancing the cost and bene-
fit. Unfortunately, for a discrete choice problem like this one, an analytical solution is
typically not available. However, all the numerical experiments that I have calculated
unanimously show that the cost of having more creditors always outweighs the benefit.
The firm chooses more creditors only when borrowing the required level of repayment
from fewer creditors is infeasible.
3.6.1 A Numerical Example
In this subsection, I explicitly describe a numerical example based on the following
parameter choices: the per period shock to the final dividend process z follows a
uniform distribution on (0.63, 1.83), the probabilities of the states staying unchanged
(pG, pB) = (0.8, 0.3), the per period probability of the project maturing pi = 0.2, the
liquidation coefficient λ = 1, and the required up-front investment I0 = 1. Even with
the choice of λ = 1, liquidation is still inefficient since the future growth opportu-
nities are lost. The key equilibrium variables, debt capacities, are calculated to be
(κG1 , κ
G
2 , κ
B
1 , κ
B
2 ) = (1.23, 1.273, 0.984, 1.022) and κ
θ = κθ2. Under this parameterization,
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the creditor capacity N = 2, and therefore the relevant choice for the new creditors N+
is between 1 and 2. The numerical example is not designed to match any data, and the
qualitative features of this example are robust to parameter and distribution choices.
Figure 2 plots the total firm value normalized by fundamental (
V θN (F,Y )
Y ) against
the normalized value of the debt (
DθN (F,Y )
Y ) or equivalently the amount that has to be
borrowed XY in problem (3.11). The solid (dashed) line is the firm value with a single
creditor when the fundamental θ = G (θ = B). The dotted (dash-dotted) line is the firm
value with two creditors when the fundamental θ = G (θ = B). The thick solid segments
can be supported only by two creditors (the lower curves). A quick observation is that
when the value of debt is low, the firm values for one and two creditors converge. This
is because the firm has to honor the promised face value regardless of the fundamental
realization and the number of lenders.7 Thus, the choice of the number of creditors
has no impact on the firm value. As the value of debt increases, the two lines diverge
and, when both are feasible, the single creditor case always delivers a higher firm value.
This pattern suggests that the cost of inefficient liquidation is greater than the benefit
of interest reduction (lower continuation face value F+). However, since the curves end
on the x-axis at κθN ,
8 the lower curves for two creditor cases indeed extend farther
than their single creditor counterparts. This means that when the firm needs to borrow
beyond its single creditor debt capacities, it has to seek two creditors.
Figure 3 is a typical sample path of the firm. Areas are shaded when the state is
bad. The solid (dashed) line denotes the exogenous fundamental process Yt−1 (the face
value process Ft determined in equilibrium). I use bold segments when the firm chooses
two creditors. The values plotted at each period t are the state variables entering this
period: number of creditors Nt, the promised face value Ft, state θt, and fundamental
process Yt−1. Finally, the dotted bars plot the interest rates Ft
D
θt
Nt
(Ft,Yt−1)
during each
period.
The firm starts by borrowing the required investment I0 = 1 from one creditor in
a good state with an interest rate of 9% (a level of 1.09 in the plot). During period
1, the fundamental drops to 0.7. With a single creditor, the firm negotiates the actual
7 This case is possible since per period shock z has a compact support. So when F
Y
is sufficiently
small such that F
Y z
≤ 1, the firm will repay F in the next period in order to continue.
8 This is because
DθN (F,Y )
Y
≤ κθN by definition.
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payment down to the liquidation value 0.7 and issues new debt with a face value of 0.76
and an interest rate of 9% to finance the repayment. During period 2, the fundamental
keeps deteriorating to 0.49 and the state θ3 switches to bad. The firm again negotiates
the actual payment down to 0.49. In a bad state, however, the firm must refinance
this payment from two creditors, because the debt capacity with a single creditor is
insufficient to cover the liquidation value. The interest rate soars to 63%. The firm
enters period 3 with face value F3 = 0.8. During period 3, even though the state θ
is still bad, the fundamental dramatically improves and the firm is able to make the
promised repayment 0.8 and roll over the debt with a single creditor. The required
interest rate reduces to 49%. What happens during period 4 is very similar to period 1.
The state θ returns to good and the firm pays out and refinances the liquidation value
by borrowing from one creditor at an interest rate of 9%. On period 5, the fundamental
continues to improve to 1.23, and the firm can even issue risk free debt to finance the
0.77 debt obligation. This is possible since even if the project matures with the lowest
shock realization z = z = 0.63, the full value of the debt can still be repaid.9 Period
6 and 7 are similar to period 2 and 3: the state switches to bad, the financing costs for
the firm increases and two creditors are eventually required. Finally, during period 8,
the state θ returns to good and the realized fundamental improves to 1.14. Even so, the
borrowing capacity is only 1.14 × 1.27 = 1.45, which is not high enough to cover the
promised amount of 1.55 to the two creditors. The firm is then liquidated.
The first noticeable feature in figure 3 is that the firm switches to two creditors only
in the bad state θ = B when the fundamental deteriorates and consolidates back to a
single creditor structure when its performance improves. In the model, the firm is never
liquidated with a single incumbent creditor. Therefore, the extra pledgeability from two
creditors is costly, and the firm uses it only as a last line of defense. Second, the interest
rates are higher in general with more creditors. Why does this not contradict with
proposition 10, which states that having more creditors reduces interest rates? Even
though an exogenous increase in the number of creditors may increase pledgeability
and lower the interest rate, once the number of creditors is endogenized in equilibrium,
the firm only chooses to have more creditors when higher debt capacity is needed,
which occurs in worse states and causes higher interest rates. Empirically, Petersen and
9 To be specific, 1.23× 0.63 > 0.77.
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Rajan (1994) find that companies with more banking relationships also have higher cost
of credit.
3.6.2 When Do Firms Choose More Creditors?
Although dynamic programming discrete choice models generally do not deliver analyt-
ical tractability, I can provide a sufficient condition under which the firm increases the
number of creditors. This result inherits the idea from the previous subsection that the
firm has to borrow from more creditors when its debt capacity with fewer creditors is
insufficient. The next result argues that one of these scenarios is the case in which the
firm has performed poorly in the past. Here, I keep the time subscripts to avoid any
confusion.
Proposition 13 Suppose that the realized fundamental is low Ft ≥ NtλYt, the state is
bad θt+1 = B, and rollover is possible Ntλ ≤ κB. Then the continuation number of
creditors must strictly increase, NB?+ (NtλYt, Ft, Yt) > Nt.
Providing the proof here is worthwhile. Since NtλYt ≤ κBYt and NtλYt ≤ Ft, the firm
can roll over by paying the liquidation value to each creditor, totaling NtλYt. Because
the realized repayment to each creditor at period t + 1 is at most min{ Ft+1Nt+1 , λYt+1} ≤
λYt+1, the debt capacity in the bad state with Nt+1 creditors is bounded by
κBNt+1Yt ≤ (1− pi)Nt+1E(λYt+1) = (1− pi)µ(Nt+1λYt).
Since (1 − pi)µ < 1 by assumption (3.1), κBNt+1Yt < Nt+1λYt. The firm chooses a
continuation number of creditors N+ at least to finance the required repayment NtλYt.
Thus,
NtλYt ≤ κBN+Yt < N+λYt.
Therefore, N+ > Nt.
The intuition here is straightforward. For each individual creditor, the pledgeable
amount is at most the expected liquidation value. In the bad state, with probability pi,
the firm dies without payout in the next period. The assumption (1− pi)µ < 1 implies
that the expected liquidation value tomorrow is less than the liquidation value today.
So for each liquidation value that the firm has to pledge today, it must seek more than
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one creditor on average. Therefore, the number of creditors must strictly increase. This
result has also been empirically documented by Farinha and Santos (2002), who show
that firms are more likely to abandon a single creditor structure when the performance
measures are worse.10
3.6.3 Empirical Predictions Revisited
Recall that section 3.5 focused on the comparative statics of the number of creditors
on interest rates, the probabilities of liquidation, renegotiation, and default, and the
firm value. Now I discuss the corresponding implications in equilibrium, taking into
account that the firm chooses more creditors when it is in bad shape. As we have seen
in subsection 3.6.1, the implication of proposition 10 on the interest rate is reversed. The
equilibrium selection effect dominates the pledgeability effect, resulting in higher interest
rates associated with more creditors. However, as the direction predicted by proposition
12, the firm value is still lower with more creditors in equilibrium. The selection effect
that links more creditors with bad performance reinforces the comparative static result
in proposition 12. By the same reasoning, the liquidation probability jumps up with
more creditors in equilibrium.
Growth and the Number of Creditors
When the per period shock to fundamental zt on average improves, the future of the
firm becomes more promising. This situation has several effects. A direct effect is that
the firm has a higher liquidation value on average in the next period, which increases
the bargaining position of the creditors. Second, the firm in the next period is more
likely to have the resources to make the promised repayment or survive a negotiation.
Both effects improve the debt value as well as the debt capacity, and more creditors can
be supported.
Proposition 14 Suppose gi (i = a, b) are two density functions for z, and ga first-
order stochastically dominates gb. Then for any equilibrium under gb, there exists an
equilibrium under ga such that κ
θ,a ≥ κθ,b, where κθ,i are the corresponding debt capacity
10 The performance measures include liquidity, cash flow, leverage and so on.
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coefficients.11 In addition, the creditor capacity and the safe number of creditors are
both higher under ga, i.e., Na ≥ N b and Na ≥ N b.
Since first-order stochastic dominance implies that the average growth rate is higher,
a direct implication is that firms with higher growth rates can be associated with more
creditors. This is consistent with the empirical evidence documented by Farinha and
Santos (2002), who find that firms with a better growth perspective, as measured by
sales growth, tend to have more creditors.
3.7 The Value of Coordination Failure
3.7.1 Ex Post Efficient Policies
Coordination failure among creditors reduces the financial flexibility that the firm needs
during a crisis. Quite often, firms in distress or even default are more valuable as going
concerns than they are being liquidated piecemeal. In fact, because of the coordination
problem among creditors, many policies are designed to reduce or eliminate liquidation.
For example, the automatic stay clause, which halts creditors’ actions to claim a debtor’s
assets, and Chapter 11 reorganization, which promotes a constructive renegotiation with
all creditors collectively, both fall into this category. If the policies indeed eliminate all
ex post coordination failure and force multiple creditors to negotiate the debt as one,
then I show that such policies cause ex ante higher chances of liquidation and lower firm
values.
Committing to an ex post efficient negotiation is equivalent to a counterfactual
model in which the firm can borrow only from one creditor. With one creditor, the firm
at most repays the liquidation value if the project does not mature, independent of the
firm’s ability to switch to multiple creditors. Therefore, it is easy to see that the debt
capacities are still (κN1 , κ
B
1 ) given by (3.21) in this counterfactual case.
In the bad state, the debt capacity is κB1 = (1 − pi)µλ < λ, so when the realized
fundamental Y is sufficiently weak (F > λY ), repayment negotiation fails because the
firm cannot credibly pledge the liquidation payoff min(F, λY ) = λY > κB1 Y . Therefore,
11 The opposite direction holds too. That is, for any equilibrium under ga, there exists an equilibrium
under gb such that κ
θ,a ≥ κθ,b.
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the single-creditor counterfactual case has effectively no room for negotiation, when the
state is bad. On the contrary, in the true model if the firm is allowed to have multiple
creditors, it can pledge at least λY (in fact, κBY ), so a single creditor never liquidates.
Therefore, the expected probability of liquidation Lθ,T1 (F, Y ) is lower for the true model
compared with the counterfactual one.
Using the same example as in section 3.6, figure 4 plots the expected probability
of liquidation Lθ,∞1 (F, Y ) against the expected value of the debt conditional on the
current state θ = G (top panel) and θ = B (bottom panel). The solid (dashed) line
is the liquidation probability with a single creditor (two creditors) in the full model.
The dotted line is for the counterfactual model in which the number of creditors is
exogenously fixed at one.
As figure 4 illustrates, having two creditors generally means a higher liquidation
probability than having a single creditor in the true model because of the following two
adverse effects. The short-term effect is a higher probability of an immediate liquidation
in the next period, captured by lemma 4. The long-term effect is that more creditors
can secure a bigger repayment, which requires a larger continuation face value, which
in turn causes a higher liquidation probability in the future. Even so, the option of
having two creditors is still beneficial in the sense that it uniformly reduces the firm’s
liquidation probability with a single creditor compared with the counterfactual. The
possibility of having multiple creditors in the future and supporting a higher debt level
prevent an even sooner liquidation when the firm initially gets into trouble.
Firm values tell a similar story. Although establishing strict inequalities in a dy-
namic programming framework requires some work, the economics behind it is intuitive.
Without the costly mechanism to support a higher leverage by more creditors, the firm
fails even sooner, lowering its value.
Proposition 15 Let V θCF (F, Y ) be the firm value in the counterfactual world. Then for
any F > 0, V θCF (F, Y ) < V
θ
1 (F, Y ), and for any N > 1, there exists a nonempty set F
(may depend on N) such that V θCF (F, Y ) < V
θ
N (F, Y ) for all F ∈ F.
In this economy, since the creditors always break even, the total value of the firm
is a welfare criterion. As predicted by proposition 15, eliminating the possibility of a
coordination failure is socially inefficient. More interestingly, the result suggests that
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mistakenly sticking with a single creditor may be even more inefficient than having the
firm mistakenly end up with multiple creditors. This comparision between two types of
mistakes is also confirmed by the liquidation probability. In figure 4, for a substantial
range of fundamental values, the liquidation probability with two creditors in the true
model is strictly lower compared with the single creditor counterfactual.
These findings raise caution regarding ex post efficient procedures such as automatic
stay clause and Chapter 11 reorganization. These policies can be somewhat viewed as a
commitment that the creditors will accept ex post efficient offers. Although eliminating
ex post inefficiency, the policies also prevent the firm from utilizing enhanced pledge-
ability in the future. As we have seen, such policies lead to more likely liquidation,
lower firm value and lower welfare ex ante.
3.7.2 Collateral
Collateral is typically viewed as a means of securing a creditor’s position. It alleviates
the ex post coordination problem because the liquidating creditor can no longer pose
externalities on the secured creditors. In the extreme case, if all positions are secured,
then no ex post coordination failure exists. In the model this case is equivalent to the
previous counterfactual model in which the firm is exogenously restricted to borrowing
from only one creditor. All results in the previous subsection still hold, with the striking
prediction that firms that issue collateralized debts are more likely to be liquidated and
have lower values. In addition, counterintuitively collateralized debt also leads to lower
borrowing capacity compared with an uncollateralized instrument that is subject to ex
post coordination failure.
3.8 Renegotiation Frequency
How does renegotiation frequency affect the equilibrium outcome? Since renegotiation
happens each time the debt matures, it is equivalent to the debt maturity in the model.
To highlight the economic intuition, I simplify the model such that the shock zt = µ is
a constant and the transition matrix is symmetric pG = pB = p. Instead of shrinking
the debt maturity directly, I keep a stationary structure of one-period debt and extend
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the expected project duration. Letting
pˆi =
pi
T
, (3.28)
the expected project duration becomes E(τ pˆi) =
T
pi = TE(τpi), T times longer than in
the original model. This structure effectively shrinks the debt maturity to 1T period
under the original calendar time. I then pick the new growth rate µˆ and the switching
probability pˆ to match the first best firm values as defined in (3.3):
Vˆ θ?FB(Y |µˆ, pˆi, pˆ) = V θ?FB(Y |µ, pi, p) (3.29)
for both θ = G,B, so the firm quality is unaffected by the change in timescale. The
following lemma confirms that the proposed modifications are natural in the following
sense. First, the parameters of the game after the timescale change are well defined.
Second, when the period length is very small, the (probabilities of) changes in the state
variables are also very small.
Lemma 5 The new set of parameters after the timescale change pˆi = piT ∈ (0, 1), µˆ =
Tµ
Tµ−µ+1 > 1, and pˆ =
T−1+p(1−pi)
T−pi ∈ (0, 1) are well defined. In addition, as the effective
debt maturity goes to 0, i.e., when T → ∞, the new parameters satisfy pˆi = piT → 0,
µˆ→ 1, pˆ→ 0, and (1− pˆi)µˆ < 1.
From (3.21), an immediate implication of lemma 5 is κˆθ1 → λ. The next result
characterizes the debt capacity under the new timescale. The key feature is that with
more frequent negotiation, in the limit, the pledgeable amount in the bad state θ = B
approaches the liquidation value. Recall from the example in section 3.6 and proposi-
tion 13 that the debt capacity in the bad state is crucial for when the firm increases
the number of creditors. Therefore, the benefit of having multiple creditors becomes
negligible as the firm renegotiates more frequently. I denote the variables with hats as
the ones after the timescale change.
Proposition 16 When T →∞, the debt capacities κˆB → λ.
To understand this result, recall that the firm can only pledge the liquidation value
with a single creditor. Although more creditors indeed enforce more repayment by
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proposition 10, the ultimate source of this extra repayment is from the growth between
two negotiation dates. If the expected per period growth of the fundamental diminishes
(µˆ → 1), then the incremental pledgeability vanishes as well. Since renegotiation is
closely related to the debt maturity in the model and a troubled firm typically negotiates
the repayment at maturity in practice, the renegotiation frequency can be interpreted
as the debt maturity. With very short maturity,12 having multiple creditors provides
no extra pledgeability.
3.9 Possible Extensions
3.9.1 Staggered Debt
In this section, I explicitly consider the staggered debt structure. Everything stays the
same except for the (re)financing stage. After the entrepreneur decides the number of
new creditors, he specifies the order in which the new debt claims mature in the next
period. The creditors know their position in the maturity sequence, which controls the
binary renegotiation order. Denote n to be the creditor whose debt matures in the nth
place. Clearly, same as before, the ones who renegotiate earlier are in better positions.
Hence, the value of debt also depends on n:
Dθn,N (F, Y ) = E{pimin(F,Y z)N 1θ=G
+ (1− pi)[1min(F,NλY z)≤κθ′Y z min( FN , λY z)
+1min(F,NλY z)>κθ′Y z min(
F
N ,max(λY z − n−1N F, 0))]}.
The first two terms are the same as in (3.15). The last term captures the fact that
if rollover fails, the previous n − 1 creditors will reject the firm’s offers and claim
min(n−1N F, λY z) against the firm’s liquidation proceeds. The nth creditor can claim
the remaining cash from liquidation up to the full value of his claim. Define the total
value of debt as
DθN (F, Y ) =
N∑
n=1
Dθn,N (F, Y ).
Then, it is easy to see that DθN (F, Y ) defined above coincides with (3.15). Therefore,
the total value of debt and the firm’s problem are essentially unchanged.
12 For example, an overnight repo agreement.
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3.9.2 Trading of the Debt Claims in the Secondary Market
Because debt claims may be more valuable if held by some different number of investors,
so the creditors may have incentives to trade with others. Suppose after the firm issues
new debt claims in the refinancing stage, the new creditors can trade these claims free
of transaction costs. Then naturally trades will occur until the number of creditors
eventually maximizes the debt value. In the numerical example from section 3.6.1, for
instance, even if the firm issues debt to a single creditor, it is in the creditor’s best
interest to sell half of the claim to a second investor. As a matter of fact, it can be
shown that the number of creditors is often suboptimally high, which hurts the firm
value by Proposition 12.
This result is surprising because it suggests that better liquidity in the secondary
debt market undermines the firm’s ability to control its creditor dispersion and therefore
could potentially be bad for the firm. However, I must highlight that I am not claiming
a secondary corporate debt market is necessarily bad and should be banned all together.
In fact, He and Xiong (2012b) have studied the consequence of a liquidity crunch in
the secondary market. What is indeed worth noting here is that when the coordination
problem among the creditors is a major concern, trades among them may render the
pool of debt holders inefficiently large and thereby exacerbate rollover risks.
It is also interesting to contrast the result with Dewatripont’s comment that the
possibility of trading leads to ex post efficient consolidation of the claims. 13 To get
Dewatripont’s effect in this model, we need to allow for trades after the uncertainty is
realized (before the renegotiation). When rollover is going to fail in the current model,
the creditors have incentive to consolidate, similar to the discussion in section 3.7.1.
Here the timing is different. Trading after the new debts are issued in the refinancing
stage leads to sub-optimally large creditor pool, as dispersed ownership may make the
debt more valuable.
3.9.3 Uneven Concentration
So far, I have assumed that the firm must evenly distribute the face value of the debt
when refinancing from new creditors. However, this assumption is not crucial for the
13 The comment is made at the Nobel foundation conference on corporate finance (Stockholm, August
1995). See page 410 in Tirole (2006) for detailed discussions.
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intuition to work. The key economic force here is that having more creditors means
that each one of them can pose greater externalities on the others, causing coordina-
tion problems, which, on the other hand, improves their collective bargaining position
against the entrepreneur. Allowing creditors to have different shares of the loan does
not eliminate these channels.
Of course, the exact amount of externalities they create certainly depends on the
specific distribution of creditor size. For example, suppose there are two creditors. One
is large and the other is small. Renegotiating with the smaller creditor will be more
difficult, while forcing concession from the larger one will be easier. In the limit, if the
large lender holds almost the entire outstanding debt, then the outcome approaches
the single creditor case. The same economic forces can also potentially endogenize the
optimal debt concentration, an aspect that can be investigated by future research.
3.9.4 Private Savings by the Entrepreneur
Suppose the entrepreneur can save; that is, instead of raising just enough money to
roll over maturing debts, the firm can now borrow more and keep internal cash. The
relevant question regarding the equilibrium creditor dispersion becomes whether the
firm wishes to borrow from more creditors and save for the future. A rigorous analysis
of this problem is beyond the scope of this paper, but intuitively I conjecture that the
firm has no incentive to do so.
First, having more creditors increases the firm’s probability of liquidation. Moreover,
internal cash in the current model is unlikely to serve as a “cushion” that provides
“the last source of repayment”, as one might imagine. Recall that the project has no
cash flow. Therefore, additional cash can only be raised by promising an even higher
repayment (weakly positive interest rate). Because the internal cash can always be
seized so, when the debt becomes due in the next period, this additional repayment
may hardly be renegotiated down even when the liquidation value of the project is
very low. Thus, the private cash savings will be insufficient to meet the associated
additional repayment, let alone to be the source of funds for the original level of debt.
To summarize, having internal cash may not benefit the firm. It gives each creditor a
stronger bargaining position as the liquidation value of the firm (including both project
and cash) increases, which in turn exacerbates the coordination problem among the
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lenders.
3.9.5 Entrepreneur’s Liquidation Incentive
The endogenous parameter assumption κθ ≥ λ in proposition 9 rules out the en-
trepreneur’s incentive to voluntarily liquidate the project. Without this assumption,
the entrepreneur may wish to liquidate in equilibrium. For example, in a bad state, if
the entrepreneur definitely foresees a liquidation tomorrow, he is better off voluntarily
liquidating today, since the liquidation payoff λYt is higher than the continuation value
(1− pi)λEt(Ytzt+1) = (1− pi)µλYt. An interesting study would investigate how creditor
dispersion interacts with the entrepreneur’s liquidation decision. This topic is left for
future research.
3.10 Conclusion
I build a dynamic model in which the firm must repeatedly roll over debt and can
renegotiate repayment. Having more creditors brings the disadvantage of coordination
problems, which in bad times make it harder for a firm to restructure its debt to avoid
liquidation. In good times, however, these same coordination problems enhance pledge-
ability by making it harder for a firm to opportunistically hold up its creditors. In the
model, the firm actively chooses the number of creditors over time by optimally trading
off pledgeability with the liquidation probability.
Analysis of the model shows that firms increase the number of creditors when they
perform badly. Doing so increases the liquidation probability and lowers the firm value.
Allowing for coordination failure in equilibrium is valuable and policies that commit
the creditors to ex post efficient coordination reduce the firm value and may raise the
liquidation probability. If the firm can renegotiate the debt very frequently, the enhanced
pledgeability from multiple creditors diminishes.
The model’s implications highlight the potential for selection bias in empirical stud-
ies that investigate the effect of creditor dispersion. For example, an exogenous increase
in the number of creditors lowers the required interest rate due to the firm’s better re-
payment incentives. In equilibrium, however, this relationship is reversed because firms
choose more creditors when they are in trouble, which in turn leads to higher interest
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rate.
Finally, having outstanding debt may provide the entrepreneur with the incentive to
inefficiently continue the project, for example, risk shifting and gambling for survival.
The received wisdom is that a higher level of debt exacerbates the problem and increases
the inefficiency associated with such continuation bias. In this paper, I make parameter
assumptions such that continuing the project is always efficient.14 Therefore, there
is no debt-equity conflict in continuing the project inefficiently. Instead, if abandoning
the project is optimal in certain states, then having outstanding debt generates non-
monotonic outcomes in my model, in contrast with the aforementioned intuition. When
leverage is low, the entrepreneur implements the first best liquidation strategy. When
leverage is high, the efficient liquidation can still be implemented. In this case, even
though the entrepreneur is willing to gamble for survival, the creditors refuse to rollover
and force an efficient termination. In addition, an intermediate case may exist, in which
the debt level is high enough to distort the entrepreneur’s liquidation incentive, but
not too high to spur the creditors into action. Intuitively, having more creditors in this
intermediate case may facilitate restoring the efficient liquidation strategy and correct
the entrepreneur’s continuation bias. A more rigorous analysis is required to further
investigate this problem and I look forward to future research that can shed light on
this issue.
14 To be specific, condition (3.4).
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Appendix A
A.1 Proof of Results
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose to the contrary that a′ ≥ a′′. Since firms a′ and a′′
follow different strategies, a′ > a′′. Let P ′1 and P ′2 (respectively, P ′′1 and P ′′2 ) be the
prices associated with s′1 and s′2 (respectively, s′′1 and s′′2). Also, let 1′ and 1′′ be the
investment decisions of firms a′ and a′′.
From the equilibrium conditions,
a′′ + S − s′′1 − s′′2 + b1′′
1− s′′1
P ′′1
− s′′2
P ′′2
≥ a
′′ + S − s′1 − s′2 + b1′
1− s′1
P ′1
− s′2
P ′2
. (A.1)
By supposition, and given optimal investment decisions, the numerator of the LHS is
strictly smaller than the numerator of RHS. Hence the denominator of the LHS must
also be strictly smaller, i.e.,
1− s
′′
1
P ′′1
− s
′′
2
P ′′2
< 1− s
′
1
P ′1
− s
′
2
P ′2
. (A.2)
Also from the equilibrium conditions,
a′ + S − s′1 − s′2 + b1′
1− s′1
P ′1
− s′2
P ′2
≥ a
′ + S − s′′1 − s′′2 + b1′′
1− s′′1
P ′′1
− s′′2
P ′′2
.
From (A.2),
a′ − a′′
1− s′1
P ′1
− s′2
P ′2
<
a′ − a′′
1− s′′1
P ′′1
− s′′2
P ′′2
,
which implies
a′′ + S − s′1 − s′2 + b1′
1− s′1
P ′1
− s′2
P ′2
>
a′′ + S − s′′1 − s′′2 + b1′′
1− s′′1
P ′′1
− s′′2
P ′′2
,
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contradicting the equilibrium condition (A.1) and completing the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1: Suppose to the contrary that the claim does not hold, i.e.,
there exists an equilibrium in which there are firms a′ and a′′ > a′ where a′′ invests and
a′ does not invest. Since investment decisions are optimal, the capital transactions of
firms a′ and a′′, say (s′1, s′2) and (s′′1, s′′2), must satisfy S − s′1 − s′2 < I ≤ S − s′′1 − s′′2.
This contradicts Lemma 1, completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1: Suppose otherwise. Let s1 (a) be the strategy of firm a,
and Arep = {a : s1 (a) > 0} be the set of firms who repurchase in equilibrium. By
supposition, µ (Arep) > 0. On the one hand, a firm prefers repurchasing to doing
nothing if and only if a+S−s1
1− s1
P1(s1)
≥ a + S, or equivalently, P1 (s1) ≤ a + S. Since by
supposition a strictly positive mass of repurchasing firms have a strict preference for
repurchasing,
E [P1 (s1 (a))− (a+ S) |a ∈ Arep] < 0.
One the other hand, investors only sell if P1 (s1) ≥ E
[
a+S−s1
1− s1
P1(s1)
|s1
]
, or equivalently,
P1 (s1) ≥ E [a|s1] + S. By the law of iterated expectations, this implies
E [P1 (s1 (a))− (a+ S) |a ∈ Arep] ≥ 0.
The contradiction completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2: Fix an equilibrium. From Proposition 1, there cannot be a
positive mass of firms who repurchase and obtain P3 > a+S. By a parallel proof, there
cannot be a positive mass of firms who issue, do not invest, and obtain P3 > a+ S. By
(2.4), any issue s that is enough for investment is associated with the price
P1 (s) = S + E [a|s] + b. (A.3)
Given these observations, standard arguments then imply that there exists some ε > 0
such that almost all firms in [a, a+ ε] issue and invest: if an equilibrium does not have
this property, then these firms certainly have the incentive to deviate and issue and
invest, since this is profitable under any investor beliefs. So by Corollary 1, there exists
a∗ > a such that all firms in [a, a∗) issue and invest.
Finally, suppose that contrary to the claimed result that different firms in [a, a∗)
issue different amounts. Given Lemma 1, it follows that there exists aˇ ∈ (a, a∗) such
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that any firm in [a, aˇ) issues strictly more than any firm in (aˇ, a∗). Hence there must
exist firms a′ ∈ [a, aˇ) and a′′ ∈ (aˇ, a∗) such that
P1
(
s
(
a′
)) ≤ S + a′ + b < S + a′′ + b ≤ P1 (s (a′′)) .
Since −s (a′) > −s (a′′), this combines with the equilibrium condition for firm a′ to
deliver the following contradiction, which completes the proof:
S − s (a′′) + a′ + b
1− s(a′′)P1(s(a′′))
≤ S − s (a
′) + a′ + b
1− s(a′)P1(s(a′))
≤ S − s (a
′′) + a′ + b
1− s(a′′)P1(s(a′))
<
S − s (a′′) + a′ + b
1− s(a′′)P1(s(a′′))
.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Preliminaries:
Given any date 1 repurchase level s1 > 0, define a
∗(s1) to be the smallest solution
of
1
1 + I−S+s1S−s1+E[a|a≤a∗]+b
(I + a∗ + b)− (S − s1 + a∗) = 0. (A.4)
We first show that a∗(s1) is well-defined, decreasing in s1, and lies in (a, a¯). The proof is
as follows. The LHS of (A.4) is strictly positive at a∗ = a. The LHS of (A.4) is strictly
decreasing in s1 for any a
∗ > a. Consequently, (2.6) implies that the LHS of (A.4) is
strictly negative at a∗ = a¯. Existence of a∗(s1) follows by continuity. The other two
properties are immediate.
Observe that at s1 = 0 and a1 = a,
1
1− s1S+a¯
1
1 + I−S+s1S−s1+E[a|a≤a1]+b
(I + a1 + b) > S + a1. (A.5)
By continuity, choose a¯1 > a and s¯1 > 0 such that inequality (A.5) holds for all
(a1, s1) ∈[a, a¯1]×[0, s¯1]. Note that a∗ (s1) > a¯1.
Fix s1 ∈ (0,min
{
s¯1,
S
2
}
] sufficiently small such that
max
{
I − S + s1
S − s1 + E
[
a|a < a∗(S2 )
]
+ b
,
I − S + s1
S − s1 + E [a|a < a¯1] + b
}
≤ I − S
S + a+ b
. (A.6)
Given s1, we explicitly construct an equilibrium. There are two cases, corresponding to
whether S + a∗ (s1) is larger or smaller than S + E [a] + bPr (a ≤ a∗ (s1)). In the first
case, all firms repurchase s1 at date 1, and then a strict subset of firms issue I + s1− S
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at date 2. In the second case, some firms repurchase s1 at date 1, with a strict subset
then issuing I + s1 − S at date 2; while other firms do nothing at date 1, with a strict
subset then issuing I − S at date 2. In both cases, any off-equilibrium repurchase offer
triggers investor beliefs that the firm is type a¯, while any off-equilibrium issue offer
triggers beliefs that the firm is type a.
Case 1: S + a∗ (s1) ≥ S + E [a] + bPr (a ≤ a∗ (s1)).
In this (easier) case, we show there is an equilibrium in which at date 1 all firms
repurchase s1; and at date 2 firms a ≤ a∗ (s1) issue I − S + s1 and invest, while other
firms do nothing at date 2. The date 1 repurchase price P1 and date 2 issue price P2 in
such an equilibrium are
P1 = S + E [a] + bPr (a ≤ a∗ (s1))
P2 =
S − s1 + E [a|a ≤ a∗ (s1)] + b
1− s1P1
.
Hence the payoff for a firm a from repurchase-issue is
1
1− s1P1 + I−S+s1P2
(I + a+ b) =
1
1− s1P1
I + a+ b
1 + I−S+s1S−s1+E[a|a≤a∗(s1)]+b
. (A.7)
By (A.6) and a∗ (s1) > a¯1, the payoff (A.7) is at least
1
1− s1P1
I + a+ b
1 + I−SS+a+b
>
I + a+ b
1 + I−SS+a+b
.
The RHS of this inequality is the payoff to issuing directly given out-of-equilibrium
beliefs in which direct issue is associated with the worst firm a. Hence all firms prefer
the equilibrium repurchase-issue strategy to the off-equilibrium direct issue strategy.
Firms a ≥ a∗(s1) prefer repurchase-do-nothing to do-nothing. To see this, simply
note that the payoff for a firm a from repurchase-do-nothing is S−s1+a
1− s1
P1
, which exceeds
the payoff from do-nothing, i.e., S + a, if and only if P1 ≤ S + a. Since we are in Case
1, this condition is satisfied for all firms a ≥ a∗(s1).
Firms a ≥ a∗(s1) prefer repurchase-do-nothing to repurchase-issue by the definition
of a∗(s1).
Likewise, firms a ≤ a∗(s1) prefer repurchase-issue to repurchase-do-nothing by the
definition of a∗(s1).
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Finally, firms a ≤ a∗(s1) prefer repurchase-issue to do-nothing because this is true
for firm a∗ (s1); and is also true for firm a, since this firm prefers direct issue to do-
nothing. Since all payoffs are linear in firm type, it then follow that all firms between a
and a? (s1) likewise prefer repurchase-issue to do-nothing.
Case 2: S + a∗ (s1) < S + E(a) + bPr (a ≤ a∗ (s1)).
In this case, we show there exists a1 and a2, along with a partition A0, A1 of [a, a1],
such that the following is an equilibrium: At date 1 firms A1∪[a2, a¯] repurchase s1,
while other firms do nothing; and at date 2 firms A1 issue I − S + s1 and invest, firms
A0 directly issue I − S (without previously repurchasing), and the remaining firms do
nothing.
In such an equilibrium, the date 1 repurchase price P1 and date 2 issue price P2
following repurchase are
P1 = S +
E [a|A1]µ (A1) + E [a|a ≥ a2]µ ([a2, a¯]) + bµ (A1)
µ (A1) + µ ([a2, a¯])
P2 =
S − s1 + E [a|A1] + b
1− s1P1
.
We show that there exist a1, a2 ∈ [a, a¯] and a1 < a2, together with a partition A0, A1 of
[a, a1], that solve the following system of equations (where P1 is as defined immediately
above):
1
1− s1P1
1
1 + I−S+s1S−s1+E[a|A1]+b
(I + a1 + b) = S + a1 (A.8)
1
1− s1P1
1
1 + I−S+s1S−s1+E[a|A1]+b
=
1
1 + I−SS+E[a|A0]+b
(A.9)
P1 = S + a2 (A.10)
Condition (A.8) states that firm a1 is indifferent between repurchase-issue and do-
nothing. Condition (A.9) states that firms are indifferent between repurchasing and
then issuing, and issuing directly. Condition (A.10) states that firm a2 is indifferent
between repurchase-do-nothing and do-nothing.
Notationally, define γ0 ≡ µ(A0)µ([a,a1]) and E0 ≡ E [a|A0], and note that E [a|A1] =
E[a|a≤a1]−γ0E0
1−γ0 . The system of equations (A.8)-(A.10) has a solution if and only if the
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following system has a solution in γ0, E0, a1 and a2:
1
1− s1S+a2
1
1 + I−S+s1
S−s1+E[a|a≤a1]−γ0E01−γ0 +b
(I + a1 + b)− (S + a1) = 0 (A.11)
1
1 + I−SS+E0+b
(I + a1 + b)− (S + a1) = 0 (A.12)
(E [a|a ≤ a1]− γ0E0)µ ([a, a1]) + E [a|a ≥ a2]µ ([a2, a¯])
(1− γ0)µ ([a, a1]) + µ ([a2, a¯])
+
b (1− γ0)µ ([a, a1])
(1− γ0)µ ([a, a1]) + µ ([a2, a¯])
− a2 = 0 (A.13)
along with the additional restriction that E0 is consistent with γ0 and a1. (At γ0 = 0
this consistency condition is simply that E0 lies in the interval [a, a1]. As γ0 increases,
the lower bound of this interval increases and the upper bound decreases, with both
continuous in γ0.)
Claim (i): There exists aˆ ∈[a¯1, a¯] such that for γ0 = 0 and a1 ∈[aˆ, a∗(s1)], equa-
tion (A.11) has a unique solution in a2, which we denote a2 (a1) . Moreover, a2 (a1) is
continuous in a1, with a2 (aˆ) = a¯ and a2 (a
∗ (s1)) = a∗ (s1), and a2 (a1) ∈ (a1, a¯) for
a1 ∈ (aˆ, a∗(s1)).
Proof of Claim (i): The LHS of (A.11) is strictly decreasing in a2, so if a solution
exists it is continuous. By the definition of a∗ (s1), the LHS of (A.4) is positive for all
a1 ∈ [a, a∗ (s1)], and strictly so except for at a1 = a∗ (s1). Consequently, the LHS of
(A.11) evaluated at a2 = a1 is greater than
S−s1+a1
1− s1
S+a1
− (S + a1) = 0, and strictly so
except for at a1 = a
∗ (s1). So at a1 = a∗ (s1) we have a2 (a1) = a1, while for a1 < a∗ (s1)
any solution to (A.11) must strictly exceed a1.
Evaluated at a1 = a¯1 and a2 = a¯, the LHS of (A.11) is strictly positive, by (A.5).
Evaluated at a1 = a
∗ (s1) and a2 = a¯, the LHS of (A.11) is
S − s1 + a∗ (s1)
1− s1S+a¯
− (S + a∗ (s1)) = (S + a¯) S − s1 + a
∗ (s1)
S − s1 + a¯ − (S + a
∗ (s1)) < 0.
So by continuity, there exists aˆ ∈(a¯1, a∗ (s1)) such that, for all a1 ∈(aˆ, a∗(s1)), the LHS
of (A.11) evaluated at a2 = a¯ is strictly negative, while at a1 = aˆ it is exactly zero.
Consequently, for a1 ∈[aˆ, a∗(s1)] equation (A.11) has a unique solution in a2. The
solution lies in the interval [a1, a¯]; equals a1 when a1 = a
∗(s1); equals a¯ when a1 = aˆ;
and lies in (a1, a¯) otherwise. This completes the proof of the Claim (i).
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Claim (ii): There exists γ¯0 > 0 such that (A.12) has a unique solution, E0(a1) say,
when γ0 ∈ [0, γ¯0] and a1 ∈ [aˆ, a∗ (s1)]. Moreover, the solution E0(a1) is independent of
γ0, and is consistent with a1 and γ0.
Proof of Claim (ii): From Claim (i), (A.11) has a unique solution in a2 when γ0 = 0
and a1 ∈ [aˆ, a∗ (s1)]. A necessary condition for (A.11) to have a solution is that the LHS
of (A.11) is weakly negative at a2 = a¯. From (A.6), and the fact that a1 ≥ aˆ ≥ a¯1, we
know 1
1+ I−S
S+a+b
< 1
1− s1
S+a¯
1
1+
I−S+s1
S−s1+E[a|a≤a1]+b
. Hence the LHS of (A.12) is strictly negative
when E0 = a. Conversely, the LHS of (A.12) is strictly positive when E0 = a1. Finally,
noting that the LHS of (A.12) is strictly increasing in E0 completes the proof of Claim
(ii).
Since (A.11) is strictly decreasing in a2, it follows from Claims (i) and (ii) that there
exist continuous functions a2 (a1; γ0) , aˆ (γ0) , a
∗ (s1; γ0) of γ0 ∈ [0, γ¯0] such that for all
a1 ∈ [aˆ (γ0) , a∗ (s1; γ0)], the unique solution of (A.11) and (A.12) is (a2 (a1; γ0) , E0 (a1));
and moreover, (a2 (a1; 0) , aˆ (0) , a
∗ (s1; 0)) = (a2 (a1) , aˆ, a∗ (s1)). Moreover, it is straight-
forward to see that for any γ0 ∈ [0, γ¯0], a2 (a1; γ0) is continuous in a1.
At γ0 = 0, the LHS of (A.13) evaluated at (a1, a2, E0) = (aˆ(γ0), a2(aˆ(γ0); γ0),
E0(aˆ(γ0))) equals E [a|a ≤ a1] + b − a¯, which is strictly negative by (2.7); while eval-
uated at (a1, a2, E0) = (a
∗ (s1; γ0) , a2 (a∗ (s1; γ0) ; γ0) , E0 (a∗ (s1; γ0))) it equals E [a] +
bPr (a ≤ a∗ (s1))− a∗ (s1), which is strictly positive since we are in Case 2. By continu-
ity, the same two statements also hold for γ0 small but strictly positive. Fix any such γ0.
By continuity, there then exists exists (a1, a2 (a1; γ0) , E0 (a1)) that satisfies equations
(A.11)-(A.13). This completes the treatment of this case, and hence the proof.
Lemma A-1 There is no equilibrium in which almost all firms invest.
Proof of Lemma A-1: Suppose to the contrary that there is an equilibrium in which
almost all firms invest. By assumption (2.6), it follows that there is a firm a′ that invests
and such that a′ > E [a] and
S + a′ >
I + a′ + b
1 + I−SS+E[a]+b
.
Let (s1, s2) be the strategy of firm a
′, and let (P1, P2) be the associated prices. So the
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equilibrium condition for firm a′ implies
S − s1 − s2 + a′ + b
1− s1P1 − s2P2
≥ S + a′ > I + a
′ + b
1 + I−SS+E[a]+b
≥ S − s1 − s2 + a
′ + b
1− s1+s2S+E[a]+b
,
where the final inequality makes use of −s1 − s2 ≥ I − S (since firm a′ invests) and
a′ > E [a]. Since any firm has the option of following strategy (s1, s2), it follows that
the equilibrium payoff of an arbitrary firm a is at least
S − s1 − s2 + a+ b
1− s1P1 − s2P2
>
S − s1 − s2 + a+ b
1− s1+s2S+E[a]+b
.
Consequently, the unconditional expected firm payoff is strictly greater than
E
[
S − s1 − s2 + a+ b
1− s1+s2S+E[a]+b
]
= S + E [a] + b.
But this violates investor rationality (formally, it violates (2.4)), giving a contradiction
and completing the proof.
Corollary A-2 In any equilibrium, there is a non-empty interval [a¯− δ, a¯] of firms that
do not invest.
Proof of Corollary A-2: Immediate from Corollary 1 and Lemma A-1.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Claim: There is a non-empty interval [a¯− δ, a¯] of firms that make strictly positive
profits, i.e., obtain a payoff strictly in excess of S + a.
Proof of Claim: Suppose to the contrary that this is not the case. i.e., that one can
find a firm a arbitrarily close to a¯ that has a payoff of S + a.
Consider any repurchase offer s1 > 0. If P1 (s1) < S + a¯, then by supposition one can
find a firm that could strictly increase its payoff by repurchasing s1, a contradiction.
Hence P1 (s1) ≥ S + a¯. So from (2.4), the beliefs associated with s1 must be such that
E [a+ b1S−s1−s2≥I |s1] ≥ a¯. (A.14)
There are two separate cases, which we deal with in turn. In the first case, E [a|s1] = a¯.
By the NDOC restriction on beliefs, it follows that if the firm offers s2 = S− s1− I < 0
so that investment is possible, the firm’s equilibrium payoff (2.5) is
I + a+ b(
1− s1S+a¯+b
)(
1− S−s1−IS−s1+a¯+b
) = I + a+ b
I + a¯+ b
(S + a¯+ b) > S + a,
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where the inequality follows from I > S and b > 0. Consequently, any firm a is able to
achieve a payoff strictly in excess of S + a by first repurchasing s1 and then at date 2
issuing enough shares to fund investment I. The contradiction completes the proof of
the claim.
The remainder of the proof deals with the second case, in which E [a|s1] < a¯. In
this case, inequality (A.14) implies that Pr (s2 s.t. S − s1 − s2 ≥ I|s1) > 0, and hence
that there exists s2 with S− s1− s2 ≥ I such that E [a+ b|s1, s2] ≥ a¯. So by (2.3), firm
a’s payoff from playing (s1, s2) is weakly greater than
S − s1 − s2 + a+ b(
1− s1P1(s1)
)(
1− s2S−s1+a¯
) .
By the equilibrium condition, the unconditional expected equilibrium payoff of a firm
is at least
S − s1 − s2 + E [a] + b(
1− s1P1(s1)
)(
1− s2S−s1+a¯
) ≥ I + E [a] + b(
1− s1P1(s1)
)(
I+a¯
S−s1+a¯
) , (A.15)
where the inequality follows from (2.7) and S − s1 − s2 ≥ I.
Since P1 (s1) is bounded below by S+a, the term
s1
P1(s1)
approaches 0 as s1 approaches
0. Consequently, the limiting value of the RHS of (A.15) is
(I + E [a] + b)
S + a¯
I + a¯
. (A.16)
Because the above argument holds for any initial choice of s1 > 0, the unconditional
expected equilibrium payoff of a firm is at least (A.16). Moreover, by (2.7), expression
(A.16) is itself strictly greater than S + E [a] + b. But this violates investor rationality
(formally, it violates (2.4)), giving a contradiction.
Completing the proof: By Corollary A-2 and the Claim, there exists δ′ > 0 such that
all firms in
[
a¯− δ′, a¯] make strictly positive profits and do not invest. Let ε > 0 be the
minimum profits made by a firm in this interval. (Note that the minimum is well-defined
because a firm’s equilibrium payoff is continuous in a: if this is not the case, there is
a profitable deviation for some a.) Then choose δ ∈ (0, δ′) sufficiently small such that,
for all a ∈ [a¯− δ, a¯], a + ε > a¯,a + b > a¯, and (S + a) a¯a < S + a + ε. To complete the
proof, we show all firms in [a¯− δ, a¯] repurchase, and make strictly positive profits from
the repurchase transaction.
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Suppose to the contrary that there exists some firm a ∈ [a¯− δ, a¯] that either does
not repurchase, or else makes weakly negative profits from the repurchase: formally,
either s1 (a) ≤ 0, or s1 (a) > 0 with P1 (s1 (a)) ≥ S + a; and either s2 (a) ≤ 0, or
s2 (a) > 0 with P2 (s1 (a) , s2 (a)) ≥ S−s1(a)+a
1− s1(a)
P1(s1(a))
.
We first show that firm a’s payoff is bounded above by
S − s1 (a) + a¯
1− s1(a)P1(s1(a))
. (A.17)
If s2 (a) > 0 this is immediate. Otherwise, (2.5) and the fact that by (2.3) (and using
a ≤ a¯ and the firm does not invest) P2 (s1 (a) , s2 (a)) ≤ S−s1(a)+a¯
1− s1(a)
P1(s1(a))
together imply that
the firm’s payoff is bounded above by
S − s1 (a)− s2 (a) + a(
1− s1(a)P1(s1(a))
)(
1− s2(a)S−s1(a)+a¯
) = S − s1 (a) + a¯
1− s1(a)P1(s1(a))
S − s1 (a)− s2 (a) + a
S − s1 (a)− s2 (a) + a¯ ,
which is below expression (A.17).
If s1 (a) > 0, expression (A.17) is in turn bounded above by
S − s1 (a) + a¯
1− s1(a)S+a
= (S + a)
S − s1 (a) + a¯
S − s1 (a) + a ≤ (S + a)
a¯
a
.
But this is less than S + a+ ε, a contradiction.
Consequently, it must be the case that s1 (a) ≤ 0. Observe that if P1 (s1 (a)) ≤
S + a+ ε, from (A.17) and the fact that a+ ε > a¯, firm a’s payoff is bounded above by
(S + a+ ε)
S − s1 (a) + a¯
S − s1 (a) + a+ ε < S + a+ ε,
which again is a contradiction. Hence P1 (s1 (a)) > S + a + ε > S + a¯. It then follows
from (2.4) that there must exist s2 such that S − s1 (a)− s2 ≥ I and
E [S + a+ b1S−s1−s2≥I |s1 = s1 (a) , s2] ≥ P1 (s1 (a)) . (A.18)
On the one hand, the equilibrium payoff of firm a ∈ A is—using (A.17), together with
P1 (s1 (a)) > S + a¯—bounded above by
P1 (s1 (a))
S − s1 (a) + a¯
P1 (s1 (a))− s1 (a) ≤ P1 (s1 (a))
I + a¯
P1 (s1 (a)) + I − S .
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On the other hand, the payoff to firm a to instead deviating and using strategy (s1 (a) , s2),
where s2 is as above, is bounded below by
S − s1 (a)− s2 + a+ b
1− s1(a)+s2P1(s1(a))
≥ min
{
P1 (s1 (a)) , P1 (s1 (a))
I + a+ b
P1 (s1 (a)) + I − S
}
.
Since this is strictly greater than the upper bound on firm a’s equilibrium payoff, firm a
has the incentive to deviate. This contradicts the equilibrium condition, and completes
the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Perturbation (I), exogenous probability of no capital market transaction at date 1:
Under this perturbation, if a firm undertakes transactions s1 and s2 = − (I − S + s1)
at date 2, so that it is just able to invest, the date 2 price is
P2 =
S − s1 + E [a|s1, s2] + b
1− s1P1
and the firm’s payoff is
I + a+ b
1− s1P1 + I−S+s1P2
=
1
1− s1P1
I + a+ b
1 + I−S+s1S−s1+E[a|s1,s2]+b
. (A.19)
Preliminaries: Consider an open set K of s1 ∈ (0,min
{
s¯1,
S
2
}
] sufficiently small
such that
max
{
I − S + s1
S − s1 + E
[
a|a < a∗(S2 )
]
+ b
,
I − S + s1
S − s1 + E [a|a < a¯1] + b
}
≤ I − S
S + a+ b
. (A.20)
We next show that it is possible to pick some s1 ∈ K such that S+a∗ (s1) 6= S+E [a]+
bPr (a ≤ a∗ (s1)). Suppose otherwise,
S + a∗ (s1) = S + E [a] + bPr (a ≤ a∗ (s1)) (A.21)
holds identity on K. For any s1 such that a
∗(s1) is continuous, one can choose a
sequence of s1,n ∈ K such that limn→∞ s1,n → s1. By continuity, a∗(s1,n) → a∗(s1).
Notice that (A.21) holds for all s1,n as well as s1. Therefore, it must be a
∗(s1,n)−a∗(s1) =
b [Pr (a ≤ a∗ (s1,n))− Pr (a ≤ a∗ (s1))], which implies Pr(a≤a
∗(s1,n))−Pr(a≤a∗(s1))
a∗(s1,n)−a∗(s1) =
1
b . Tak-
ing the limit, we have f(a∗(s1)) = 1b for any continuity point s1. Because a
∗(s1) is a
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strictly decreasing function, so it can have at most countably many discontinuities. To-
gether, this argument suggests that f(a) = 1b for uncountably many a. A contradiction.
So we can choose an s1 ∈ K such that (A.21) does not hold.
Given s1, we explicitly construct an equilibrium. There are two cases, corresponding
to whether S+a∗ (s1) is strictly larger or strictly smaller than S+E [a]+bPr (a ≤ a∗ (s1)).
In the first case, all firms repurchase s1 at date 1, and then a strict subset of firms issue
I+s1−S at date 2. In the second case, some firms repurchase s1 at date 1, with a strict
subset then issuing I + s1 − S at date 2; while other firms do nothing at date 1, with a
strict subset then issuing I −S at date 2. In both cases, any off-equilibrium repurchase
offer triggers investor beliefs that the firm is type a¯, while any off-equilibrium issue offer
triggers beliefs that the firm is type a.
Formally, proof shows that: For any set of parameter values, for all α > 0 sufficiently
small, an equilibrium exists.
Case 1: S + a∗ (s1) > S + E [a] + bPr (a ≤ a∗ (s1)).
We construct an equilibrium in which: At date 1, all active firms other than some
subset A0 repurchase an amount s1. At date 2, firms that repurchased at date 1 and
have a ≤ a1issue I − S + s1 and invest, while firms that did not repurchase at date
1 and have a ≤ a3 issue I − S and invest. The set A0 and cutoffs a1 and a3 satisfy
A0 ⊂ [a, a1] ⊂ [a, a3].
The date 1 repurchase price is
P1 = S + E [a|a /∈ A0] + bPr (a ≤ a1|a /∈ A0)
and the equilibrium indifference conditions are
1
1− s1P1
I + a1 + b
1 + I−S+s1S−s1+E[a|a∈[a,a1]\A0]+b
=
S − s1 + a1
1− s1P1(
1− s1
P1
)(
1 +
I − S + s1
S − s1 + E [a|a ∈ [a, a1] \A0] + b
)
=
1 +
I − S
S + αµ([a,a3])E[a|a≤a3]+(1−α)µ(A0)E[a|A0]αµ([a,a3])+(1−α)µ(A0) + b
I + a3 + b
1 + I−S
S+
αµ([a,a3])E[a|a≤a3]+(1−α)µ(A0)E[a|A0]
αµ([a,a3])+(1−α)µ(A0) +b
= S + a3.
76
Respectively, these three conditions say that: firm a1 is indifferent between repurchase-
issue and repurchase-do-nothing; firms are indifferent between repurchase-issue and
direct-issue; firm a3 is indifferent between direct issue and do-nothing.
Notationally, define γ0 ≡ µ(A0)µ([a,a1]) and E0 ≡ E [a|A0]. Note that E [a|a /∈ A0] =
E[a]−γ0µ([a,a1])E0
1−γ0µ([a,a1]) and Pr (a ≤ a1|a /∈ A0) =
(1−γ0)µ([a,a1])
1−γ0µ([a,a1]) and µ ([a, a1] \A0) = (1− γ0)µ
([a, a1]) and E [a|a ∈ [a, a1] \A0] = E[a|a≤a1]−γ0E01−γ0 .
Hence
P1 (a1, E0) = S +
E [a]− γ0µ ([a, a1])E0 + b (1− γ0)µ ([a, a1])
1− γ0µ ([a, a1])
(A.22)
and the equilibrium indifference conditions are
I + a1 + b
1 + I−S+s1
S−s1+E[a|a≤a1]−γ0E01−γ0 +b
= S − s1 + a1 (A.23)
(
1− s1
P1 (a1, E0)
)1 + I − S + s1
S − s1 + E[a|a≤a1]−γ0E01−γ0 + b
 =
1 +
I − S
S + αµ([a,a3])E[a|a≤a3]+(1−α)γ0µ([a,a1])E0αµ([a,a3])+(1−α)γ0µ([a,a1]) + b
(A.24)
I + a3 + b
1 + I−S
S+
αµ([a,a3])E[a|a≤a3]+(1−α)γ0µ([a,a1])E0
αµ([a,a3])+(1−α)γ0µ([a,a1]) +b
= S + a3. (A.25)
For any γ0 > 0, let E0 (a1; γ0) be the value of E0 that solves (A.23) given a1. (The LHS
of (A.23) is strictly decreasing in E0 for γ0 > 0, so if a solution exists, it is unique.)
Note that E0 (a
∗ (s1) ; γ0) = E [a|a ≤ a∗ (s1)]. Recall that a∗ (s1) lies strictly between a
and a¯. Hence, for γ0 > 0, the LHS of (A.23) strictly exceeds the RHS at a1 = a
∗ (s1)
and E0 =
a+E[a|a≤a∗(s1)]
2 . Define a¯
∗ (γ0) ≥ a∗ (s1) by
a¯∗ (γ0) =
maxa1
 I+a˜1+b1+ I−S+s1
S−s1+
E[a|a≤a˜1]−γ0
a+E[a|a≤a˜1]
2
1−γ0 +b
− (S − s1 + a˜1) ≥ 0 for all a˜1 ∈ [a∗ (s1) , a1]
 .
Note that, by the definition of a∗ (s1), a¯∗ (0) = a∗ (s1). In addition, because the expres-
sion in the above definition is strictly increasing in γ0, so a¯
∗ (γ0) > a∗ (s1) for γ0 > 0.
Moreover, a¯∗ (γ0)→ a∗ (s1) as γ0 → 0.
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For the remainder of the proof, fix γ0 > 0 sufficiently small such that a¯
∗ (γ0) ≤ a¯, and
moreover (and using the fact we are in Case 1), such that for all a1 ∈ [a∗ (s1) , a¯∗ (γ0)],
S + a1 > S +
E [a]− γ0µ ([a, a1]) a+ b (1− γ0)µ ([a, a1])
1− γ0µ ([a, a1])
. (A.26)
Having fixed γ0 > 0, we omit the γ0 arguments in a¯
∗ and E0 (a1) for the remainder of
the proof.
By the definition of a∗ (s1), the LHS of (A.23) is strictly less than the RHS for
a1 > a
∗ (s1) and E0 = E [a|a ≤ a1]. Hence a+E[a|a≤a1]2 ≤ E0 (a1) < E [a|a ≤ a1] for
a1 ∈ (a∗ (s1) , a¯∗], with E0 (a¯∗) = a+E[a|a≤a
∗(s1)]
2 . Therefore the function E0 (a1) is
well-defined and continuous over [a∗ (s1) , a¯∗].
Define a3 (a1;α) as the value of a3 that solves (A.25), given a1 and E0 = E0 (a1).
Observe that the LHS of (A.25) strictly exceeds the RHS at α = 0, E0 ≥ a and
a3 = a. Moreover, by assumption (2.6), the LHS is strictly less than the RHS at α = 0,
E0 ≤ E [a] and a3 = a¯. Hence for a1 ∈ [a∗ (s1) , a¯∗], E0 = E0 (a1), and α = 0, there is
a unique value of a3 solving (A.25). By continuity, the same is true a1 ∈ [a∗ (s1) , a¯∗],
E0 = E0 (a1), and α sufficiently small. Note that a3 (a1;α) is continuous in both a1 and
α.
For use below, we next establish that a3 (a
∗ (s1) ; 0) > a∗ (s1). By definition,
I + a∗ (s1) + b
1 + I−S+s1S−s1+E[a|a≤a∗(s1)]+b
= S − s1 + a∗ (s1) .
Since a∗ (s1) > E [a|a ≤ a∗ (s1)], it is straightforward to show that
I + a∗ (s1) + b
1 + I−SS+E[a|a≤a∗(s1)]+b
> S + a∗ (s1) .
By definition, this last inequality is at equality if a∗ (s1) is replaced by a3 (a∗ (s1) ; 0).
Consequently, a3 (a
∗ (s1) ; 0) > a∗ (s1).
We now turn to (A.24). Since E0 (a¯
∗) = a < E [a|a ≤ a¯∗], and E [a|a ≤ a¯1] <
E [a|a ≤ a∗ (s1)] < E [a|a ≤ a¯∗],
I − S + s1
S − s1 + E[a|a≤a¯∗]−γ0E0(a¯∗)1−γ0 + b
<
I − S + s1
S − s1 + E [a|a ≤ a¯∗] + b <
I − S + s1
S − s1 + E [a|a ≤ a¯1] + b .
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Since certainly 1− s1P1(a1,E0) < 1, it follows from (A.20) that the LHS of (A.24) is strictly
less than the RHS at (a1, E0) = (a¯
∗, E0 (a¯∗)) and α = 0.
Next, we show that the LHS of (A.24) strictly exceeds the RHS at (a1, E0) =
(a∗ (s1) , E0 (a∗ (s1))) and α = 0. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose to the contrary
that, at (a1, E0) = (a
∗ (s1) , E0 (a∗ (s1))),(
1− s1
P1 (a1, E0)
)1 + I − S + s1
S − s1 + E[a|a≤a1]−γ0E01−γ0 + b
 ≤ 1 + I − S
S + E0 + b
. (A.27)
First, we show that at (a1, E0) = (a
∗ (s1) , E0 (a∗ (s1))),
P1 (a1, E0) < S + a1. (A.28)
To establish (A.28), note that because (a1, E0) = (a
∗ (s1) , E0 (a∗ (s1))) satisfies (A.23),
the combination of (A.23) and (A.27) implies
S − s1 + a1
1− s1P1(a1,E0)
≥ I + a1 + b
1 + I−SS+E0+b
.
Substituting in for a3 (a1), and using the earlier observation that a3 (a
∗ (s1) ; 0) >
a∗ (s1) = a1, we have
S − s1 + a1
1− s1P1(a1,E0)
≥ (I + a1 + b) (S + a3 (a
∗ (s1) ; 0))
I + a3 (a∗ (s1) ; 0) + b
> S + a1,
which is equivalent to (A.28).
Second, straightforward algebra implies
P1 (a1, E0) =
(1−γ0)µ([a,a1])
1−γ0µ([a,a1])
I+
E[a|a≤a1]−γ0E0
1−γ0 +b(
1− s1
P1
)1+ I−S+s1
S−s1+
E[a|a≤a1]−γ0E0
1−γ0 +b

+ 1−µ([a,a1])1−γ0µ([a,a1])
S−s1+E[a|a≥a1]
1− s1
P1
.
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Then (A.27) and (A.28) imply that at (a1, E0) = (a
∗ (s1) , E0 (a∗ (s1))),
P1 (a1, E0) >
(1− γ0)µ ([a, a1])
1− γ0µ ([a, a1])
I + E[a|a≤a1]−γ0E01−γ0 + b
1 + I−SS+E0+b
+
1− µ ([a, a1])
1− γ0µ ([a, a1])
(S + E [a|a ≥ a1])
=
(1− γ0)µ ([a, a1])
1− γ0µ ([a, a1])
(S + E [a|a ≤ a1] + b) +
1− µ ([a, a1])
1− γ0µ ([a, a1])
(S + E [a|a ≥ a1])
= S +
E [a]− γ0µ ([a, a1])E [a|a ≤ a1] + (1− γ0)µ ([a, a1]) b
1− γ0µ ([a, a1])
= P1 (a1, E0) ,
where the equality is simply (A.22). The contradiction completes the proof that the
LHS of (A.24) strictly exceeds the RHS at (a1, E0) = (a
∗ (s1) , E0 (a∗ (s1))) and α = 0.
By continuity, it follows that, for α = 0, there exists a∗∗1 ∈ (a∗ (s1) , a¯∗) such that
(a1, E0, a3) = (a
∗∗
1 , E0 (a
∗∗
1 ) , a3 (a
∗∗
1 ;α)) satisfies the required conditions (A.23), (A.24)
and (A.25). By continuity, the same statement holds true for all α > 0 sufficiently small.
Finally, to complete the proof of Case 1, we must show that all firms prefer the
equilibrium action described to doing nothing. It suffices to show this for firm a1. We
must show that firm a1 indeed profits from repurchasing its own stock, i.e., S + a1 >
P1 (a1, E0). This follows from (A.26), together with the fact that P1 satisfies (A.22),
E0 > γ0, and a1 ∈ [a∗ (s1) , a¯∗].
Case 2: S + a∗ (s1) < S + E(a) + bPr (a ≤ a∗ (s1)).
In this case, we show there exists a1, a2 along with a partition A0, A1 of [a, a1], such
that the following is an equilibrium: At date 1 firms A1∪[a2, a¯] repurchase s1, while
other firms do nothing; and at date 2 firms A1 issue I − S + s1 and invest, firms A0
directly issue I − S (without previously repurchasing), along with inactive firms [a, a1],
and the remaining firms do nothing.
In such an equilibrium, the date 1 repurchase price P1 and date 2 issue price P2
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following repurchase are
P1 = S +
E [a|A1]µ (A1) + E [a|a ≥ a2]µ ([a2, a¯]) + bµ (A1)
µ (A1) + µ ([a2, a¯])
P2 =
S − s1 + E [a|A1] + b
1− s1P1
.
We show that there exist a1, a2 ∈ [a, a¯], together with a partition A0, A1 of [a, a1], that
solve the following system of equations (where P1 is as defined immediately above):
S + a1 =
1
1− s1P1
1
1 + I−S+s1S−s1+E[a|A1]+b
(I + a1 + b) (A.29)
S + a2 = P1 (A.30)
1
1− s1P1
1
1 + I−S+s1S−s1+E[a|A1]+b
=
1
1 + I−S
S+
αµ([a,a1])E[a|a≤a1]+(1−α)µ(A0)E[a|A0]
αµ([a,a1])+(1−α)µ(A0) +b
(A.31)
Condition (A.29) states that firm a1 is indifferent between repurchase-issue and do-
nothing. Condition (A.30) states that firm a2 is indifferent between repurchase-do-
nothing and do-nothing. Condition (A.31) states that firms are indifferent between
repurchasing and then issuing, and issuing directly.
Notationally, define γ0 ≡ µ(A0)µ([a,a1]) and E0 ≡ E [a|A0], and note that E [a|A1] =
E[a|a≤a1]−γ0E0
1−γ0 . The system of equations (A.29)-(A.31) has a solution if and only if the
following system has a solution in γ0, E0, a1 and a2:
1
1− s1S+a2
I + a1 + b
1 + I−S+s1
S−s1+E[a|a≤a1]−γ0E01−γ0 +b
− (S + a1) = 0 (A.32)
I + a1 + b
1 + I−S
S+
αE[a|a≤a1]+(1−α)γ0E0
α+(1−α)γ0 +b
− (S + a1) = 0 (A.33)
(E [a|a ≤ a1]− γ0E0)µ ([a, a1]) + E [a|a ≥ a2]µ ([a2, a¯])
(1− γ0)µ ([a, a1]) + µ ([a2, a¯])
+
b (1− γ0)µ ([a, a1])
(1− γ0)µ ([a, a1]) + µ ([a2, a¯])
− a2 = 0 (A.34)
along with the additional restriction that E0 is consistent with γ0 and a1. (At γ0 = 0
this consistency condition is simply that E0 lies in the interval [a, a1]. As γ0 increases,
the lower bound of this interval increases and the upper bound decreases, with both
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continuous in γ0.) Note that equations (A.32) and (A.34) are simple rewritings of (A.29)
and (A.30), while (A.33) is obtained from combining (A.29) and (A.31).
Claim (i): There exists aˆ ∈[a¯1, a¯] such that for γ0 = 0 and a1 ∈[aˆ, a∗(s1)], equa-
tion (A.32) has a unique solution in a2, which we denote a2 (a1) . Moreover, a2 (a1) is
continuous in a1, with a2 (aˆ) = a¯ and a2 (a
∗ (s1)) = a∗ (s1), and a2 (a1) ∈ (a1, a¯) for
a1 ∈ (aˆ, a∗(s1)).
Proof of Claim (i): The LHS of (A.32) is strictly decreasing in a2, so if a solution
exists it is continuous. By the definition of a∗ (s1), the LHS of (A.4) is positive for all
a1 ∈ [a, a∗ (s1)], and strictly so except for at a1 = a∗ (s1). Consequently, the LHS of
(A.32) evaluated at a2 = a1 is greater than
S−s1+a1
1− s1
S+a1
− (S + a1) = 0, and strictly so
except for at a1 = a
∗ (s1). So at a1 = a∗ (s1) we have a2 (a1) = a1, while for a1 < a∗ (s1)
any solution to (A.32) must strictly exceed a1.
Evaluated at a1 = a¯1 and a2 = a¯, the LHS of (A.32) is strictly positive, by (A.5).
Evaluated at a1 = a
∗ (s1) and a2 = a¯, the LHS of (A.32) is
S − s1 + a∗ (s1)
1− s1S+a¯
− (S + a∗ (s1)) = (S + a¯) S − s1 + a
∗ (s1)
S − s1 + a¯ − (S + a
∗ (s1)) < 0.
So by continuity, there exists aˆ ∈(a¯1, a∗ (s1)) such that, for all a1 ∈(aˆ, a∗(s1)), the LHS
of (A.32) evaluated at a2 = a¯ is strictly negative, while at a1 = aˆ it is exactly zero.
Consequently, for a1 ∈[aˆ, a∗(s1)] and γ0 = 0, equation (A.32) has a unique solution
in a2. The solution lies in the interval [a1, a¯]; equals a1 when a1 = a
∗(s1); equals a¯ when
a1 = aˆ; and lies in (a1, a¯) otherwise. This completes the proof of the Claim (i).
Claim (ii): There exist constants γ¯0 > 0 and κ such that: If γ0 ≤ γ¯0, α ≤ γ0κ+γ0 , a1 ∈
[aˆ, a∗ (s1)], then there exists a unique E0 (a1; γ0, α) that solves (A.33), and moreover,
E0 (a1; γ0, α)is consistent with a1 and γ0.
Proof of Claim (ii): Fix a1 ∈ [aˆ, a∗ (s1)]. As a preliminary, note that, from Claim
(i), (A.32) has a unique solution in a2 when γ0 = 0 and a1 ∈ [aˆ, a∗ (s1)]. A nec-
essary condition for (A.32) to have a solution is that the LHS of (A.32) is weakly
negative at a2 = a¯. From (A.20), and the fact that a1 ≥ aˆ ≥ a¯1, we know 11+ I−S
S+a+b
<
1
1− s1
S+a¯
1
1+
I−S+s1
S−s1+E[a|a≤a1]+b
. Consequently,
I + a1 + b
1 + I−SS+a+b
− (S + a1) < 0.
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From this inequality, the LHS of (A.33) is strictly negative when α = 0, γ0 > 0 and
E0 = a. Conversely, the LHS of (A.33) is strictly positive when α = 0, γ0 > 0 and
E0 = a1. The LHS of (A.33) is strictly increasing in E0. Consequently, for α = 0 and
any γ0, there is a unique solution E0 to (A.33).
Moreover, there exists γ¯0 (independent of a1) such that, for γ0 ≤ γ¯0, the solution
E0 is consistent with a1 and γ0.
By continuity, there exists κ such that the same statement is true provided 1−αα γ0 ≥
κ, i.e., α ≤ γ0κ+γ0 , cmpleting the proof of Claim (ii).
Since (A.32) is strictly decreasing in a2, it follows from Claims (i) and (ii) that there
exist functions a2 (a1; γ0, α) , aˆ (γ0) , a
∗ (s1; γ0), continuous in γ0 and α, such that for all
a1 ∈ [aˆ (γ0) , a∗ (s1; γ0)], the unique solution of (A.32) and (A.33) is (a2 (a1; γ0, α) ,
E0 (a1; γ0, α)); and moreover, limγ0→0 (a2 (a1; γ0, 0) , aˆ (γ0) , a
∗ (s1; γ0)) = (a2 (a1) , aˆ,
a∗ (s1)). Define a2 (a1; 0, 0) ≡ limγ0→0 a2 (a1; γ0, 0). Moreover, it is straightforward
to see that for any γ0 ∈ [0, γ¯0], a2 (a1; γ0, 0) is continuous in a1.
At γ0 = 0, the LHS of (A.34) evaluated at (a1, a2, E0) = (aˆ (γ0) , a2 (aˆ (γ0) ; γ0, 0) ,
E0 (aˆ (γ0))) equals E [a|a ≤ a1] + b− a¯, which is strictly negative by (2.7); while evalu-
ated at (a1, a2, E0) = (a
∗ (s1; γ0) , a2 (a∗ (s1; γ0) ; γ0, 0) , E0 (a∗ (s1; γ0))) it equals E [a]+
bPr (a ≤ a∗ (s1))− a∗ (s1), which is strictly positive since we are in Case 2. By continu-
ity, the same two statements also hold for γ0 small but strictly positive. Fix any such
γ0. By continuity, there then exists (a1, a2 (a1; γ0, 0) , E0 (a1)) that satisfies equations
(A.32)-(A.34).
By a further application of continuity, for all α sufficiently small, there exists
(a1, a2 (a1; γ0, α) , E0 (a1;α)) that satisfies equations (A.32)-(A.34).
This completes the treatment of this case, and hence the construction proof. Finally,
we finish by proposing the following off equilibrium belief. Write (s˜1, s˜2) for an arbitrary
off-equilibrium action.
Off-equilibrium beliefs are as follows. Date 2 repurchases s˜2 > 0 are associated with
the best firm a¯ and issues s˜2 < 0 are associated with the worst firm a. At date 1,
repurchases s˜1 > 0 are associated with the best firm a¯ with probability 1 − ε and the
worst firm with probability ε; while issues s˜1 < 0 are associated with the best firm a¯
with probability ε and the worst firm a with probability 1− ε. Note that these date 1
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beliefs, together with the fact that with probability α > 0 all firm types do nothing at
date 1, mean that the specification of date 2 beliefs satisfies NDOC.
Write P˜1 and P˜2 for the associated off-equilibrium prices. Given the stated off-
equilibrium beliefs, there exists some κ > 0 such that
P˜1
≥ S + a¯− εκ if s˜1 > 0
≤ S + a+ b+ εκ if s˜1 < 0
. (A.35)
Moreover,
P˜2 =

S−s˜1+a¯+b1S−s˜1−s˜2≥I
1− s˜1
P˜1
if s˜2 > 0
S−s˜1+a+b1S−s˜1−s˜2≥I
1− s˜1
P˜1
if s˜2 < 0
. (A.36)
From the proof of Proposition 3, the equilibrium payoff of any firm a ∈[a, a¯] strictly
exceeds the payoff from direct issue under investor beliefs a, namely I+a+b
1+ I−S
S+a+b
. Moreover,
for firms a sufficiently close to a¯, the equilibrium payoff also strictly exceeds the payoff
from doing nothing, namely S + a. (Of course, this relation holds weakly for all firms.)
Hence it is possible to choose ε > 0 such that, for all firms a ∈ [a, a¯],
max
{
I + a+ b
1 + I−S−εκS+a+b+εκ
, a
S + a¯− εκ
a¯− εκ
}
< equilibrium payoff of firm a. (A.37)
Moreover, and using b > 0 and inequality (2.7), choose ε > 0 sufficiently small such
that, in addition to inequality (A.37), the following pair of inequalities holds:
a
a+ b
≤ I + a+ b
I + a+ b
if a ∈ [a+ b, a+ b+ εκ] , (A.38)
a+ b+ εκ ≤ a¯− εκ. (A.39)
Firm a’s payoff from an arbitrary off-equilibrium strategy (s˜1, s˜2) is
S − s˜1 − s˜2 + a+ b1S−s˜1−s˜2≥I
1− s˜1
P˜1
− s˜2
P˜2
.
First, observe that
− s˜2
P˜2
≥ − s˜2
S − s˜1 + a+ b
(
1− s˜1
P˜1
)
.
This follows directly from (A.36) if s˜2 < 0, and from (A.36) together with (2.7) if s˜2 > 0.
Second, observe that
− s˜1
P˜1
≥ − s˜1
S + a+ b+ εκ
.
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This follows directly from (A.35) if s˜1 < 0, and from (A.35) together with (A.39) if
s˜1 > 0.
Consequently, firm a’s payoff is bounded above by
S − s˜1 − s˜2 + a+ b1S−s˜1−s˜2≥I(
1− s˜1S+a+b+εκ
)(
1− s˜2S−s˜1+a+b
)
=
S − s˜1 − s˜2 + a+ b1S−s˜1−s˜2≥I
S − s˜1 − s˜2 + a+ b
S − s˜1 + a+ b
S − s˜1 + a+ b+ εκ (S + a+ b+ εκ) .
To complete the proof, by (A.37) it is sufficient to show that expression (A.40) is
bounded above by either the LHS of (A.37), or by S + a. There are four cases:
If S − s˜1 − s˜2 ≥ I it is immediate that (A.40) is bounded above by I+a+bI+a+b(S + a+ b
+εκ), which is the first term in the LHS of (A.37).
If S − s˜1 − s˜2 < I and a ≤ a+ b then (A.40) is bounded above by (S + a+ b+ εκ).
If S − s˜1 − s˜2 < I and a ∈[a+ b, a+ b+ εκ] then (A.40) is bounded above by
a
a+b (S + a+ b+ εκ), and the result then follows from (A.38).
Finally, consider the case S − s˜1 − s˜2 < I and a > a+ b+ εκ. Note first that since
S − s˜1 − s˜2 < I, the off-equilibrium beliefs imply that the firm weakly loses money on
its date 2 transactions, so that its payoff is bounded above by
S − s˜1 + a
1− s˜1
P˜1
= P˜1
S − s˜1 + a
P˜1 − s˜1
.
If s˜1 > 0, this expression is bounded above by max
{
S + a, aP˜1
P˜1−S
}
, which by (A.35) is
bounded above by max
{
S + a, aS+a¯−εκa¯−εκ
}
. If instead s˜1 < 0 this expression is bounded
above by max
{
S + a, P˜1
}
, which by (A.35) is bounded above by max{S + a, S + a
+b+ εκ} = S + a. This completes the proof .
Perturbation (II), exogenous upper bound S¯ on repurchase size:
When the equilibrium of the proof of Proposition 3 falls in Case 1, off-equilibrium
beliefs are defined in an identical way to Part (I) above, and the proof is identical.
For the remainder of the proof suppose that the equilibrium of the proof of Propo-
sition 3 falls in Case 2. As a preliminary step, recall that the proof of Proposition 3
entails choosing s1 to lie below some bound (defined in the proof). Here, choose S¯ to
lie below this same bound. Then set s1 = S¯.
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Choose the sets A0 and A1 so that A1 contains a and A0 contains a point a
+ that
is close to a. Off-equilibrium beliefs are identical to Part (I), with the exception of
off-equilibrium beliefs following s1 = 0: now, these beliefs put probability 1 on type a2
if s˜2 > 0, and put probability 1 on type a
+ if s˜2 < 0. Note that these beliefs satisfy
NDOC.
Given these beliefs, a firm’s payoff from deviating to (s1 = 0, s˜2), where s˜2 > 0, is
S − s˜2 + a
1− s˜2S+a2
.
For a ≤ a2 this expression is below the do-nothing payoff of S+a. If instead a > a2, this
expression is below S−S¯+a
1− S¯
S+a2
= S−s1+a
1− s1
S+a2
, which is the payoff from following the equilibrium
strategy (s1, 0) (recall the repurchase price is S + a2). Hence no deviation of this type
strictly improves a firm’s payoff relative to the equilibrium payoff.
Finally, a parallel proof to Part (I) establishes that provided a+ is chosen sufficiently
close to a, no deviation of the type (s1 = 0, s˜2) with s˜2 < 0 strictly improves a firm’s
payoff relative to the equilibrium payoff.
All other deviations are handled exactly as in Part (I), completing the proof.
Lemma A-2 If an equilibrium features capital transactions (s′1, s′2) and (s′′1, s′′2) with
S− s′1− s′2 = S− s′′1 − s′′2, then the associated transaction prices P ′1, P ′2, P ′′1 , P ′′2 are such
that
1− s
′′
1
P ′′1
− s
′′
2
P ′′2
= 1− s
′
1
P ′1
− s
′
2
P ′2
. (A.40)
Proof of Lemma A-2: Let a′ and a′′ be firms that play (s′1, s′2) and (s′′1, s′′2) respectively.
The equilibrium conditions for firm a′ include
S − s′1 − s′2 + a′ + b1S−s′1−s′2≥I
1− s′1
P ′1
− s′2
P ′2
≥ S − s
′′
1 − s′′2 + a′ + b1S−s′′1−s′′2≥I
1− s′′1
P ′′1
− s′′2
P ′′2
,
which simplifies to 1− s′′1
P ′′1
− s′′2
P ′′2
≥ 1− s′1
P ′1
− s′2
P ′2
. The symmetric equilibrium condition
for a firm a′′ playing (s′′1, s′′2) then implies (A.40). QED
Proof of Proposition 6:
Part (A): Firms that repurchase s1 at date 1 are, at date 2, in exactly the situation
characterized by Proposition 2. Consequently, at date 2 a positive-measure subset of
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these firms must issue an amount s2 such that investment is possible, i.e., S−s1−s2 ≥ I
at date 2. If almost all firms that repurchase s1 also issue s2, then P1 = P2, and the
proof is complete. Otherwise, let As11 denote the set of firms that repurchase s1 at date
1. From Proposition 2, there exists a∗ such that almost all firms in As11 ∩ [a∗, a¯] choose
not to issue s2 at date 2. The equilibrium condition for any firm a ∈ As11 ∩ [a∗, a¯] in this
non-issuing set is
S − s1 + a
1− s1P1
≥ S − s1 − s2 + a+ b
1− s1P1 − s2P2
.
Hence
E
[
S − s1 + a
1− s1P1
|a ∈ As11 ∩ [a∗, a¯]
]
> E
[
S − s1 − s2 + a+ b
1− s1P1 − s2P2
|a ∈ As11 ∩ [a, a∗]
]
,
so that the date 2 share price of non-issuing firms strictly exceeds the date 2 share price
of issuing firms, i.e., P2. Since the date 1 share price equals the conditional expectation
of the date 2 share price, it follows that P2 < P1.
Part (B): First, suppose a positive measure of firms issue s′1 < 0. If S− s′1 ≥ I, then by
the argument of Proposition 2, almost all firms play s′2 = 0. If instead S − s′1 < I, then
by the argument of Proposition 2, there exists s′2 such that S − s′1 − s′2 ≥ I and such
that a positive measure of firms play (s′1, s′2), and almost all the remainder play (s′1, 0).
Moreover, Pr (s′2|s′1) = 1, as follows. Suppose to the contrary that Pr (s′2|s′1) < 1. The
equilibrium condition for a firm a that plays (s′1, 0) is
S − s′1 + a
1− s′1
P1(s′1)
≥ S − s
′
1 − s′2 + a+ b(
1− s′1
P1(s′1)
)(
1− s′2
E[S−s1+a+b|s′1,s′2]
) ,
which simplifies (using s′2 < 0) to
S − s′1 + a
E [S − s′1 + a+ b|s′1, s′2]
≥ 1− b
s′2
.
Hence any firm a that plays (s′1, 0) must satisfy a > E [a+ b|s′1, s′2]. By Lemma
1, firms that play (s′1, 0) are better than firms that play (s′1, s′2). Hence P1 (s′1) <
S + sup {a : a plays s′1}; and almost all firms sufficiently close to sup {a : a plays s′1}
play (s′1, 0), and would obtain a higher payoff by doing nothing, a contradiction. This
establishes that P2 (s
′
1, s
′
2) = P1 (s
′
1).
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We next establish the price comparison with firms that issue after previously repur-
chasing, i.e., P2 (s1, s2). Given the first step, we handle the two cases in the proposition
together: let (s′1, s′2) be a strategy with S−s′1−s′2 ≥ I and s′1, s′2 ≤ 0. At any date with
strictly positive issue, the price is P2 (s
′
1, s
′
2) = E [S + a+ b|s′1, s′2]. We first show that
S − s′1 − s′2 ≥ S − s1 − s2. (A.41)
The proof is by contradiction: suppose instead that S − s′1 − s′2 < S − s1 − s2.
So by Lemma 1, E [a|s′1, s′2] > E [a|s1, s2]. By Part (A), P1 (s1) ≥ P2 (s1, s2) =
S−s1+E[a|s1,s2]+b
1− s1
P1(s1)
, and so P1 (s1) ≥ S + E [a|s1, s2] + b. Hence(
1− s1
P1 (s1)
)(
1
S − s1 + E [a|s1, s2] + b
)
≥ 1
S + E [a|s1, s2] + b .
So the payoff to firm a from (s1, s2) is
S − s1 − s2 + a+ b(
1− s1P1(s1)
)(
1− s2S−s1+E[a|s1,s2]+b
) ≤ S − s1 − s2 + a+ b
S−s1−s2+E[a|s1,s2]+b
S+E[a|s1,s2]+b
.
Fix a firm playing (s1, s2) with a > E [a|s1, s2]. By the supposition S − s′1 − s′2 <
S − s1 − s2, the payoff from (s1, s2) for firm a is strictly less than
S − s′1 − s′2 + a+ b
S−s′1−s′2+E[a|s1,s2]+b
S+E[a|s1,s2]+b
,
which since E [a|s′1, s′2] > E [a|s1, s2] is in turn strictly less than
S − s′1 − s′2 + a+ b
S−s′1−s′2+E[a|s′1,s′2]+b
S+E[a|s′1,s′2]+b
=
S − s′1 − s′2 + a+ b
1− s′1+s′2
S+E[a|s′1,s′2]+b
.
But this contradicts the equilibrium condition, since the RHS is firm a’s payoff from
deviating and playing (s′1, s′2), and establishes inequality (A.41).
To complete the proof of Part (B), we consider in turn the cases in which (A.41)
holds with equality, and in which it holds strictly. First, if (A.41) holds with equality,
Lemma A-2 implies
− s1
P1 (s1)
− s2
P2 (s1, s2)
= − s
′
1 + s
′
2
P2 (s′1, s′2)
.
From Part (A), P2 (s1, s2) ≤ P1 (s1), and since s1 ≥ 0, this implies
− s1 + s2
P2 (s1, s2)
≤ − s
′
1 + s
′
2
P2 (s′1, s′2)
,
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which since (A.41) holds with equality, implies P2(s1, s2) ≥ P2 (s′1, s′2).
Second, if instead (A.41) holds strictly, taking the expectation over the equilibrium
condition for all firms a playing (s1, s2), together with the implication of Lemma 1 that
E [a|s1, s2] > E [a|s′1, s′2], yields
S − s1 − s2 + E [a|s1, s2] + b
1− s1P1(s1) −
s2
P2(s1,s2)
≥ S − s
′
1 − s′2 + E [a|s1, s2] + b
1− s′1
P1(s′1)
− s′2
P2(s′1,s′2)
>
S − s′1 − s′2 + E [a|s′1, s′2] + b
1− s′1
P1(s′1)
− s′2
P2(s′1,s′2)
.
Since the first and last terms in this inequality are simply P2 (s1, s2) and P2 (s
′
1, s
′
2)
respectively, this establishes P2 (s1, s2) > P2 (s
′
1, s
′
2).
Part (C): By the argument of Proposition 2, either almost all firms that play 0 at date
1 also play 0 at date 2; or there exists s′2 such that S− s′2 ≥ I and almost all firms play
either 0 or s′2 at date 2. The date 1 price for do-nothing firms satisfies
P1 (0) = E [S + a| (0, 0)] Pr (0|0) + P2
(
0, s′2
)
Pr
(
s′2|0
)
.
From Parts (A) and (B), we know P2 (0, s
′
2) ≤ P2 (s1, s2) ≤ P1 (s1). From the equilib-
rium condition, and firm a that plays (0, 0) satisfies S + a ≤ P1 (s1), since otherwise
firm a would be strictly better off playing (s1, 0). The result then follows, completing
the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7: Part (A): By the equilibrium condition for firm a′′,
S − s′′ + a′′
1− s′′P ′′
≥ S − s
′ + a′′
1− s′P ′
. (A.42)
Since s′′ > s′, it is immediate that s′′/P ′′ > s′/P ′, establishing (ii). By the equilibrium
condition for firm a′,
S − s′ + a′
1− s′P ′
≥ S − s
′′ + a′
1− s′′P ′′
. (A.43)
Multiplying (A.43) by −1 and combining with (A.42) yields
a′′ − a′
1− s′′P ′′
≥ a
′′ − a′
1− s′P ′
.
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If a′ > a′′ then this inequality contradicts (ii); hence a′′ ≥ a′, which (since a′′ 6= a′)
establishes (iii).
Firm a′ also has the choice of doing nothing, and so the equilibrium condition implies
S + a′ ≥ P ′, i.e., firm a′ pays weakly less than its stock is worth. Consequently,
S − s′′ + a′
1− s′′P ′
≥ S − s
′ + a′
1− s′P ′
,
i.e., if firm a′ were able to repurchase more stock at the constant price P ′, it would weakly
prefer to do so. Combined with (A.43), it then follows that P ′′ ≥ P ′, establishing (i),
and completing the proof of Part (A).
Part (B): The proof is exactly the same as the final paragraph of the proof of Part (B)
of Proposition 6.
Proof of Proposition 8: By hypothesis, there are only a finite number of strategies
played in equilibrium. Throughout the proof, we ignore any firm that plays a strategy
that is played by only a measure zero set of firms. Partition the remaining firms so that
if two firms share the same s1 + s2 and make the same investment decision, then they
lie in the same partition element. Let A1, . . . , AM be the partition elements in which
firms invest. Let A0 be the set of non-investing firms. Without loss, order the sets
A1, . . . , AM so that i > j is equivalent to S − s1 − s2 being smaller for firms in Ai than
Aj . By Lemma 1, it follows that Ai are intervals, with Ai > Aj if i > j. By Corollary
1, inf A1 = a. Define si = s1 + s2 for all firms in A
i, and by Lemma A-2, and define
N i = 1− s1(a)P1(s1(a)) −
s2(a)
P2(s1(a),s2(a))
for all firms a ∈ Ai.
If s1 ≤ 0 for some firm in Ai, an easy adaption of the arguments of Propositions 1
and 2 implies that all firms that use this action at date 1 take the same date 2 action,
s2. Moreover, by the definition of A
i, all such firms invest. So for these firms, the date
1 and 2 transaction prices coincide, and by (2.4), both equal E [S + a+ b|s1 (a) , s2 (a)].
Hence in this case N i = 1− siE[S+a+b|s1(a),s2(a)] .
If instead s1 > 0 for some firm in a ∈ Ai, then by Proposition 6, the date 1 and
2 transaction prices satisfy P1 ≥ P2, and so using s2 (a) < 0, N i ≥ 1 − siP2(s1(a),s2(a)) .
Since P2 (s1 (a) , s2 (a)) = E
[
S−si+a+b
N i
|s1 (a) , s2 (a)
]
, we know
P2 (s1 (a) , s2 (a)) ≤ E
[
S − si + a+ b
1− siP2(s1(a),s2(a))
|s1 (a) , s2 (a)
]
.
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and hence
P2 (s1 (a) , s2 (a)) ≤ E [S + a+ b|s1 (a) , s2 (a)] ,
and so
N i ≥ 1− s
i
E [S + a+ b|s1 (a) , s2 (a)] .
Moreover, by Proposition 6, the inequality is strict whenever Pr (invest|s1 (a)) < 1.
The above observations imply
N i ≥ 1− s
i
E [S + a+ b|a ∈ Ai] , (A.44)
with the inequality strict whenever Pr
(
invest|s1 ∈ s1
(
Ai
))
< 1.
We next show that Pr
(
invest|s1 ∈ s1
(
Ai
))
< 1 for at least some i. Suppose to
the contrary that this is not the case. Then Pr
(
not invest|s1 ∈ s1
(
A0
))
= 1. So
E
[
P3|s1 ∈ s1
(
A0
)]
= E
[
P3|a ∈ A0
]
= S + E
[
a|a ∈ A0]. But a straightforward adap-
tion of the proof of Proposition 4 implies that there exists an upper interval of firms
who obtain a payoff strictly in excess of S+a, and by Corollary A-2, this upper interval
has a non-null intersection with A0. But then E
[
P3|a ∈ A0
]
> S + E
[
a|a ∈ A0], a
contradiction.
Boundary firms ai∗ ≡ sup(Ai) must be indifferent across two adjacent issue paths
si−1 and si, i.e., for all i < M ,
1
N i
(ai∗ + S + b− si) = 1
N i+1
(ai∗ + S + b− si+1). (A.45)
The heart of the proof is to establish that inequality (A.44), with the inequality strict
for at least some i, implies
NM > 1− s
M
E[a+ S + b|a ∈ [a, aM∗]] . (A.46)
We establish (A.46) by showing inductively that for any i = 1, . . . ,M ,
N i ≥ 1− s
i
E[a+ S + b|a ∈ [a, ai∗]] . (A.47)
The initial case i = 1 is immediate from (A.44) and the earlier observation that inf A1 =
a. For the inductive step, suppose (A.47) holds at i = K−1 < M . We show that (A.47)
also holds at i = K.
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Observe first that inequality (A.47) at i = K − 1 is equivalent to
S + a(K−1)∗ + b− sK−1
NK−1
≤ S + a
(K−1)∗ + b− sK−1
1− sK−1
E[a+S+b|a∈[a,a(K−1)∗]]
.
Since a(K−1)∗ ≥ E[a|a ∈ [a, a(K−1)∗]], the RHS of this inequality is increasing in sK−1,
i.e., if the share price is E[a + S + b|a ∈ [a, a(K−1)∗]], the best firm a(K−1)∗ in pool
[a, a(K−1)∗] would be better off raising fewer funds than S − sK−1. We know S − sK <
S − sK−1, and so
S + a(K−1)∗ + b− sK−1
NK−1
<
S + a(K−1)∗ + b− sK
1− sK
E[a+S+b|a∈[a,a(K−1)∗]]
.
Combined with the indifference condition (A.45) at i = K − 1, it follows that
NK ≥ 1− s
K
E[a+ S + b|a ∈ [a, a(K−1)∗]] .
Combined with (A.44), it then follows that
NK ≥ 1− s
K
E[a+ S + b|a ∈ AK ∪ [a, a(K−1)∗]] = 1−
sK
E[a+ S + b|a ∈ [a, aK∗]] ,
which establishes the inductive step. Moreover, this inequality must hold strictly for at
least one step.
To complete the proof, note that in equilibrium, for all a ∈ AM ,
S − sM + a+ b
NM
≥ S + a.
So by (A.46)
S − sM + aM∗ + b
1− sM
E[S+a+b|a∈[a,aM∗]]
> S + aM∗.
Consequently, by continuity together with (2.6), there exists a˜∗ > aM∗ such that
S − sM + a˜∗ + b
1− sME[S+a+b|a∈[a,a˜∗]]
= S + a˜∗.
It is straightforward to show that there is an equilibrium of the one-period benchmark
in which firms in [a, a˜∗] issue shares at a price E [S + a+ b|a ∈ [a, a˜∗]] to raise funds
−sM and invest, while firms a ∈ (a˜∗, a¯] do nothing. This completes the proof.
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Lemma A-3 (Multi-dimensional Blackwell’s Sufficient Condition) Let X ⊆ RK and
BL(X) be the space of bounded vector-valued functions: v = (v1, v2, ..., vL) : X →
RL, where L < ∞. Equipe BL(X) with the sup norm over coordinates, i.e. ||v|| =
maxi≤L{supx vi(x)}. Suppose v, w ∈ BL(X), and define v ≥ w if and only if vi ≥ wi
for all i ≤ L. If the operator T : BL(X)→ BL(X) satisfies that
1. (monotonicity) if v ≥ w, then T (v) ≥ T (w), and
2. (discounting) there exists a constant β such that for any constant a, T (v + a) ≤
T (v) + βa,
then T is a contraction mapping with coefficient β, namely ||Tv− Tw|| ≤ β||v−w|| for
any v, w ∈ BL(X).
Proof. Since w ≤ v + ||w − v||, so monotonicity of T implies T (w) ≤ T (v + ||w − v||).
The latter expession is in turn bounded by T (v) +β||w− v|| by discounting. Therefore,
T (w)− T (v) ≤ β||w − v||.
Similarly, one can derive the opposite side T (v)−T (w) ≤ β||w−v||. By the definition of
the norm on BL(X), ||T (w)−T (v)|| ≤ β||w− v||. T is therefore a contraction mapping
with coefficient β.
Proof of Lemma 2: In order to be consistent with the notations in the main
text following the lemma, denote the values given in (3.2) by V θ?FB(Y ). They can be
recursively formulated as following:
V G?FB(Y ) = E{piY z + (1− pi)[pGV G?FB(Y z) + (1− pG)V B?FB(Y z)]}
V B?FB(Y ) = (1− pi)E[pBV B?FB(Y z) + (1− pB)V G?FB(Y z)].
(A.48)
The first part piY z captures the final dividend, which is materialized only in the good
state θ = G. This case occurs with probability pi. The second part captures the
continuation payoff taking into account a potential switch in the state θ. Normalizing
by Y and letting vθFB(Y ) =
V θ?FB(Y )
Y , (A.48) becomes
vGFB(Y ) = E{piz + (1− pi)[pGvGFB(Y z)z + (1− pG)vBFB(Y z)z]}
vBFB(Y ) = (1− pi)E[pBvBFB(Y z)z + (1− pB)vGFB(Y z)z].
(A.49)
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For any bounded continuous functions on R+: vθFB ∈ B1(R+), (θ = G,B), it is easy
to check that the right hand side of (A.49) induces a natural operator T : C2B(R+) →
C2B(R+) as following:
T (vGFB, v
B
FB) =
E{piz + (1− pi)[pGvGFB(Y z)z + (1− pG)vBFB(Y z)z]}(1− pi)E[pBvBFB(Y z)z + (1− pB)vGFB(Y z)z].
Clearly T satisfies the monotonicity condition in lemma A-3. To verify the discounting
condition, notice
T (vFB + a) = T (vFB) + (1− pi)E(az) = T (vFB) + (1− pi)µa.
By assumption (3.1) and lamma A-3, T is a contraction. Therefore, Banach fixed point
theorem states that T has a unique fixed point, which implies (A.49) and thereby (A.48)
have a unique solution. Finally, to find this solution, observe that (A.49) has a constant
solution (vG?FB, v
B?
FB) that satisfies:
vGFB = piµ+ (1− pi)µ[pGvGFB + (1− pG)vBFB]}
vBFB = (1− pi)µ[pBvBFB + (1− pB)vGFB].
Solving the above system for (vGFB, v
B
FB) gives (3.3).
Proof of Proposition 9: The proof contains three parts to verify the proposed
equilibrium. First, given the conjectured properties stated in the proposition, I show
that the conjectured strategy profile indeed constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Part II (III) proves that the conjectured properties for the value of debt (firm) indeed
hold in this equilibrium. In the following proof, the time indices and the arguements in
the strategies are sometimes omitted when there is no confusion.
Part I: Given the stated properties ofDθN and V
θ
N , I check that the proposed strategy
profile is subgame perfect. If the firm survives the period t stage game, then following
the equilibrium strategies, the expected payoff to the entrepreneur is
V
θt+1
N?+
(F ?+, Yt)−min(Ft, NλYt) = max
N+
V
θt+1
N+
(F+(X
∗), Yt)−X∗,
where X∗ = min(Ft, NλYt) and F+(X) is the smallest solution to DθN+(F+, Y ) = X.
By the definition of κθ, the conjectured property that V θN+(F+, Y ) ≥ κθN+Y , and the
endogenous assumption κθ ≥ λ, the above equality implies:
V
θt+1
N?+
(F ?+, Yt)−min(Ft, NλYt) ≥ κθt+1Y − Ft ≥ λYt − Ft.
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Therefore, the continuation payoff is weakly higher than the liquidation payoff. Thus
the firm has no strict incentive to voluntarily liquidate nor to offer Si < min(
F
N , λY )
and induce an immediate liquidation. Suppose the firm offers Si > min(
F
N , λY ). Two
possible cases can happen. If the offer is infeasible, i.e.,
∑
j≤i Sj+(N− i) min( FN , λY ) >
DCθ(Y ), then the creditor rejects the offer and the project is liquidated. This case is
clearly dominated by the equilibrium outcome as discussed before. Alternatively if the
offer is feasible. Let X be the total negotiated repayment following Si. Clearly, it
must be X > X∗, which implies F+(X) > F+(X∗) for any given N+. Because we have
conjectured that V θN (F, Y ) is weakly decreasing in F , so
V
θt+1
N+
(F+(X
∗), Yt)−X∗ ≥ V θt+1N+ (F+(X), Yt)−X∗ > V
θt+1
N+
(F+(X), Yt)−X,
for any N+. Therefore, the entrepreneur is strictly worse off by offering any Si >
min( FN , λY ). In all, the offering strategy S
?
i = min(
F
N , λY ) is optimal.
The entrepreneur’s financing strategy (N θ?+ , F
θ?
+ ) is just a repetition of the equilib-
rium definition. The ith incumbent creditor clearly has no incentive to accept any offer
lower than the liquidation payoff. On the other hand, if the payoff is not feasible such
that (3.12) fails, the project will be liquidated following the equilibrium strategies by
other creditors. In this case, creditor i either gets min( FtNt ,
1
Nt−1 max(0, λYt − FtNt )) or
1
Nt
min(Ft, λYt), both are weakly dominated by min(
Ft
Nt
, λYt). Finally, the optimality of
the new creditors’ strategies rθ?i is trivial to verify.
Part II: Given the above strategies, I now show that there exists a consistent linear
conjecture of the debt capacities, i.e. DCθ(Y ) = κθY for some constants κθ. In addition,
the value of debt DθN (F, Y ) is continuous and HD1 in (F, Y ).
Under the conjecture DCθ(Y ) = κθY , the equilibrium strategies (condition (3.12)
in particular) imply that rollover is possible if and only if (3.14) holds. Under this
condition, the value of debt can be rewritten as (3.15). The value of debt DθN (F, Y ) is
clearly HD1, because one can verify that
DθN (F, Y ) = Y D
θ
N (
F
Y
, 1) ≡ Y DθN (f, 1).
where f ≡ FY . The ratio F
θ
N (Y )
Y being a constant independ of Y is a simple corollary of
HD1. In fact, one can readily see f
θ
N (Y ) = arg maxf D
θ
N (f, 1). In addition, the debt
capacity with N creditors is linear as given by (3.16). Finally, DθN (f, 1) is continuous in
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f , since it can be expressed as the sum of integrals in the form of
∫ A(f)
B(f) C(f, z)dz, where
A,B,C are continuous functions in their arguments. For example, when N > maxθ κ
θ
λ ,
DθN (f, 1) ≡ pi
∫ z
z min(f, z)1θ=Gg(z)dz + (1− pi)
∑
θ′=G,B
P (θ′|θ)[∫ max(z, fκθ′ )
max(z, f
κθ
′ )
g(z)fdz +
∫ min(z, f
κθ
′ )
min(z, f
κθ
′ )
λzg(z)dz]
(A.50)
which is clearly continuous in f . The remaining cases are similar. Finally, I show
that there exists a consistent conjecture of {κθN , κθ}θ=G,BN∈N . Notice that (3.16) is a
function of (κG, κB). Denote κˆθN (κ
G, κB) to be this function and let Lθ(κG, κB) ≡
max{κˆθ1, ..., κˆθ
[
maxθ k
θ
λ
]+1
}. So a consistent conjecture of {κθN , κθ}θ=G,BN∈N is a solution to
(3.13) which is in turn a fixed point of L ≡ (LG, LB) : R2+ → R2+. Equipe R2+ with the
usual partial order ≤ such that x ≤ y if and only if x1 ≤ y1 and x2 ≤ y2. Apparently
L is order-preserving, since DθN is weakly increasing in κ
θ. I shall then construct a
complete lattice Ω ⊆ R2+ such that L(Ω) ⊆ Ω. By Tarski’s fixed point theorem, L has
a fixed point and therefore a solution to (3.13) exists. The remainder of the proof is to
construct such an Ω.
By (3.1), it is possible to choose M big enough such that
(pi + (1− pi)M)µ < M. (A.51)
Let Ω ≡ [0,M ]× [0,M ] be a complete lattice. Suppose (κG, κB) ∈ Ω, (3.16) and (A.51)
imply that for all N ≤ [Mλ ] + 1,
κˆθN = maxf E{pimin(f, z)1θ=G + (1− pi)
[1min(f,Nλz)≤κθ′z min(f,Nλz) + 1min(f,Nλz)>κθ′z min(f, λz)]}
≤ piE(z) + (1− pi)E[1min(f,Nλz)≤κθ′zκθ
′
z + 1min(f,Nλz)>κθ′zλz]
≤ piµ+ (1− pi)Mµ
< M.
Therefore, Lθ(κθN ) < M , which implies that Ω is invariant under L . This completes
the proof.
Part III: Finally, for any pair of κθ ≥ λ, I will show there exists a unique continuous
HD1 function V θN (F, Y ) which is increasing in Y , weakly decreasing in F and V
θ
N (F, Y ) ≥
κθNY for any F ≤ F
θ
N . By the discussion following proposition 9, in the conjectured
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equilibrium, the firm’s problem can be rewritten as a dynamic programming problem
(3.17) and (3.18). By the definition of N in (3.19) and the discussion following it, we
can confine the choice of N θ+ to {1, 2, ..., N} without loss of generality.
Define an auxiliary problem:
vθN (f) =
E{piz1θ=G + (1− pi)[1min(f,Nλz)≤κθ′z maxN+ vθ
′
N+
(f+)z + 1min(f,Nλz)>κθ′zλz]}
(A.52)
where f+(
f
z , N) is the minimum solution to
Dθ
′
N+(f+, 1) = min(
f
z
,Nλ). (A.53)
By the definition of f
θ
N in proposition 9, it must be f+ ≤ fθ
′
N+ . Denote T
θ
N : B
2N → B
to be the operator on (vθi )
θ=G,B
i≤N induced by the right-hand side of (A.52) and let T ≡
(T θN ) : B
2N → B2N .
First, notice that if v ∈ B2N is bounded by some M > 1, then ||Tf(v)|| ≤ pi(1+µ)+
(1 − pi)M(1 + µ) is also bounded. So T is indeed well-defined. Then I prove that T is
a contraction mapping by verifying monotonicity and discounting conditions in lemma
A-3. Monotonicity is trivial. For any constant a, T (v+ a) ≤ T (v) + (1−pi)(1 +µ)a. So
the discounting condition holds by (3.1).
Denote Ca,l = {v : v is bounded, continuous, decreasing, and v|[0,a] ≥ l} ⊆ B1 to
be the subset of all bounded continuous decreasing functions taking values in [l,∞)
when restricted to [0, a]. Consider C ≡ ×N≤N,θ=G,BCfθN ,κθN . Clearly C is a closed
subset of B2N . Next I show T (C) ⊆ C. Suppose v ∈ C and f1 ≤ f2. By the definition
of f+, we have f+(
f1
z , N) ≤ f+(f2z , N). To simplify notation, let f1+ ≡ f+(f1z , N). The
following inequalities must hold:
T θN (v)(f1) = E{piz1θ=G + (1− pi)[1min(f1,Nλz)≤κθ′z maxN+ vθ
′
N+
(f1+)z+
1min(f1,Nλz)>κθ′zλz]}
≥ E{piz1θ=G + (1− pi)[1min(f1,Nλz)≤κθ′z maxN+ vθ
′
N+
(f2+)z+
1min(f1,Nλz)>κθ′zλz]}
≥ E{piz1θ=G + (1− pi)[1min(f2,Nλz)≤κθ′z maxN+ vθ
′
N+
(f2+)z+
1min(f2,Nλz)>κθ′zλz]}
= T θN (v)(f2).
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The last inequality is because that vθN+(f2+) ≥ κθ ≥ λ and {z|min(f1, Nλz) ≤ κθz} ⊇
{z|min(f2, Nλz) ≤ κθz} for θ = G,B. So each coordinate in T (v) is also a decreasing
function. In addition,
T θN (v)(f
θ
N ) = E{piz1θ=G + (1− pi)[1min(fθN ,Nλz)≤κθ′z maxN+ v
θ′
N+
(f+)z+
1
min(f
θ
N ,Nλz)>κ
θ′z
λz]}
≥ E{piz1θ=G + (1− pi)[1min(fθN ,Nλz)≤κθ′zκ
θ′z + 1
min(f
θ
N ,Nλz)>κ
θ′z
λz]}
≥ E{piz1θ=G + (1− pi)[1min(fθN ,Nλz)≤κθ′z min(f
θ
N , Nλz)+
1
min(f
θ
N ,Nλz)>κ
θ′z
min(f
θ
N , Nλz)]}
= κθN
The first inequality uses the fact maxN+ v
θ
N+
(f+) ≥ maxN+ κθN+ = κθ for both θ = G,B,
since v ∈ C. The second inequality holds because min(fθN , Nλz) ≤ κθz over the relevant
region. The last equality is by the definition of f
θ
N and (3.16). Because T
θ
N (v) is a
decreasing function, so T θN (v)|[0,fθN ] ≥ κ
θ
N . Finally, I show that T
θ
N (v) must be a
continuous function. Consider f2f1 = 1 + δ. By definition (A.52)
T θN (v)(f2) = piµ1θ=G + (1− pi)
∑
θ′=G,B P (θ
′|θ)
[
∫
min(f2,Nλz)≤κθ′z maxN+ v
θ′
N+
(f2+)zg(z)dz +
∫
min(f2,Nλz)>κθ
′z λzg(z)dz]
= piµ1θ=G + (1− pi)
∑
θ′=G,B P (θ
′|θ)
[
∫
min(f1,Nλz′)≤κθ′z′ maxN+ v
θ′
N+
(f1+)(1 + δ)
2z′g[z′(1 + δ)]dz′
+
∫
min(f1,Nλz′)>κθ′z′ λ(1 + δ)z
′g[z′(1 + δ)]dz′]
where the change of variable z = (1+δ)z′. Notice that, by assumption, vθN are bounded
by some constant M and g is a density function, so, as δ → 0, the functions under the
integrals in the above expression are dominated by 2Mz′g(2z′). Because the random
variable z has a finite mean, so
∫
2Mz′g(2z′)dz′ < ∞. The dominated convergence
theorem then implies that as δ → 0, the last expression converges to T θN (v)(f1). There-
fore, the function T θN (v) is continuous. In all, I have established that the contraction
mapping T maps C into itself.
By contraction mapping theorem, the operator T has a unique fixed point v? ∈ B2N .
Furthermore, this fixed point must belong to C. Define
V θN (F, Y ) = v
θ?
N (
F
Y
)Y. (A.54)
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which is decreasing in F . It is very easy to verify that the constructed solution satisfies
the original recursive problem (3.17) with (3.18). Because vθ?N (
F
Y ) is increasing in Y ,
so V θN as defined above is also increasing in Y . This completes the full proof of this
proposition.
Proof of Lemma 3: Suppose otherwise if κG ≤ κB, then
1min(F,Nλz)≤κGz min(f,Nλz) + 1min(F,Nλz)>κGz min(f, λz)
≤ 1min(F,Nλz)≤κBz min(f,Nλz) + 1min(F,Nλz)>κBz min(f, λz).
So (3.16) implies:
κB ≤ maxN,f (1− pi)E[1min(F,Nλz)≤κBz min(f,Nλz) + 1min(F,Nλz)>κBz min(f, λz)]
≤ (1− pi)EκBz = (1− pi)µκB
< κB.
Contradiction! So it must be κG > κB.
Proof of Proposition 10: First, if N1 = 1, then by (3.15),
DθN2(F, Y ) = E{pimin(F, Y z)1θ=G + (1− pi)[1min(F,N2λY z)≤κθ′Y z min(F,N2λY z)+
1min(F,N2λY z)>κθ′Y z min(F, λY z)]}
≥ E[pimin(F, Y z)1θ=N + (1− pi) min(F, λY z)]
= Dθ1(F, Y ).
If N ≥ N2 > N1, by the definition of N in (3.20), then the liquidation region {z|min(F,
NiλY z) > κ
θY z} = ∅ for θ = G,B. Therefore,
DθN2(F, Y ) = E[pimin(F, Y z)1θ=G + (1− pi) min(F,N2λY z)]
≥ E[pimin(F, Y z)1θ=G + (1− pi) min(F,N1λY z)]
= DθN1(F, Y ).
Finally, if N > N2 > N1 ≥ N , then {z|min(F,NiλY z) > κGY z} = ∅ and {z|min(F,
NiλY z) > κ
BY z} = {z|F > κBY z}. Therefore,
DθN2(F, Y ) = E{pimin(F, Y z)1θ=G + (1− pi){P (G|θ) min(F,N2λY z)
+ P (B|θ)[1F≤κBY z min(F,N2λY z) + 1F>κBY z min(F, λY z)]}}
≥ E{pimin(F, Y z)1θ=G + (1− pi){P (G|θ) min(F,N1λY z)
+ P (B|θ)[1F≤κBY z min(F,N1λY z) + 1F>κBY z min(F, λY z)]}}
= DθN1(F, Y ).
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So statement 1 holds. Higher debt capacity with N2 in each category (κ
θ
N2
≥ κθN1) is a
direct implication of the previous statement.
Finally, to show the last statement, by definition (3.15), DθN (F, Y ) is continuous
in F with DθN (0, Y ) = 0. Intermediate value theorem guarantees the existence of the
solutions F θNi . Utilizing statement 1,
DθN2(F
θ
N2 , Y ) = S = D
θ
N1(F
θ
N1 , Y ) ≤ DθN2(F θN1 , Y ).
Again by intermediate value theorem, the minimum solution to DθN2(F
θ
N2
, Y ) = S must
be within (0, F θN1 ], completing the proof of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 12: For any continuation number of creditors N+, define
F+,Ni (i = 1, 2) to be the minimum solution such thatD
θ
N+
(F+,Ni , Y z) = min(F,NiλY z).
For a given N+
DθN+(F+,N2 , Y z) = min(F,N2λY z)
≥ min(F,N1λY z)
= DθN+(F+,N1 , Y z).
Thus F+,N2 ≥ F+,N1 , so for any given continuation number of creditors N+, having more
incumbent creditors N2 > N1 implies higher continuation face value F+,N2 ≥ F+,N1 . By
the recursive formulation (3.17) and proposition 9 we have:
V θN2(F, Y ) = E{piY z1θ=G + (1− pi)[1min(F,N2λY z)≤κθ′Y z maxN+ V θ
′
N+
(F+,N2 , Y z)
+ 1min(F,N2λY z)>κθ′Y zλY z]}
≤ E{piY z1θ=G + (1− pi)[1min(F,N1λY z)≤κθ′Y z maxN+ V θ
′
N+
(F+,N2 , Y z)
+1min(F,N1λY z)>κθ′Y zλY z]}
≤ E{piY z1θ=G + (1− pi)[1min(F,N1λY z)≤κθ′Y z maxN+ V θ
′
N+
(F+,N1 , Y z)
+1min(F,N1λY z)>κθ′Y zλY z]}
= V θN1(F, Y ).
The first equality is by definition. The second inequality is because {z|min(F,N2λY z) ≤
κθY z} ⊆ {z|min(F,N1λY z) ≤ κθY z} and V θN+(F+, Y z) ≥ λY z by proposition 9. The
third inequality is because F+,N2 ≥ F+,N1 and the fact that V θN+(F+, Y z) is decreasing
in F+ by proposition 9. Thus V
θ
N2
(F, Y ) ≤ V θN2(F, Y ).
Proof of Proposition 14: The proof shares the same spirit as the existence proof
of κθ in proposition 9 part II. Define the same order-preserving function L : R2+ → R2+
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as in the proof of proposition 9 with the expectations taken under the distribution ga.
Pick any pair of κθ,b. I shall prove that there exists a fixed point κθ,a ∈ Ω of L, where
Ω = [κG,b,M ] × [κB,b,M ] is a complete lattice and M is given by (A.51). For any N
and κθ,a ∈ Ω,
κˆθ,aN = maxf Ega{pimin(f, z)1θ=G
+ (1− pi)[1min(f,Nλz)≤κθ′,az min(f,Nλz) + 1min(f,Nλz)>κθ′,az min(f, λz)]}
≥ maxf Ega{pimin(f, z)1θ=G
+ (1− pi)[1min(f,Nλz)≤κθ′,bz min(f,Nλz) + 1min(f,Nλz)>κθ′,bz min(f, λz)]}
≥ maxf Egb{pimin(f, z)1θ=G
+ (1− pi)[1min(f,Nλz)≤κθ′,bz min(f,Nλz) + 1min(f,Nλz)>κθ′,bz min(f, λz)]}
= κθ,bN .
The first inequality is because min(f,Nλz) ≥ min(f, λz) and {z|min(f,Nλz) ≤ κθ,bz} ⊆
{z|min(f,Nλz) ≤ κθ,az}. The second inequality uses first order stochastic dominance
and the fact that the function under the expectation is weakly increasing in z. There-
fore, for any κθ,a ∈ Ω, Lθ(κθ,a) = maxN κˆθ,aN ≥ maxN κθ,bN ≥ κθ,b. So L(Ω) ⊆ Ω and
Tarski’s fixed point theorem completes the argument. The omitted proof for the other
direction is very similar, with the auxiliary set Ω = [0, κθ,aN ].
Proof of Proposition 15: First I show V θCF (F, Y ) < V
θ
1 (F, Y ). Recall the function
space C and the mapping T defined in proposition 9 part III. Define a new closed subset
of functions in B2(N+1): CA = {(vθCF , vθN )θ=G,BN≤N |(vθN )
θ=G,B
N≤N ∈ C and vθCF ≤ vθ1} ⊂
B2(N+1). Let CB = {(vθCF , vθN )θ=G,BN≤N ∈ CA|vθCF < vθ1 for all f > 0} ⊂ CA. Finally
let Cβ = {(vθCF , vθN )θ=G,BN≤N ∈ CA|vθCF (f) < vθ1(f) for all f > β}. Clearly CB = C0 ⊂
Cβ2 ⊂ Cβ1 ⊂ C∞ = CA for any β2 < β1. Define a new mapping TC(vθCF , vθN )θ=G,BN≤N =(
TCF [(v
θ
CF )
θ=G,B], T [(vθN )
θ=G,B
N≤N ]
)
on B2(N+1), where TCF = (T
G
CF , T
B
CF ) is given by
T θCF (vCF ) = piµ1θ=G + (1− pi)E[1min(f,λz)≤κθ′1 zv
θ′
CF (f+,1)z + 1min(f,λz)>κθ′1 z
λz]
where f+,N is an abbreviation for f+(
f
z , N), the minimum solution to D
θ
N (f+, 1) =
min(fz , λN) as before. Similar to the proof in proposition 9 part III, it is straight forward
to check that TC defined above satisfies the monotonicity and discounting conditions
stated in lemma A-3. So TC must have a unique fixed point v? in B2(N+1). Our goal is
to show this v? ∈ CB.
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Claim: there exists a decreasing sequence of βn → 0 such that β0 = ∞ and
TC(Cβn) ⊆ Cβn+1 .
Given this claim, we have
TC(CA) = TC(C∞) ⊆ Cβ1 ⊆ CA. (A.55)
The contraction mapping theorem states that the unique fixed point can be derived from
repeated iterations starting from any point v, i.e., v? = limn→∞ TC(n)(v). Because the
set CA is closed, one can start the iteration from any point v ∈ CA and the limiting point
v? will stay in CA by (A.55). Furthermore, for any n, one can argue v
? ∈ TC(n)(CA) ⊆
Cβn . As n → ∞, v? ∈ limn→∞ TC(n)(CA) ⊆ limn→∞Cβn = C0 = CB. Therefore,
v? ∈ CB. Let V θCF (F, Y ) = vθ?CF (FY )Y . Following the same procedures in proposition 9
part III, one can check that it is indeed the firm’s value function in the counterfactual
case. The fact v? ∈ CB implies V θCF (F, Y ) < V θ1 (F, Y ) for all F > 0, completing the
first half of the statement in the proposition.
Finally, when F < λzY < κθY , the actual repayment in the true model must be
F = min(F, λNzY ) regardless of the number of incumbent creditors N . The firm always
survives the next period. Therefore, it is easy to see from (3.17) and (3.18) that the
firm values do not depend on N when F < λzY . Combining with the result we just
proved, it is immediate that V θN (F, Y ) = V
θ
1 (F, Y ) > V
θ
CF (F, Y ) for all N , establishing
the proposition.
Proof of the claim: Suppose (vθCF , v
θ
N )
θ=G,B
N≤N ∈ CA. By the construction of the
operator T θCF , we have
T θCF (vCF ) = piµ1θ=G + (1− pi)E[1min(f,λz)≤κθ′1 zv
θ′
CF (f+,1)z + 1min(f,λz)>κθ′1 z
λz]
≤ piµ1θ=G + (1− pi)E[1min(f,λz)≤κθ′1 zv
θ′
1 (f+,1)z + 1min(f,λz)>κθ′1 z
λz]
(A.56)
Because κθ1 ≤ κθ and κB1 = (1 − pi)µλ < λ < κB, so whenever f > (1 − pi)µλz there
is a positive probability that f > κB1 z. In addition, because maxN+ v
θ
N+
(f+,N+) ≥
maxN+ κ
θ
N+
= κθ > λ, the last expression in (A.56) is strictly dominated by
(A.56) < piµ1θ=G + (1− pi)E[1min(f,λz)≤κθ′z maxN+ vθ
′
N+
(f+,N+)z
+1min(f,λz)>κθ′zλz]
= piµ1θ=G + (1− pi)E[maxN+ vθ
′
N+
(f+,N+)z]
= T θ1 ((v
θ
N )
θ=G,B
N≤N ).
(A.57)
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Therefore, TC((vθCF , v
θ
N )
θ=G,B
N≤N ) ∈ C(1−pi)µλz and we can pick β1 = (1 − pi)µλz. Let
βn+1 = (1 − pi)βn. I shall prove that TC(v) ∈ C(1−pi)βn for all v ∈ Cβn . Suppose
(vθCF , v
θ
N )
θ=G,B
N≤N ∈ Cβn and consider any f ∈ (βn(1 − pi), βn]. On one hand, from the
rollover condition (A.53) and the fact that fz ≤ fz ≤ βnz < β1z = (1− pi)µλ < λ, we have
DB1 (f
B
+ , 1) = min(
f
z
, λ) =
f
z
.
On the other hand, from expression (3.15) and the fact f ≤ βn ≤ λz, we have
DB1 (f
B
+ , 1) = (1− pi)fB+ .
The above two equalities together imply that fB+,1 =
f
z(1−pi) >
βn
z , which in turn implies
that there is positive possibility that fB+,1 > βn. By the construction of the set Cβn ,
vBCF (f+,1) < v
B
1 (f+,1) holds strictly when f+,1 > βn. Therefore, the inequality (A.56)
holds strictly in this case. On the other hand, the weak inequality between (A.56) and
(A.57) is trivial, so we again have T θCF (vCF )(f) < T
θ((vθN )
θ=G,B
N≤N )(f) for all f > (1 −
pi)βn. Therefore, we have established TC(Cβn) ⊆ Cβn+1 for the constructed sequence of
βn that converges to zero, completing the proof of the claim and the whole proposition.
Proof of Lemma 5: By definition (3.28), limT→∞ pˆi = limT→∞ piT = 0 is obvious.
Rewrite (3.29) using (3.3):
pˆi[1− (1− pˆi)µˆpˆ]µˆ
[1− (1− pˆi)µˆ][1− (1− pˆi)µˆ(2pˆ− 1)] =
pi[1− (1− pi)µp]µ
[1− (1− pi)µ][1− (1− pi)µ(2p− 1)] , (A.58)
pˆi(1− pˆ)(1− pˆi)µˆ2
[1− (1− pˆi)µˆ][1− (1− pˆi)µˆ(2pˆ− 1)] =
pi(1− p)(1− pi)µ2
[1− (1− pi)µ][1− (1− pi)µ(2p− 1)] . (A.59)
Adding the above two equations, we have
pˆiµˆ
1− (1− pˆi)µˆ =
piµ
1− (1− pi)µ. (A.60)
Plugging in pˆi = piT from (3.28), one can solve for µˆ =
Tµ
Tµ−µ+1 → 1 as T →∞. Finally,
in order to calculate pˆ, divide (A.58) by (A.59) and then we have
1− (1− pˆi)µˆpˆ
(1− pˆ)(1− pˆi)µˆ =
1− (1− pi)µp
(1− p)(1− pi)µ.
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Subtract 1 from both sides and multiply it by (A.60),
pˆi
(1− pˆ)(1− pˆi) =
pi
(1− p)(1− pi) .
Plug in pˆi = piT and we can solve for pˆ =
T−1+p(1−pi)
T−pi . Clearly, when T ≥ 1, pˆi, pˆ ∈ (0, 1).
In addition, limT→∞ pˆi = 0 and limT→∞ pˆ = 1. Finally,
(1− pˆi)µˆ = µ(T − pi)
Tµ− µ+ 1 = 1−
1− µ(1− pi)
Tµ− µ+ 1 < 1,
by assumption (3.1). Therefore, the new parameters are well defined.
Proof of Proposition 16: First, notice κˆG must be bounded as T → ∞. This is
because
κˆGNY = max
F
DGN (F, Y ) ≤ V G?FB(Y ).
So κˆG = maxN κˆ
G
N must be bounded by some upper bound M (
V G?FB(Y )
Y for example)
that is independent of T . Let Nˆ be the number of creditors such that κˆB
Nˆ
attains the
total debt capacity κˆB, then
κˆB = max
f
(1− pˆi){pˆ[1min(f,Nˆλµ)≤κˆB µˆ min(f, Nˆλµˆ) + 1min(f,Nˆλµˆ)>κˆB2 µˆ min(f, λµˆ)]
+ (1− pˆ)[1min(f,Nˆλµˆ)≤κˆG2 µˆ min(f, Nˆλµˆ) + 1min(f,Nˆλµ)>κˆG2 µˆ min(f, λµˆ)]}. (A.61)
≤ max
f
(1− pˆi){pˆ[1min(f,Nˆλµ)≤κˆB µˆ min(f, Nˆλµˆ) + 1min(f,Nˆλµˆ)>κˆB2 µˆ min(f, λµˆ)]
+ (1− pˆ) min(f, Nˆλµˆ)}. (A.62)
Let f? be the optimal f such that (A.61) attains κˆB. Suppose f? ≤ κˆBµˆ. Notice that
the expression in (A.62) is increasing in f ∈ [0, κˆBµˆ] and (1− pˆi)µˆ < 1 by lemma 5, so
κˆB ≤ (1− pˆi) min(κˆBµˆ, Nˆλµˆ) < κˆB.
Contradiction! On the other hand, if Nˆλ ≤ κˆB, then it is optimal to set f? arbitrarily
large in (A.62) and κˆB = (1 − pˆi)Nˆλµˆ < Nˆλ. Again a contradiction! Therefore, at
f = f?, it must be min(f?, Nˆλµˆ) > κˆBµˆ and (A.61) becomes:
κˆB = (1− pˆi){pˆmin(f?, λµˆ)
+ (1− pˆ)[1min(f?,Nˆλµˆ)≤κˆGµˆ min(f?, Nˆλµˆ) + 1min(f?,Nˆλµˆ)>κˆGµˆ min(f?, λµˆ)]}
≤ (1− pˆi){pˆmin(f?, λµˆ) + (1− p)κˆGµˆ}
≤ (1− pˆi){pˆλµˆ+ (1− pˆ)µˆM}, (A.63)
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where the last inequality uses the fact that κˆG ≤ M , which is independent of T . As
T → ∞, lemma 5 states pˆi → 0, µˆ → 1, and pˆ → 1, so the upper bound given by
(A.63) approaches λ. Finally, because κˆB ≥ κˆB1 → λ as T → ∞, so we conclude
limT→∞ κˆB = λ.
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A.2 Figures
Figure 1 The timeline and the evolution of the state variables.
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Figure 2 The figure plots the expected total firm value against the expected value of
the debt. The solid (dashed) line is the firm value with a single creditor when the
fundamental θ = G (θ = B). The dotted (dash-dotted) line is the firm value with two
creditors when the fundamental θ = G (θ = B). The thick solid black segments can be
supported only by two creditors. Although the firm values are comparatively much lower
along the thick lines, the firm cannot even reach that portion with just one creditor.
When the value of debt is very low the choice between one and two creditors is irrelevant.
As the fundamental worsens, the two groups of lines diverge and, when both are feasible,
the single creditor structure always delivers a higher firm value.
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Figure 3 The figure plots a typical sample path of the firm. Areas are shaded when the
state is bad. The solid (dashed) line denotes the exogenous fundamental process Yt−1
(the face value process Ft determined in equilibrium). I use bold segments when the firm
chooses two creditors. The values plotted at each period t are the state variables entering
period t: number of creditors Nt, the promised face value Ft, state θt, and fundamental
process Yt−1. Finally, the dotted bars plot the interest rates Ft
D
θt
Nt
(Ft,Yt−1)
during each
period.
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Figure 4 The figure plots the expected probability of liquidation Lθ,∞1 (F, Y ) against the
expected value of the debt conditional on the current state θ = G (top panel) and θ = B
(bottom panel). The solid (dashed) line is the liquidation probability with a single creditor
(two creditors) in the full model. The dotted line is for the counterfactual model in which
the number of creditors is exogenously fixed at one. It is easy to see that having a single
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creditor in the true model means a lower liquidation probability compared to having two
creditors as well as the counterfactual one creditor model. For a substantial range of
fundamental values, the liquidation probability with two creditors in the true model is
strictly lower compared with the single creditor counterfactual.
